Archive Electronique - Institut Jean Nicod
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Modèles de coopération à base de réputation: de la réciprocité au signal social
No full textHuman cooperation is often understood through the lens of reciprocity. In classic models,cooperation is sustained because it is reciprocal: individuals who bear costs to help otherscan then expect to be helped in return. Another framework is honest signaling. Accordingto this approach, cooperation can be sustained when helpers reveal information aboutthemselves, which in turn affects receivers’ behavior. Here, we aim to bridge the gap betweenthese two approaches, in order to better characterize human cooperation. We showhow integrating both approaches can help explain the variability of human cooperation,its extent, and its limits. In chapter 1, we introduce the main method used during this thesis:evolutionary game theory. In chapter 2, we show that cooperation with strangers canbe understood as a signal of time preferences. In equilibrium, patient individuals cooperatemore often, and individuals who reveal higher preference for the future inspire moretrust. We show how our model can help explain the variability of cooperation and trust. Inchapter 3, we turn to the psychology of revenge. Revenge is often understood in terms ofenforcing cooperation, or equivalently, deterring transgressions: vengeful individuals paycosts, which may be offset by the benefit of a vengeful reputation. Yet, revenge does notalways seem designed for optimal deterrence. Our model reconciles the deterrent functionof revenge with its apparent quirks, such as our propensity to overreact to minuscule transgressions,and to forgive dangerous behavior based on a lucky positive outcome. In chapter4, we study dysfunctional forms of cooperation and signaling. We posit that outrage cansometimes act as a second-order signal, demonstrating investment in another, first-ordersignal. We then show how outrage can lead to dishonest displays of commitment, andescalating costs. In chapter 5, we extend the model in chapter 2 to include institutions.Institutions are often invoked as solutions to hard cooperation problems: they stabilize cooperationin contexts where reputation is insufficient. Yet, institutions are at the mercy ofthe very problem they are designed to solve. People must devote time and resources to createnew rules and compensate institutional operatives. We show that institutions for hardcooperation problems can emerge nonetheless, as long as they rest on an easy cooperationproblem. Our model shows how designing efficient institutions can allow humans to extendthe scale of cooperation. Finally, in chapter 6, we discuss the merits of mathematicalmodeling in the social sciences.La coopération humaine est souvent appréhendée sous l’angle de la réciprocité. Dans lesmodèles classiques, la coopération est maintenue parce que réciproque : les individus quiassument un coût pour aider les autres peuvent s’attendre à être aidés en retour. Un autreangle est offert par la théorie du signal honnête. Selon cette approche, la coopération peutêtre maintenue lorsque le fait d’aider informe sur des qualités sous-jacentes, ce qui affectele comportement des destinataires du signal. Nous visons ici à combler le fossé entre cesdeux approches, afin de mieux caractériser la coopération humaine. Nous montrons commentl’intégration des deux approches peut aider à expliquer la variabilité de la coopérationhumaine, son étendue et ses limites. Dans le chapitre 1, nous introduisons la méthode principalesur laquelle cette thèse est basée : la théorie des jeux évolutionnaire. Dans le chapitre2, nous montrons que la coopération avec des inconnus peut être comprise comme un signalde préférences temporelles. À l’équilibre, les individus patients coopèrent plus souvent,et les individus qui révèlent une plus grande préférence pour l’avenir inspirent davantageconfiance. Notre modèle peut expliquer la variabilité de la coopération et de la confiance.Le chapitre 3 est consacré à la psychologie de la vengeance. La vengeance est souvent comprisecomme un moyen d’imposer la coopération ou, de manière équivalente, de dissuaderles transgressions : les individus vengeurs assument des coûts, qui peuvent être compenséspar l’avantage d’une réputation vengeresse. Pourtant, la vengeance ne semble pas toujoursconçue pour une dissuasion optimale. Notre modèle réconcilie la fonction dissuasive de lavengeance avec ses bizarreries apparentes, comme notre propension à réagir de manièreexcessive à des transgressions minuscules, ainsi que la tendance à pardonner un comportementdangereux lorsqu’il aboutit de manière fortuite à un résultat positif. Dans le chapitre4, nous nous penchons sur les formes dysfonctionnelles de coopération et de signal. Nouspostulons que l’indignation peut parfois servir de signal de second ordre, en démontrantl’investissement de l’individu dans un autre signal du premier ordre. Nous montrons ensuitecomment l’indignation peut conduire à des signaux malhonnêtes et à une escaladedes coûts. Dans le chapitre 5, nous étendons le modèle du chapitre 1 aux institutions. Lesinstitutions sont souvent invoquées comme des solutions à des problèmes de coopérationdifficiles : elles stabilisent la coopération dans des contextes où la réputation est insuffisante.Cependant, les institutions sont à la merci du problème même qu’elles sont censéesrésoudre. Les individus doivent consacrer du temps et des ressources à l’élaboration denouvelles règles et à la rémunération des acteurs institutionnels. Nous montrons que desinstitutions pour des problèmes de coopération difficiles peuvent néanmoins émerger, àcondition qu’elles reposent sur un problème de coopération facile. Notre modèle montrecomment la conception d’institutions efficaces permet aux humains d’étendre l’échelle dela coopération. Enfin, dans le chapitre 6, nous discutons des mérites de la modélisationmathématique en sciences sociales
The reputational benefits of intellectual humility
No full textInternational audienceMuch work on intellectual humility has focused on its epistemic benefits. We suggest that expressing (or failing to express) intellectual humility also has effects on how others perceive us and can thus serve reputation management purposes, in at least four ways: (i) Intellectual humility can signal we are a good source of information; (ii) Intellectual humility can signal we are competent through countersignaling; (iii) Intellectual humility can make it less likely for others to believe we are overclaiming superiority; (iv) lack of intellectual humility (or intellectual arrogance) can signal dominance. Some evidence suggests that intellectual humility (or lack thereof) can have each of these effects. Seeing intellectual humility as (inter alia) a reputation management tool predicts that expressions of intellectual humility will vary across contexts. In conclusion, we speculate that understanding intellectual humility in view of reputation management could help construct environments more conducive to expressions of intellectual humility
