1,720,995 research outputs found
Rational Decision-Making in a Complex World: Towards an Instrumental, yet Embodied, Account
Full text linkPrima facie, we make successful decisions as we act on and intervene in the world day-to-day. Epistemologists are often concerned with whether rationality is involved in such decision-making practices, and, if so, to what degree. Some, particularly in the post-structuralist tradition, argue that successful decision-making occurs via an existential leap into the unknown rather than via any determinant or criterion such as rationality. I call this view radical voluntarism (RV). Proponents of RV include those who subscribe to a view they call Critical Complexity (CC). In this paper, I argue that CC presents a false dichotomy when it conceives of rationality in Cartesian – i.e. ideal and transcendental – terms, and then concludes that RV is the proper alternative. I then outline a pragmatist rationality informed by recent work in psychology on bounded rationality, ecological rationality, and specifically embodied rationality. Such a pragmatist rationality seems to be compatible with the tenets of post-structuralism, and can therefore replace RV in CC
Perspectives and meta-perspectives: context versus hierarchy in the epistemology of complex systems
No full textFor some post-structuralist complexity theorists, there are no epistemic meta-perspectives from where to judge between different epistemic perspectives toward complex systems. In this paper, I argue that these theorists face a dilemma because they argue against meta-perspectives from just such a meta-perspective. In fact, when we understand two or more different perspectives, we seem to unavoidably adopt a meta-perspective to analyse, compare, and judge between those perspectives. I further argue that meta-perspectives can be evaluated and judged from meta-meta-perspectives, and so on. This suggests an epistemic hierarchy. Perspectives, meta-perspectives, meta-meta-perspectives, etc. can be ranked according to the degree to which they confer understanding. I also explore what scope my thesis might have outside the philosophy of complexity by applying it to the sociology of science
15 Years On: Sam Harris’s Moral Landscape, a Retrospective Critique
Full text linkIn his best-selling book The Moral Landscape, Sam Harris develops a model for a universal ethics. His version of consequentialism has had some impact on the public, specifically on so-called new atheists. On the book’s 15th anniversary, I look back at and retrospectively critique Harris’s “science of morality” to see if it has stood the test of time. I first summarise the view, then identify various problems with it. Thereafter, I turn to arguably the most famous utilitarian, Peter Singer, for potential solutions to these problems. Since the publication of Harris’s book, Singer and Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek have written The Point of View of the Universe. This book looks to Henry Sidgwick’s The Methods of Ethics for answers to many of utilitarianism’s perennial challenges, some of which Harris does not ostensibly overcome. My aim is to investigate whether Singer and de Lazari-Radek’s utilitarianism (as informed by Sidgwick) can succeed where Harris’s version seemingly does not
Ontic Structural Realism and the Case of the Missing Kantian Residue
No full textAs the name suggests, Ontic Structural Realism (OSR) entails the claim that structure is all there is. However, several critics have argued that OSR’s ontology is incomplete. There must be something ontologically significant beyond structure. I will suggest an ontology for these critics, one that invokes what Ladyman and Ross call “Kantian residue”. In doing so, I modify Rae Langton’s Kantian humility thesis to incorporate some extra-structural noumenal “something=x” (as Kant puts it). This involves positing (a) that a mysterious something=x exists and (b) that something=x is responsible for structure (specifically structure’s non-arbitrary properties). Responsibility is a modal relation that is potentially equivalent to some asymmetric relation (causation, explanation, determination, grounding, or the like). Regarding the nature of something=x, I argue in deflationary spirit that we can only know that it is that which is responsible for structure
How pluralistic is pluralism really? A case study of Sandra Mitchell’s Integrative Pluralism
No full textEpistemic pluralists in the philosophy of science often argue that different epistemic perspectives in science are equally warranted. Sandra Mitchell – with her Integrative Pluralism (IP) – has notably advocated for this kind of epistemic pluralism. A problem arises for Mitchell however because she also wants to be an epistemological pluralist. She claims that, not only are different epistemic perspectives in science equally warranted in different contexts, but different understandings of these epistemic perspectives in science are also equally warranted in different contexts. The problem is that Mitchell argues that her understanding of epistemic perspectives in science (IP) is the correct one, and it is dilemmic to then claim that there is more than one such understanding. As solution, I