1,721,094 research outputs found
Patent Portfolios and Firms’ Technological Choices
Full text linkIn many industrial sectors, firms amass large patent portfolios to reinforce their bargaining position with competitors. In a context where patents have a pure strategic nature, we discuss how the presence and effectiveness of a patent system affect the technology decisions of firms. Specifically, we present a game where firms choose whether to agglomerate (i.e. develop technologies for the same technological territory) or to separate (i.e. develop technologies for different territories) prior to taking their patenting decisions. We show that strong patents may distort technology choices causing firms to follow inefficient technology trajectories in an attempt to reduce their competitors’ patenting activity. We also discuss how such distortions change when a firm is prevented from obtaining its optimal number of patents
On the Impact of Call-Back Competition on International Telephony
No full textIn this paper we build a simple three-country model to evaluate the impact of "callback" on international telephony. The effects on both accounting rates and collection prices are studied. Callback frms exploit arbitrage opportunities in collection prices among countries, rerouting calls that originate in countries with high prices for international phone calls via countries with low prices. Contrary to what is commonly perceived, we show that callback tends to magnify the distortions associated with the current accounting rate regime. In particular callback puts upward pressure on low price countries' accounting rates and on collection charges. Callback companies are assumed to enjoy a volume price discount on each rerouted call; we show that the larger the price discount offered to callback companies, the higher the prices for international calls in the country hosting callback
Strategie di Costo con Esternalità di Rete
No full textThis paper analyses the impact of consumption externalities on firms’ cost raising Strategies. Two cases are considered: unilateral and reciprocal cost raising strategies. Following Economides (1996a), we show that the externality may have a pro-competitive role by inducing the firms to pursue an accomodating strategy. In addition, we show that when each firm can raise the cost of the rivals (reciprocal cost raising strategy), then the externality, when it is sufficiently strong, acts as a coordinating mechanism towards a Pareto superior outcome
The Demand for International Telecommunications in Italy
No full textIn this paper we estimate the demand for international telephony in Italy. By following a point-to-point approach, we estimate simultaneously outgoing and incoming traffic. We show that the ”reverse calling effect”, namely the impact of incoming traffic on the amount of calls placed by Italian residents, is the most relevant determinant of the total amount of telephone traffic from Italy to the rest of the world. The global price elasticity is found to be lower than one, thus suggesting a very inelastic demand. We include among the regressors the number of internet hosts in Italy and in the country receiving the calls; this variable is intended as a proxy for the use of the internet as an international communication channel. We show that the number of hosts has a negative impact on the demand for international calls thus suggesting that internet-based communication channels tend to reduce the market for standard calls. Finally, income together with the dimension of telephone network and tourism are also found to be positive determinants of the demand
Access Regulation, Entry and Investments in Telecommunications
No full textThis paper presents a model of competition between an
incumbent and an entrant firm in telecommunications. The entrant has the option to enter the market with or without having preliminary invested in its own infrastructure; in case of facility based entry, the entrant has also the option to invest in the provision of enhanced services. In case of resale based entry the entrant needs access to the incumbent network. Unlike the rival, the incumbent has always the option to upgrade the existing network to provide advanced services. We study the impact of access regulation on the type of entry and on firms' investments. We find that without regulation the incumbent sets the access charge to prevent resale based entry and this generates a social inefficient level of facility based entry. Access regulation may discourage welfare enhancing investments, thus also inducing a socially inefficient outcome. We extend the model to account for negotiated interconnection in case of facilities based entry
Industrial Organization Of High-Technology Markets
No full textDescription
This text rigorously blends theory with real-world applications to study the industrial organization of the ICT sector. Each of the self-contained chapters, which can be studied in isolation, contains theoretical models that are presented in a clear and accessible way. Throughout, a series of useful boxes complements and elucidates the theories with additional empirical/anecdotal evidence. This text will be of great interest to advanced undergraduate students with a background in microeconomics and game theory, particularly those taking courses in industrial organization, innovation economics and the economics of networks.
