Archive Electronique - Institut Jean Nicod
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1997 research outputs found
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Evidence for compositionality in baboons (Papio papio) through the test case of negation
No full textInternational audienceCan non-human animals combine abstract representations much like humans do with language? In particular, can they entertain a compositional representation such as 'not blue'? Across two experiments, we demonstrate that baboons (Papio papio) show a capacity for compositionality. Experiment 1 showed that baboons can entertain negative, compositional, representations: they can learn to associate a cue with iconically related referents (e.g., a blue patch referring to all blue objects), but also to the complement set associated with it (e.g., a blue patch referring to all non-blue objects). Strikingly, Experiment 2 showed that baboons not only learn to associate a cue with iconically related referents, but can learn to associate complex cues (composed of the same cue and an additional visual element) with the complement object set. Thus, they can learn an operation, instantiated by this additional visual element, that can be compositionally combined with previously learned cues. These results significantly reduce any claim that would make the manipulation and combination of abstract representations a solely human privilege
Moral disciplining: The cognitive and evolutionary foundations of puritanical morality
No full textInternational audienceWhy do many societies moralize apparently harmless pleasures, such as lust, gluttony, alcohol, drugs, and even music and dance? Why do they erect temperance, asceticism, sobriety, modesty, and piety as cardinal moral virtues? According to existing theories, this puritanical morality cannot be reduced to concerns for harm and fairness: it must emerge from cognitive systems that did not evolve for cooperation (e.g., disgust-based “Purity” concerns). Here, we argue that, despite appearances, puritanical morality is no exception to the cooperative function of moral cognition. It emerges in response to a key feature of cooperation, namely that cooperation is (ultimately) a long-term strategy, requiring (proximately) the self-control of appetites for immediate gratification. Puritanical moralizations condemn behaviors which, although inherently harmless, are perceived as indirectly facilitating uncooperative behaviors, by impairing the self-control required to refrain from cheating. Drinking, drugs, immodest clothing, and unruly music and dance, are condemned as stimulating short-term impulses, thus facilitating uncooperative behaviors (e.g., violence, adultery, free-riding). Overindulgence in harmless bodily pleasures (e.g., masturbation, gluttony) is perceived as making people slave to their urges, thus altering abilities to resist future antisocial temptations. Daily self-discipline, ascetic temperance, and pious ritual observance are perceived as cultivating the self-control required to honor prosocial obligations. We review psychological, historical, and ethnographic evidence supporting this account. We use this theory to explain the fall of puritanism in WEIRD societies, and discuss the cultural evolution of puritanical norms. Explaining puritanical norms does not require adding mechanisms unrelated to cooperation in our models of the moral mind
Collective emotion: an experimental framework
No full textA bustling literature spanning philosophy, psychology and social sciences aims for a better understanding of the collective patterns of emotions stirring human society. To date, however, this endeavour is still in need of a unifying conceptual framework and empirical evidence regarding the characteristics, antecedents and consequences of collective emotion remains sparse. To foster progress in the field, we examine existing accounts and identify three characteristics of collective emotion: emotion alignment, feeling of social connectedness and mutual awareness. We then propose a typology of collective emotion that accounts for the dynamic interplay of social and cognitive processes. Crucially, this typology allows for integrating different accounts and research traditions into an experimental framework that generates testable predictions regarding the mechanisms and consequences of collective emotion. Finally, we review available empirical evidence in social and cognitive sciences and we discuss future directions for an evidence-based approach to collective emotion
Early life adversity is associated with diminished social trust in adults
No full textInternational audienceSocial trust is at the center of democratic societies but it varies considerably between individuals and societies, which deeply affects a range of prosocial behaviours. Socioeconomic status has been identified as an important predictor of such variability. Although this association has mostly been reported for measures of socioeconomic status taken in adulthood, recent studies have found unique effects of harsh conditions experienced during childhood on social trust assessed decades later. Here, we report a series of three studies that provide further support for the long-lasting association between early childhood conditions and social trust. The first study revealed that higher childhood socioeconomic status was associated with greater social trust in a diverse sample of French participants (N=915), even after adjusting for current socioeconomic status. The second study replicated this result using data from the European Values Study, an independent large-scale survey of 46 European countries (N=66,281). Finally, the last study found a similar association between socioeconomic status and willingness to invest in a trust game (N=60 in original study, N=75 in replication study)