suggest that we abandon epistemological pluralism and instead follow Feyerabend in being opportunistic pluralists. We can adopt pluralism as a short-term strategy in the pursuit of a long-term unitary goal. This unitary goal is what philosophers of understanding call objectual understanding, the kind of understanding that Integrative Pluralism tacitly aspires to anyway.Los pluralistas epistémicos a menudo argumentan que diferentes perspectivas epistémicas en ciencia tienen el mismo nivel de justificación en diferentes contextos. Sandra Mitchell, con su Pluralismo Integrativo (PI), ha abogado por este tipo de pluralismo epistémico. Mitchell tiene un problema porque ella también quiere ser una pluralista epistemológica.Ella afirma que, no solo diferentes perspectivas epistémicas en ciencia estan igualmente justificadas, sino que también diferentes maneras de entender estas perspectivas epistémicas en ciencia estan igualmente justifcadas. El problema es que Mitchell presenta su interpretación de las perspectivas epistémicas en ciencia (PI) como si fuera la comprensión correcta. Es, entonces, contradictorio afirmar que hay más de una comprensión de este tipo. Como solución, sugiero que sigamos a Feyerabend en ser pluralistas oportunistas. Podemos adoptar el pluralismo como una estrategia a corto plazo en la búsqueda de objetivos unitarios a largo plazo. Uno de esos objetivos es lo que los filósofos de la comprensión denominan comprensión objetual, que en cualquier caso parece ser el tipo de comprensión a la que aspiran tácitamente visiones pluralistas como el PI
Modern Philosophers
No full textPart of the collection, My Philosophy Library.
Chapter 1 (The Introduction) is attached as a sample
Complexity, Akrasia, Cognitive Dissonance, and Buridan's Ass
Full text linkAn important philosophical question relates to whether or not our decision-making practices are constrained or free (or, at least, mostly constrained or free). The notion of rationality (reason or logical thinking) is exemplary of the former, while a kind of radical voluntarism propounded by some post-structuralists is exemplary of the latter. The post-structuralist conception of decision-making as a free (and largely unbridled) enterprise predicts that we should witness people struggling to successfully and reliably make decisions. I intend to demonstrate that this is not the case. If so, then post-structuralists suffer a debilitating dilemma. They must either (a) retain their post-structuralist principles and accept that their view does not concord with how successful decision-making actually occurs or (b) accept that successful decision-making is constrained (by something like rationality) and thereby give up their view's post-structuralist foundation. I will suggest that Option b is more tenable
Ladyman’s Realism, van Fraassen’s Anti-Realism and Fine’s Middle-Way
Full text linkThesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2019.ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The aim of this thesis is to critically analyse and evaluate the current debate between scientific realists and anti-realists. Some thinkers claim that the debate is a stalemate, with both parties appealing to self-justifying axioms. I investigate whether this is the case.
I identify James Ladyman and Bas van Fraassen as exemplars for realism and for anti-realism respectively. I also include a third category - notably represented by Arthur Fine - that I label the ‘middle-way’. The debate in the current literature generally centres around epistemology. The question is whether we can have knowledge of scientific ‘unobservables’ (e.g. trilobites, blood cells and the Higgs boson). The realists generally answer ‘yes’, the anti-realists say ‘no’ and the middle-wayers are usually undecided. There is also a concomitant question about whether successful scientific theories are (at least approximately) true. The three parties concerned generally answer as before: yes, no and agnostic.
In chapter 1 I introduce the three pertinent positions by briefly narrating the genealogy of each. Chapter 2 involves a lengthy exposition of Ladyman’s ontic structural realism, van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism and also the deflationism and/or pluralism of the middle-way, with particular focus on Fine’s natural ontological attitude.
Ontic structural realism holds that metaphysics should be strongly continuous with science. The methods of science grant epistemic access to relational structures only, and not to essences of particulars. Furthermore, since questions beyond the limits of science are meaningless, the limits of our epistemology reveal the limits of ontology. Therefore, successful scientific theories truly represent the ontic structure of the world.
Constructive empiricism holds that we cannot have epistemic access to things that lie beyond what is observable. Microscopes, and other ‘magnifying’ scientific instruments, create phenomena that are studied by scientists. Metaphysical speculation beyond the phenomena is superfluous; ontological agnosticism about unobservables is the proper attitude. Moreover, successful scientific theories are not true simpliciter, but are rather only ‘empirically adequate’.
