Archive Electronique - Institut Jean Nicod
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Supplements without Bidimensionalism
International audiencePotts (2005, 2007) has claimed that the behavior of 'supplements'-appositive relative clauses and nominals-offers a powerful argument in favor of a multidimensional semantics, one in which certain expressions fail to interact scopally with various operators because their meaning is located in a new semantic dimension. We explore an alternative to Potts's bidimensional account in which (i) appositives may be syntactically attached with matrix scope, despite their appearance in embedded positions; (ii) they may also be syntactically attached within the scope of other operators (whether attitudinal or not), in which case they semantically interact with them; (iii) they are semantically conjoined with the rest of the sentence, but (iv) they are subject to a pragmatic rule that requires that their content be relatively easy to accommodate ('Translucency')-hence some non-trivial projection facts for appositives that do not have matrix scope. In effect, our analysis accounts for most of the complexity of these data by positing a more articulated syntax and pragmatics, while keeping the semantics 'lean' and unidimensional
Au-Delà des Preuves Formelles : Philosophie de la Pratique Mathématique
International audienc
Faire des expériences avec des triangles
International audienceIs there anything like an experiment in mathematics? And if this is the case, what would distinguish a mathematical experiment from a mathematical thought experi- ment? In the present paper, a framework for the practice of mathematics will be put forward, which will consider mathematics as an experimenting activity and as a proving activity. The relationship between these two activities will be explored and more importantly a distinction between thought-experiments, real experiments, quasi experiments and proofs in pure mathematics will be provided. To do so, three examples of experimenting with triangles will be introduced and discussed
Susceptibility of agency judgments to social influence
International audienceThe experience of agency refers to the phenomenal experience of being the causal source of one's own actions, and through them, the course of events in the outside world. This experience is crucial for the production of adaptive actions, and for the adequate communication of felt action control to peers. The present study examines the possibility that, on certain occasions and under specific internal and external constraints, people rely on explicit social information provided by their peers to revise their self-reports of perceived control, i.e., their judgment of agency. To test this hypothesis, we adapted a task based on an interactive computer game. We manipulated well-known sensorimotor agency cues related to action control, as well as social information communicated to participants by two advisors. We measured the contribution of social and non-social sources of information to agency judgments. We found that at the single-trial level, participants align their JoA with advisor feedback based on their own performance during the task, the type of feedback provided by advisors, and the interaction of this social feedback with the sensorimotor agency cues. At the same time, JoA alignment in previous trial also predicted participants' tendency to revise their JoA after social feedback. Overall, these results demonstrate that agency judgment is subject to social influence. This influence is the result of the integration of social and non-social information at the scale of a single judgment, while also being driven by repeated past interactions with peers
The creative side of recreative imagination
International audienceThe philosophical literature suggests two basic kinds of imagination, namely creative and recreative imagination. While the former is taken to underlie creativity, the latter is at work when we project ourselves into another situation. Fiction is an interesting context where both kinds would be involved: producing fictional works would require creative imagination, whereas engaging with them would paradigmatically call for recreative imagination. This contribution aims at clarifying how creative and recreative imagination are related, thus shedding light on the cognitive underpinnings of fiction. It has been claimed that creative imagination is more fundamental, even from a phylogenetic point of view, than recreative imagination. It will be objected that this claim relies on a questionable definition of recreative imagination, which makes it too closely tied to perspective-taking. The critique will question the existence of creative imagination itself: it is an unnecessary posit to account for creativity. Creativity instead includes recreative imagination as one of its necessary ingredients
Are Sudden Crises Making me Collapse? Measuring Transfer Learning Performances on Urgency Detection
Track 9: Social Media for Crisis ManagementInternational audienc
Section 35 du Comité national - Éléments de méthode de la mandature 2016-2021
This report gives elements of methods defined by the Section 35 of Comité national de la recherche scientifique during the period 2016-2021. It states three constitutive rules whose efficiency has been established, with foremost the functioning as a plenary assembly during all phases of the committee work. This guarantees in particular the transparency of debates and the equality in the treatment of candidates. The report also gives elements regarding the ranking of candidates during the different phases of the "concours chercheurs" (selection, interviews), on voting procedures, and on the prevention of selection biases.Ce rapport consigne quelques éléments de méthode issus du travail collectif effectué par la Section 35 du Comité national de la recherche scientifique lors de la mandature 2016-2021. Il indique trois règles constitutionnelles ayant démontré leur efficacité, au premier rang desquelles le fonctionnement en assemblée plénière d'un bout à l'autre, qui garantit la transparence des débats et l'égalité de traitement des candidats aux concours chercheurs. Il donne des éléments sur la méthode de classement des candidats lors des différentes phases de concours (JAD, auditions), sur les procédures de vote, ainsi que sur la prévention des biais de sélection
La pensée singulière sur les groupes et les genres : des dossiers mentaux pluriels et génériques
We develop an account of mental representations of groups and of kinds as instances of singular thought. We maintain, in harmony with the mental file theory of singular thought, that their singularity consists in their functional structure being that of “mental files”, which includes “entries” corresponding to the properties the thinker attributes to the entity, the file itself which represents the entity independently of its properties and file management instructions which govern its use. Plural files mentally represent a group “as such”, integrated by an “intentional aspect” and generic files mentally represent kind, by clustering information about a cognitively constructed “paradigm instance”. This effort finds its place in the context of a wider philosophical project of extending the notion of singular thought as having a wider range of objects and that of extending mental files as a model for a wider range of mental representations.La thèse que voici soutient que les groupes et les genres ne sont pas représentés à l’esprit comme étant des descriptions du monde, mais comme étant des objets dans le monde. Ceci est dû au fait que les représentations mentales des groupes et des genres ont la même structure fonctionnelle comme les celles portantes sur les objets individuels, à savoir, la structure d’un « dossier mental », ce qui fait qu’elles soient, ou qu’elles peuvent être, des pensées singulières. Donc, les représentations mentales des entités comme un essaim d’abeilles ou Les Trois Mousquetaires, et les représentations mentales des genres, à savoir, des entités comme « les chats », « les voitures », « les maladies », etc. prennent la forme d’un dossier mental. Autrement dit, elles contiennent des « entrées de dossier » qui représentent les propriétés que l’on attribue à l’entité, le dossier lui-même qui représente l’entité indépendamment des propriétés qu’on lui attribue et les règles de gestion de dossiers qui déterminent quand le dossier sera déployé ou activé, quand il sera refermé, quand il sera divisé et quand il sera lié, voire fusionné avec d’autres dossiers. Pourtant, alors que les dossiers mentaux « classiques » regroupent de l’information sur des objets individuels réels, les dossiers mentaux pluriels regroupent de l’information sur des « groupes en tant que tels » dans le cas des dossiers pluriels et dans le cas des dossiers génériques, sur les « instances paradigmatiques » qui possèdent les propriétés typiques ou normales ou génériques des instances du genre