Plural causes in causal judgment
No full textInternational audienceCausal selection is the process whereby people decide which of several events responsible for a realized outcome should be considered as "the cause" of that outcome. A theory of causal selection requires a definition of the relevant candidates to be considered for selection. So far, the psychological literature has operated on the implicit premise that the only relevant candidates for causal selection are individual variables, corresponding to the distinct nodes of a causal network. Instead, we argue that causal judgment can recognize plural causes, featuring more than one variable. We provide evidence for the psychological relevance of plural causes by showing: (a) that plural cause judgments are influenced by the same factors that have been proven to influence causal selection judgments in general; (b) that this influence cannot be explained away by assuming that participants estimate the strength of plural cause simply by combining the strength of its individual constituents
La pensée d’un roman. Imaginaire et politique dans 1984
No full textInternational audienceAfter having been despised for a long time as a propagandist, Orwell is now considered in France as a creative writer; but he is not yet recognized as the genuine political thinker he deserves to be. This paper defends the idea that 1984 develops, by the means of a novel, a very personal, acute and illuminating political thought about past, present and future totalitarian governments. Three arguments are advanced. [1] Totalitarian governments are not primarily for Orwell the effects of economic, social or ideological processes. They are the products of human wills and imaginations. So, a novel is particularly adapted to offer an understanding of the dreams and motives of their founders and leaders. [2] Totalitarian worlds are strange conjunctions of reality and nightmare. To describe his own, Orwell uses a peculiar form of fantastic realism: everything is unreal, but it is impossible, even for the most powerful tyrants, to substitute entirely their fictions for the reality. While throwing its characters and the reader in a world where reality and fiction are undistinguishable, the novel itself is written from a resolutely realist point of view. [3] 1984 contains no theoretical model. It is rather a satirical thought experiment. If we admit the existence of an historical dynamics of totalitarian governments since the epoch of Lenin and Hitler to our time, each improving the methods of its predecessors and inventing new ones according to the circumstances, the flexibility and openness of such a novel, which avoids any kind of essentialism, offers a particularly appropriated tool to face our political present and future.Après avoir été longtemps méprisé en France comme un propagandiste, Orwell y est aujourd’hui reconnu comme un écrivain et un créateur. Mais on refuse toujours de voir en lui un penseur authentique. Le présent article défend l’idée que 1984 développe, avec les moyens d’un roman, une pensée politique originale, incisive et éclairante sur les régimes totalitaires passés, présents et futurs. Trois arguments sont ici avancés. [1] Les régimes totalitaires ne sont pas en premier lieu, pour Orwell, la conséquence de processus économiques sociaux et idéologiques : ils sont les produits de volontés et d’imaginations humaines. Ainsi, le roman semble particulièrement adapté pour offrir une compréhension des rêves et des ressorts intellectuels, psychologiques et moraux de leurs fondateurs et dirigeants. [2] Les mondes totalitaires conjuguent d’une manière singulière le cauchemar et la réalité. Pour décrire le sien, Orwell a recours à une forme particulière de réalisme fantastique : tout dans ce monde est irréel, mais il est impossible, même pour le plus puissant des tyrans, de substituer entièrement ses fictions à la réalité. Alors même que ce roman plonge ses personnages et ses lecteurs dans un monde où il est devenu impossible de distinguer la fiction de la réalité, il est lui-même est écrit d’un point de vue résolument réaliste. [3] 1984 ne contient aucun modèle théorique. C’est une expérience de pensée satirique. Si l’on admet qu’il existe depuis l’époque de Lénine et Hitler jusqu’à nos jours, une dynamique historique des régimes totalitaires, chacun perfectionnant les méthodes de ses prédécesseurs et en inventant de nouvelles, la souplesse et l’ouverture d’un pareil roman, qui évite toute espèce d’essentialisme, offre un outil particulièrement approprié pour affronter notre présent et notre futur politiques
Samethinking