Turning expletive: from embedded speech-acts to embedded propositions
No full textThis paper focuses on a non-canonical use of negation in historical and modern French, characterized by an apparent absence of meaning, expletive negation. In search of the lost meaning of expletive negation, via a diachronic investigation from Latin to French, we establish that expletive negation originates from prohibitive negation. We put forward an analysis of prohibitive negation within Krifka (2014)'s model of embedded speech-act and propose that expletive negation is the continuation of prohibitive negation and it is what remains of a long gone embedded negative imperative in French. Along this line of analysis, the paper brings historical evidence in favor of the hypothesis that languages can develop from speech-act embedding to proposition embedding. Our analysis of prohibitive negation as a clause-typing negation marker in Latin and as a verbal mood negation marker brings new evidence to the claim that sentential and verbal mood marking are two intimately related phenomena
Un traitement hybride du vague textuel : du système expert VAGO à son clone neuronal
No full textInternational audienceThe VAGO tool is an expert system for lexical vagueness detection that also measures the degree of subjectivity of the speech, as well as its level of detail. In this paper, we build a neural clone of VAGO, based on a BERT-like architecture, trained on symbolic VAGO scores on a French press corpus (FreSaDa). The qualitative and quantitative analysis shows the fidelity of the neural version. By exploiting explainability tools (LIME), we then show the interest of this neural version for the enrichment of the lexicons of the symbolic version, and for the production of versions in other languages.L'outil VAGO est un système expert de détection du vague lexical qui mesure aussi le degré de subjectivité du discours, ainsi que son niveau de détail. Dans cet article, nous construisons un clone neuronal de VAGO, fondé sur une architecture de type BERT, entraîné à partir des scores du VAGO symbolique sur un corpus de presse française (FreSaDa). L'analyse qualitative et quantitative montre la fidélité de la version neuronale. En exploitant des outils d'explicabilité (LIME), nous montrons ensuite l'intérêt de cette version neuronale d'une part pour l'enrichissement des lexiques de la version symbolique, et d'autre part pour la production de versions dans d'autres langues
Is a Non-evolutionary Psychology Possible?
No full textInternational audienceThe last thirty years has seen the emergence of a self-styled 'evolutionary' paradigm within psychology (henceforth, EP). EP is often presented and critiqued as a distinctive, contentious paradigm, to be contrasted with other accounts of human psychology. However, little attention has been paid to the sense in which those other accounts are not also evolutionary. We outline the core commitments of canonical EP. These are, from least distinctive to most: mechanism, interactionism, functionalism, adaptationism, and functional specialization. We argue that the minimal requirement for an approach to psychology to qualify as evolutionary in an important sense is functionalism. This is because the notion of functional design in organismal structures presupposes a history of evolution by natural selection. On this criterion, we argue, most, perhaps all of psychology qualifies as evolutionary, either implicitly or explicitly. We review several approaches that are typically contrasted with EP, showing that these are all evolutionary too by our criteria. We suggest that the EP/non-EP dichotomy be retired. However, though all psychology is evolutionary, psychologists do not always need to foreground evolution in their research, just as is true for biologists. At the same time, more space for evolution does not mean any less space for environment, context, culture, meaning or agency
Intrinsic motivation for choice varies with individual risk attitudes and the controllability of the environment
No full textInternational audienceWhen deciding between options that do or do not lead to future choices, humans often choose to choose. We studied choice seeking by asking subjects to first decide between a choice opportunity or performing a computer-selected action, after which they either chose freely or performed the forced action. Subjects preferred choice when these options were equally rewarded, even deterministically, and traded extrinsic rewards for opportunities to choose. We explained individual variability in choice seeking using reinforcement learning models incorporating risk sensitivity and overvaluation of rewards obtained through choice. Model fits revealed that 28% of subjects were sensitive to the worst possible outcome associated with free choice, and this pessimism reduced their choice preference with increasing risk. Moreover, outcome overvaluation was necessary to explain patterns of individual choice preference across levels of risk. We also manipulated the degree to which subjects controlled stimulus outcomes. We found that degrading coherence between their actions and stimulus outcomes diminished choice preference following forced actions, although willingness to repeat selection of choice opportunities remained high. When subjects chose freely during these repeats, they were sensitive to rewards when actions were controllable but ignored outcomes-even positive ones-associated with reduced controllability. Our results show that preference for choice can be modulated by extrinsic reward properties including reward probability and risk as well as by controllability of the environment
Conceptual promises and mechanistic challenges of the Creative Metacognition framework : Comment on "A systematic framework of creative metacognition" by I. Lebuda and M. Benedek
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The Italian futuro as a non-biased epistemic necessity: A reply to Ippolito and Farkas
No full textInternational audienceIn a recent paper, Ippolito and Farkas (Linguist Philos, 45(4):943–984, 2022b) (I &F) question the premise that Italian future is epistemic necessity; in this brief response we want to show that there is no empirical motivation for abandoning it once we employ a more flexible framework of modality such as the one advanced in Giannakidou and Mari (Linguist Philos 41(6): 623–664, 2018) (G &M) which posits a ranking meta-evaluation in the modal structure that explains the empirical objections raised by I &F. We show that the core of the account in I &F shares the main ingredients with G &M and that, unlike what I &F propose, Italian future is not pure credence