1,721,128 research outputs found
The Experts, the Virtuous and the Wounded. Who Should Take Part in an «Ideal Conversation»? A Note on Philip Kitcher’s «Moral Progress»
No full textElisabetta Lalumera and Sarah Songhorian discuss Philip Kitcher’s Moral Progress. Lalumera focuses on the notion of «ideal conversation» as central to Kitcher’s democratic contractualism, raising concerns about the criteria for inclusion, the role of expertise, and the tension between inclusivity and the requirement for virtuous participants. Songhorian explores the interplay between individual and social dimensions of moral progress, highlighting Kitcher’s rejection of teleological or discovery-based conceptions in favor of a pragmatic, problem-solving approach
The Experts, the Virtuous and the Wounded. Who Should Take Part in an «Ideal Conversation»?
No full textElisabetta Lalumera and Sarah Songhorian discuss Philip Kitcher’s Moral Progress. Lalumera focuses on the notion of «ideal conversation» as central to Kitcher’s democratic contractualism, raising concerns about the criteria for inclusion, the role of expertise, and the tension between inclusivity and the requirement for virtuous participants. Songhorian explores the interplay between individual and social dimensions of moral progress, highlighting Kitcher’s rejection of teleological or discovery-based conceptions in favor of a pragmatic, problem-solving approach
Psichiatria e scienze cognitive
No full textNnell’articolo bersaglio del presente focus Lalumera e Amoretti presentano criticamente una posizione piuttosto radicale circa lo status scientifico della psichiatria, quella di Dominic Murphy, attualmente professore presso l’University of Sidney. Secondo Murphy, la psichiatria non solo deve adottare il modello medico, ma il modello medico nella sua accezione «forte» (Murphy, 2013): la psichiatria deve cioè impegnarsi esplicitamente a formulare delle specifiche ipotesi causali, in termini di disfunzioni dei sistemi cerebrali ritenuti responsabili delle sindromi caratterizzanti i vari disturbi mentali. In questo senso, i disturbi mentali vengono identificati con dei processi distruttivi o degenerativi di uno o più sistemi del cervello. Dal momento che le neuroscienze, e in particolare la neuroscienza cognitiva, sono dedite proprio a tali studi, non sorprende come nell’ottica di Murphy la psichiatria debba essere considerata come una branca della neuroscienza cognitiva. Questa sua tesi di fondo ha ovviamente importanti conseguenze sul piano metafisico, epistemologico e nosologico.
Negli ultimi decenni la neuroscienza cognitiva ha certamente fatto dei passi da giganti, e la psichiatria è stata vieppiù influenzata dai suoi risultati (Broome e Bortolotti, 2009). Ma può la psichiatria essere ridotta a neuroscienza cognitiva? Fare esclusivamente affidamento sui metodi utilizzati all’interno di tale disciplina? Prendere in considerazione sol- tanto le ipotesi e le teorie da essa formulate? I commenti all’articolo bersaglio di Lalumera e Amoretti intendono proprio evidenziare pregi e limiti di questa possibilità abbracciata da Murphy
EVIDENZA, VALORI, RAZIONALITÀ: TRE CASI DI COVID-SCIENCE Evidence, values, rationality: Three examples of Covid-science
Get PDFLa nostra ricerca (Amoretti, Lalumera, 2021a, 2021b, 2022, manuscript) ha indagato come in alcuni casi elementi non epistemici – considerazioni valoriali e scopi pragmatici – entrino in gioco nella defini- zione dei concetti teorici e nella valutazione dei risultati nella scienza pandemica. In questo contributo illustriamo brevemente tre casi di scienza pandemica in cui abbiamo individuato e discusso il ruolo dei valori non epistemici: la definizione di morte causata da Covid-19, la scelta dei parametri nei modelli epidemiologici, con particolare attenzione al fatidico “numero R” di riproduzione del virus, e la questione del fallimento comunicativo del cosiddetto vaccino AstraZeneca.The so-called Covid-science – the research, especially the biomedical research on the biological, clinical, epidemiological, pharmacological, and psycho-sociological aspects of Covid-19 - can be considered an important case study for the philosophy of science and the philosophy of medicine. In this contribution, we briefly illustrate three cases of Covid-science in which we have identified and discussed the role of values, particularly non epistemic values: the definition of death caused by Covid-19, the choice of parameters in epidemiological models,