Contents
Contents: 1. Industrial Organisation of High-Tech Markets 2. Digital Markets 3. Network Externalities 4. Two-Sided Networks 5. Access and Interconnection in Telecommunications 6. Cumulative Innovation in Dynamic Industries 7. Imitation, Open Source and File Sharing 8. Antitrust in High-Tech Sectors Reference
高技术市场的产业组织分析
No full text【内容简介】 该书以产业组织理论为基础,对ICT领域的主要问题进行了深入而全面地经济学分析。如目录所示,全书一共分为八章。在第一章中,作者先对高技术市场的典型特征、主要问题进行了一般性分析。随后,分章节讨论了七个重要话题:第二章分析在线市场或电子市场中存在的价格歧视以及相关的价格离散;第三章聚焦于存在网络效应的市场,重点分析网络效应如何影响对高技术产品的需求与市场均衡,并考察了技术采用的动态性与市场标准的形成;第四章专门探讨双边市场相关问题,并以信用卡行业为例分析平台企业的定价策略;第五章关注ICT领域最重要的部门——电信,主要讨论接入定价、互联互通等问题;第六章考察动态产业中的累积创新,且重点分析专利制度、专利丛林等问题;第七章致力于分析可能背离知识产权保护传统方法的制度——开源与文件共享,并几个典型案例为基础重点讨论这些制度在激励和保护创新方面的作用;第八章讨论高技术部门中最重要的几个反垄断问题,且集中关注ICT领域独特性对反垄断执法与产业政策和竞争政策制定的影
Economia di Internet & delle Information and Communication Technology - I mercati High Tech fra Innovazione, Reti e Standard
No full textQuesto volume si propone come un testo di economia industriale applicata ai settori delle Information& Communication Technology; la presentazione dei modelli teorici è accompagnata con continui riferimenti a casi concreti e ciò rende la presentazione dei vari argomenti più vivace ed interessante. I diversi capitoli passano in rassegna le principali tematiche legate ai settori dell'ICT: funzionamento dei mercati in presenza di esternalità di rete (dirette ed incrociate), e-commerce e mercati digitali, innovazione nei settori ad alta intensità tecnologica, antitrust nei settori delle ICT. Il testo si rivolge ad un pubblico che, fornito di una preparazione di base in microeconomia e teoria dei giochi, desidera approfondire la conoscenza degli aspetti economici dei settori High Tech
Traffic Management in Wholesale International Roaming Market: Towards a More Efficient Market?
No full textDespite a general trend of lower charges for mobile calls, in Europe prices for international roaming calls have remained at levels surprisingly high. The apparent reluctance of mobile network operators to lower roaming tariffs is generating many antitrust concerns. This paper presents in a two country - two firm framework, the functioning of the current system governing wholesale international roaming agreements based on Inter Operator Tariffs (IOTs). The focus is on the role of traffic management: thanks to the emergence of traffic direction techniques, MNOs are allowed to select the roaming partner. We show that unless these techniques do not allow for perfect control on traffic flows, traffic management does not improve markets efficiency. In line with the regulatory mechanism recently adopted by the European Commission, we show that a simple price cap mechanism may restore partial efficiency in the wholesale market. We also show that although cross border cooperation at the wholesale level is Pareto efficient it will not emerge as an equilibrium of a two-sided matching game
Updates management in mobile applications: iTunes versus Google Play
Full text linkThis paper focuses on a specific strategy that developers of mobile applications may use to stimulate demand: The release of updates. We develop a theoretical analysis that shows that developers have incentives to release updates when experiencing a drop in performance. The predictions of the model are then tested using an unbalanced panel of top 1,000 apps iniTunes and Google Play for five European countries. We estimate that while in iTunes the release of an update stimulates a 26% increase in download growth, in Google Play updates play a less significant role. This difference is partly due to systematic differences in apps and in developers operating in the two stores (“selection effect”), and partly to a lack of quality control on apps and updates in Google Play (“quality c heck effect” ). These findings highlight the crucial importance of an appropriate management of updates as well as the relevance of institutional characteristics of the app stores
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