The natural ontological attitude offers a deflationary position in which we should generally remain silent about the epistemology and ontology of science, since there are no philosophical meta-criteria by which to judge these issues. The realism/anti-realism debate presents a false dichotomy, and attaching the ‘truth’ appendage to a scientific theory is redundant. I also discuss some relativist and feminist philosophers of science who can be grouped under the ‘middle-way’ umbrella.
In chapter 3 I conclude by considering whether the positions discussed above represent an epistemic cul-de-sac or whether any of them allow for a way forward. I conclude that, in fact, one of them - although incomplete - does offer promising prospects for further development.AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die doel van hierdie tesis is om die debat tussen wetenskaplike realiste en anti-realiste krities te analiseer en te evalueer. Party denkers betweer dat die debat ‘n doodloopstraat bereik het, waar beide partye hulself beroep op self-regverdigende aksiomas. Ek ondersoek of dit wel die geval is.
Ek identifiseer James Ladyman en Bas van Fraassen as eksemplare van realisme en anti-realisme. Ek identifiseer ook ‘n derde kategorie - verteenwoordig deur Arthur Fine - wat ek die ‘middeweg’ noem. Die huidige debat in die literatuur handel grootliks oor epistemologie. Die vraag is of ons kennis kan hê insake wetenskaplike onobserveerbare entiteite (bv.trilobeite, bloedselle en die Higgs boson. Die realiste antwoord gewoonlik ‘ja’, die anti-realiste sê ‘nee’ en die denkers wat die middeweg volg is gewoonlik agnosties. Daar is ook ‘n verwante vraag oor of suksesvolle wetenskaplike teorieë (ten minste meestal) waar is. Die drie partye vroeër genoem antwoord gewoonlik op ‘n soortgelyke manier; ‘ja’, ‘nee’ en agnosties.
In hoofstuk 1 verduidelik ek die drie posisies deur elkeen se genealogie kortliks te verduidelik. Hoofstuk 2 bevat ‘n gedetailleerde verduideliking van Ladyman se ontiese strukturele realisme, van Fraassen se konstruktiewe empirisisme, asook die deflationism en/of pluralisme van die middeweg, met ‘n spesifieke fokus op Fine se natuurlike ontologiese houding.
Ontiese strukturele realisme beweer dat metafikiska kontinu met die wetenskap moet wees. Wetenskaplike metodes bied ons slegs epistemiese toegang tot relasionele strukture, en nie tot essensies van partikuliere nie. Verder, gegewe dat vrae wat die perke van die wetenskap oorskry betekenisloos is, openbaar die perke van epistemologie die perke van ontologie. Suksesvolle wetenskaplike teorieë openbaar dus die ontiese struktuur van die wêreld.
Konstruktiewe empirisisme beweer dat ons nie epistemiese toegang tot entiteite wat ervaring transendeer kan kry nie. Mikroskope en soortgelyke instrumente skep die fenomene wat deur wetenskaplikes bestudeer word. Metafisiese spekulasie wat die fenomene transendeer is sinneloos; die korrekte houding jeens onobserveerbare entiteite is ontologiese agnostisisme. Verder, suksesvolle wetenskaplike toerieë is nie waar simpliciter nie, maar is eerder slegs ‘empiries genoegsaam’.
Die natuurlike ontologiese houding bied ‘n deflasionêre posisie wat huldig dat ons eerder moet swyg insake die epistemologie en ontologie van die wetenskap. Daar is geen filosofiese meta-kriteria wat ons kan gebruik om sulke kwessies te beoordeel nie. Die realisme/anti-realisme debat skep ‘n valse dichotomie, en om die term ‘waarheid’ aan ‘n wetenskaplike teorie te heg is onnodig. Ek bespreek ook sekere relativistiese en femisistiese filosowe wat onder die saambreelterm van die ‘middeweg’ gegroepeer kan word.
In hoofstuk 3 bespreek ek of, gegewe die bogenoemde bespreking, die bogenoemde posisies ‘n epistemiese doodloopstraat is en of enige van die posisies wel die pad vorentoe aandui. My konklusie is dat een van hulle wel belowend, alhoewel steeds onvoltooid, is.Master
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