with particular attention to the “magic” reproduction number R, and the issue of the communicative failure of the AstraZeneca vaccine. The purpose of this analysis is to show that admitting that biomedical science includes non-epistemic elements is not to deny or diminish its objectivity. Rather, detecting the role of values in specific contexts allows them to be subjected to public discussion and thus, prospectively, allows for providing shared reasons for them
Reasons and Causes in Psychiatry: Ideas from Donald Davidson’s Work
No full textThough the divide between reason-based and causal-explanatory approaches in psychiatry and psychopathology is old and deeply rooted, current trends involving multi-factorial explanatory models and evidence-based approaches to interpersonal psychotherapy, show that it has already been implicitly bridged. These trends require a philosophical reconsideration of how reasons can be causes. This paper contributes to that trajectory by arguing that Donald Davidson’s classic paradigm of 1963 is still a valid option
Understanding Schizophrenia Through Wittgenstein: Empathy, Explanation, and Philosophical Clarification
No full textIn this paper I claim that concepts taken from Wittgenstein's philosophy can shed light on the phenomenon of schizophrenia in at least three different ways: with a view to empathy, scientific explanation, or philosophical clarification. I consider two different "positive" wittgensteinian accounts-Campbell's idea that delusions involve a mechanism of which different framework propositions are parts, Sass' proposal that the schizophrenic patient can be described as a solipsist-, and a "negative" wittgensteinian account, namely Rhodes' and Gipp's, where epistemic aspects of schizophrenia are explained as failures in the ordinary background of certainties. I argue that none of them amounts to empathic-phenomenological understanding, but they provide examples of how philosophical concepts can contribute to scientific explanation, and to philosophical clarification respectively
Overcoming Expert Disagreement In A Delphi Process. An Exercise In Reverse Epistemology
Get PDFDisagreement among experts is a central topic in social epistemology. What should an expert do when confronted with the different opinion of an epistemic peer? Possible answers include the steadfast view (holding to one’s belief), the abstemious view (suspending one’s judgment), and moderate conciliatory views, which specify criteria for belief change when a peer’s different opinion is encountered. The practice of Delphi techniques in healthcare, medicine, and social sciences provides a real-life case study of expert disagreement, where disagreement is gradually transformed into consensus. An analysis of Delphi shows that moderate conciliatory views are descriptively more adequate than rival views. However, it also casts doubt on whether the debate in social epistemology is explanatory relevant vis-à-vis real life cases of expert disagreement, where consensus replaces truth, and acceptance is more explanatorily relevant than belief
Concepts are a functional kind
No full textAbstractThis commentary focuses on Machery's eliminativist claim, that “concept” ought to be eliminated from the theoretical vocabulary of psychology because it fails to denote a natural kind. I argue for the more traditional view that concepts are a functional kind, which provides the simplest account of the empirical evidence discussed by Machery.</jats:p
Philosophical Psychology
No full textPhilosophical Psychology is an international journal devoted to developing and strengthening the links between philosophy and the psychological sciences, both as basic sciences and as employed in applied settings, by publishing original, peer-refereed contributions to this expanding field of study and research.
The journal publishes empirical and conceptual work relevant to debates in philosophy and ethics, and philosophical work relevant to research in the psychological sciences. This includes issues and methods developed in a variety of disciplinary areas including the cognitive, social, and affective sciences, neuroscience, comparative psychology, clinical psychology, psychopathology, psychiatry, psychoanalysis, educational psychology, health psychology, analytic philosophy, moral psychology, phenomenology, history of psychology, and experimental philosophy.
As well as psychologists and philosophers, the journal’s readers and contributors include neuroscientists, linguists, computer scientists, biologists, and sociologists — reporting experimental, theoretical, and clinical work which relates to underlying philosophical interests.
Peer Review Policy: All peer review is double anonymized and original articles are typically reviewed by two expert referees
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