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Peace Talk and Conflict Traps
No full textCostly pre-play messages can deter unnecessary wars—but the same messages can also entrench stalemates once violence begins. We develop an overlapping-generations model of a security dilemma with persistent group types (normal vs. bad), one-sided private signaling by the current old to the current young, and noisy private memory of the last encounter. We characterize a stationary equilibrium in which, for an intermediate band of signal costs, normal old agents mix on sending a costly reassurance only after an alarming private history; the signal is kept marginally persuasive by endogenous receiver cutoffs and strategic mimicking by bad types. Signaling strictly reduces the hazard of conflict onset; conditional on onset, duration is unchanged in the private model but increases once a small probability of publicity (leaks) creates a public record of failed reconciliation. With publicity, play generically absorbs in a peace trap or a conflict trap. We discuss welfare and policy: when to prefer back-channels versus public pledges
Reputational Conservatism in Expert Advice
No full textWe develop a tractable career–concerns model of expert recommendations with a continuous private signal. In equilibrium, advice obeys a cutoff rule: the expert recommends the risky option if and only if the signal exceeds a threshold. Under a mild relative–diagnosticity condition, the threshold is (weakly) increasing in reputation, yielding reputational conservatism. Signal informativeness and success priors lower the cutoff, while stronger career concerns raise it. A success–contingent bonus implements any target experimentation rate via a one–to–one mapping, providing an implementable design lever
Digital Ecosystems and Data Regulation
No full textThis paper develops a framework in which a multiproduct ecosystem competes with multiple single-product firms in both price and innovation. The ecosystem can use data from one product to improve the quality of its other products. We use the framework to study three regulatory policies aimed at leveling the playing field. Restricting the ecosystem’s cross-product data usage, or forcing it to share data with single-product firms, benefits those firms and induces them to innovate more. However, these policies also dampen the ecosystem’s incentive to collect data and innovate, potentially raising prices. Consumers are better off only when single-product firms are sufficiently good at innovating. Facilitating data exchange between single-product firms via a data cooperative can backfire and harm them, because it induces the ecosystem to price more aggressively. For both the data-sharing and data-cooperative policies, there exist data-compensation schemes such that consumers are better off compared to no regulation
La prééminence des statuts dans la révocation du directeur général d’une SAS (note s/s Cass. com., 9 juill. 2025,(n° 24-10.428, FS–B)
No full textSujet intarissable, la révocation des dirigeants sociaux ne manque pas d’animer périodiquement les prétoires . A cet égard, l’arrêt de la Cour de cassation le 9 juillet 2025,(n° 24-10.428, FS–B) constitue une nouvelle étape dans l’élaboration progressive de la jurisprudence relative à la révocation des dirigeants sociaux, plus précisément celle d’un directeur général de SAS. C’est sous un aspect particulier que cette décision de justice est rendue, car elle répond à la question suivante : qu’advient-t-il quand un tel acte se trouve en contradiction avec les statuts ? Doit-on donner la primauté à la rigueur des statuts, considérés comme la « loi de la société », ou à la force contractuelle d’un acte plus moderne et contextualisé signé par tous les associés
Minimum wages in a dual labor market: Evidence from the 2019 minimum-wage hike in Spain
No full textThis paper provides an assessment of the 2019 minimum-wage hike in Spain, which increased the minimum wage by 22 % and directly concerned 7 % of dependent employees. We make use of two complementary approaches, one that follows incumbent workers over time and hence does not take account of any possible effects on new hires, and one that tracks employment in wage bins over time and takes account of both separations and new hires. The results are as follows. First, the minimum wage hike significantly increased the wages of directly affected workers, with small positive wage spillovers on workers with initial wages just about the new minimum wage. Second, the increase in wages comes at the expense of a reduction in low-wage employment. While employment increases just above the minimum wage, it is not sufficient to offset the decline in employment below it. Third, the reduction in employment is mainly driven by a reduction in hires of workers on open-ended contracts and to a smaller extent job losses among workers on fixed-term contracts. This illustrates that limiting the study of minimum wage hikes to stayers can dampen the estimated impact on employment
Learning markov processes with latent variables
Full text linkWe present a constructive proof of (nonparametric) identication of the parameters of a bivariate Markov chain when only one of the two random variables is observable. This setup generalizes the hidden Markov model in various useful directions, allowing for state dependence in the observables and allowing the transition kernel of the hidden Markov chain to depend on past observables. We give conditions under which the transition kernel and the distribution of the initial condition are both identied (up to a permutation of the latent states) from the joint distribution of four (or more) time-series observations
How do upstream competition and supply shocks affect investment decisions ?
No full textWe study the effect of upstream competition and supply shocks on a buyer’s investment decisions, under demand uncertainty. Imperfect upstream competition leads to double marginalization. This effect is mitigated if the supplier pool is larger (when production costs are linear or in case of diseconomies of scale): The resulting lower equilibrium input price ultimately benefits the buyer and makes it more likely to invest sooner. A supply shock—that shrinks the supplier base—may increase the market power of the remaining suppliers and exacerbate double marginalization. Such a shock may arise either exogenously (due to a sudden external event) or endogenously (when profitability upstream is reduced). An exogenous shock, which leads to higher input prices and lower order quantities, reduces the profitability of the buyer, which is then less inclined to invest if more suppliers are affected by it. When the shock arises endogenously, the buyer may be better off and invest sooner if it subsidizes its supplier base as a way to maintain more competition upstream
The software complexity of nations
No full textDespite the growing importance of the digital sector, research on economic complexity and its implications continues to rely mostly on administrative records—e.g. data on exports, patents, and employment—that have blind spots when it comes to the digital economy. In this paper we use data on the geography of programming languages used in open-source software to extend economic complexity ideas to the digital economy. We estimate a country's software economic complexity index (ECIsoftware) and show that it complements the ability of measures of complexity based on trade, patents, and research to account for international differences in GDP per capita, income inequality, and emissions. We also show that open-source software follows the principle of relatedness, meaning that a country's entries and exits in programming languages are partly explained by its current pattern of specialization. Together, these findings help extend economic complexity ideas and their policy implications to the digital economy