No full textThis thesis investigates the nature of the relation between mental representations in successful verbal communication, thought attribution, agreement, and disagreement — a relation which I call “samethinking”. The nature of samethinking raises several foundational questions about the nature of (non-natural) meaning, and the cognitive underpinnings of the emergence of culture. It bears on long-lasting puzzles in the philosophy of mind and language (such as Frege's puzzle and Kripke's puzzle about belief). Samethinking does not amount to sharing a reference (with “sharing" I refer to two or more thinkers having something in common): it is more demanding. How can we explain and characterize this relation, more stringent than coreference, that is instantiated by a pair of thoughts when samethinking takes place? It is often assumed that this relation involves sharing a thought content more fine-grained than reference. In this thesis, I argue that the issue is more complex than what has been commonly assumed, and I suggest an alternative model in which sharing thought content is not necessary.Cette thèse étudie la nature de la relation entre les représentations mentales dans la communication verbale réussie, l'attribution des pensées, l'accord et le désaccord — relation que j’appelle "samethinking". La nature du samethinking soulève plusieurs questions fondamentales sur la nature de la signification (non naturelle) et les fondements cognitifs de l'émergence de la culture. Elle concerne également des énigmes de longue date en philosophie de l'esprit et du langage (telles que le problème de Frege et le problème de Kripke sur la croyance). Le samethinking ne se résume pas au partage de la référence (par "partage" je fais référence au fait pour deux ou plusieurs penseurs d'avoir quelque chose en commun) : il est plus exigeant. Comment pouvonsnous expliquer et caractériser cette relation, plus exigeante que la coréférence, qui est instanciée par une paire de pensées lorsque le samethinking a lieu ? On suppose souvent que cette relation implique le partage d'un contenu plus fin que la référence. Dans cette thèse, je soutiens que la question est plus complexe que ce qui a été communément supposé, et je propose un modèle alternatif dans lequel le partage du contenu plus fin que la référence n'est pas nécessaire
Construire et comparer des valeurs subjectives
No full textSubjective value is an ubiquitous theoretical construct in the study of decision making. In this literature, individuals' decisions are often conceived in a two-step process. They first assign values to the available options, and then choose the option with the highest value. Thus, two ways of constructing subjective values are often considered: by description and by experience. Learning by description corresponds to obtaining information about the value of available options, via visual and semantic representations. For example, when selecting a restaurant on the Internet, we can refer to the ratings and comments provided by other users. Conversely, learning by experience corresponds to building subjective values by trial and error. This would correspond to trying different restaurants, and thus building an appreciation of them. In this thesis, we seek to evaluate whether the values constructed via these two methods are commensurable. More precisely, we seek to establish whether individuals are able to compare values learned by experience and description, and if so, by which decision processes.La valeur subjective est une construction théorique omniprésente dans l'étude de la prise de décision. Dans cette littérature, les décisions des individus sont souvent conçues selon un processus en deux étapes. Ils attribuent d'abord des valeurs aux options disponibles, puis choisissent l'option ayant la valeur la plus élevée. Aussi, deux manières de construire des valeurs subjectives sont souvent envisagées : par description et par expérience. Apprendre par description correspond à obtenir des informations sur la valeur des options disponibles, via des représentations visuelles et sémantiques. Par exemple, lorsque que l’on sélectionne un restaurant sur internet, on peut se référer aux notes et commentaires fournis par les autres utilisateurs. A l’inverse, apprendre par expérience correspond à construire des valeurs subjectives par essais-erreurs. Cela correspondrait donc à essayer différents restaurants, et ainsi se construire une appréciation de ces derniers. Dans cette thèse, nous cherchons à évaluer si les valeurs construites via ces deux méthodes sont commensurables. Plus précisément, nous cherchons à établir si les individus sont capables de comparer les valeurs acquises par expérience et description, et si oui, par quels processus de décision
Why is greater income inequality associated with lower life satisfaction and poorer health? Evidence from the European Quality of Life Survey, 2012
No full textInternational audienceGreater income inequality is associated with lower average wellbeing. There are multiple possible explanations for this pattern. We use data from the European Quality of Life Survey 2012 (27,571 respondents from 28 countries) to evaluate the contributions of different causal pathways to associations between national income inequality and wellbeing. In unadjusted analyses, greater income inequality was associated with lower life satisfaction and poorer self-rated health. For life satisfaction, 43% of the association was attributable to individual income effects, and 41% to worse public services (especially access to healthcare). The association between income inequality and self-rated health was mainly (68%) due to individual income effects. For life satisfaction but not self-rated health, we found some evidence of costs of inequality that fall on those with high incomes. We conclude that the negative associations between income inequality and wellbeing across European countries are substantially, but not entirely, due to individual income effects