339 research outputs found
Pirateria e file sharing: una rassegna della letteratura
No full textThe diffusion of digital technologies for copying and distributing information has completely changed the music business. Nevertheless piracy is not a new phenomenon. This article analyzes some recent contributions of the economic literature, both theoretical and empirical, on the impact of file-sharing and peer-to-peer distribution technologies on the music sector, including them in the branch of literature on crime economics and copyright analysi
Pirateria, differenziazione del prodotto e incentivi alla collusione
No full textNegli ultimi anni la letteratura economica ha studiato intensamente la pirateria e la violazione del copyright, tuttavia la maggior parte dei lavori teorici si focalizzano sullo studio del monopolio. In questo lavoro estendo il modello di pirateria al caso di un mercato oligopolistico in cui due imprese che competono alla Bertrand e, in particolare, analizzo gli effetti della pirateria sulla collusione mostrando come la pirateria possa, sotto condizioni sufficientemente generali, modificare gli incentivi alla collusione tra le imprese piratate
Standard minimi di qualità: un approccio teorico
No full textAt least since Akerlof (1970), asymmetric information in the case of experience goods has been a central issue in the economic literature. This paper studies regulation in markets where the quality of the experience good is never completely verifiable by consumers even after purchase. In the proposed model firms can decide the quality of the good: always producing a high quality good creates a positive externality in the market, but it causes an incentive to the firms to deviate and produce low quality goods. The main policy instrument for the government, in order to maximize Social Welfare, is to fix a minimum quality standard, but imposing a too high standard might, in some cases, lower the average quality of the good in the market
Napster and the Damage Done
No full textInternet, mp3 files, peer-to-peer software and digital technologies for copying have radically modified the music sector. In this paper I present a theoretical model, that investigates the consequences of the appearance of a pirate low quality good (typically a mp3 file) in the music market. In this paper I propose a model of sampling, consider the possibility that the firm modifies its business entering into the low quality segment and investigate the supposed conflict between the recording company, whose profit depends on the CD sold, and the artist, whose profits depend in part on the live performance, the demand of which can increase for the positive externality due to the illegal download of musi
Napster ad the damage done
No full textInternet, mp3 files, peer-to-peer software and digital technologies for copying have radically modified the music sector. In this paper I present a theoretical model, that investigates the consequences of the appearance of a pirate low quality good (typically a mp3 file) in the music market. In this paper I propose a model of sampling, consider the possibility that the firm modifies its business entering into the low quality segment and investigate the supposed conflict between the recording company, whose profit depends on the CD sold, and the artist, whose profits depend in part on the live performance, the demand of which can increase for the positive externality due to the illegal download of musi
Cartel Sustainability and Piracy in a Vertically Differentiated Oligopoly
No full textIn recent years economic literature has deeply analyzed piracy and
copyright violation. Nevertheless most of the contributions focus on the study of digital markets and monopoly. In this paper we concentrate on the effect the entry of a pirate may have in a vertically differentiated duopoly where originally two firms compete producing a high quality and a low quality good.
We show that, under general conditions payoffs of firms might increase with piracy, since piracy may support collusion between the two firms producing the original goods and the collusive profits of the firms in presence of piracy may be bigger than the profits of Nash without piracy. This result may explain the reason why in some markets, like the fashion market, where the producers of the original brands basically control the supply chain of the sector, piracy and production of high quality fakes is huge
A Game Theory Approach to the Effect of Piracy on Collusion in a Vertical Differentiated Oligopoly
No full textThe Music Market in the Age of Download
No full textInternet, mp3 files, peer-to-peer software and digital technologies for copying have radically modified the music sector. In this paper I present a theoretical model, that investigates the consequences of the appearance of a pirate low quality good (typically a mp3 file) in the music market. In this paper I propose a model of sampling, consider the possibility that the firm modifies its business entering into the low quality segment and investigate the supposed conflict between the recording company, whose profit depends on the CD sold, and the artist, whose profits depend in part on the live performance, the demand of which can increase for the positive externality due to the illegal download of music
File-sharing, sampling e pirateria nel mercato musicale: un modello teorico
No full textInternet, mp3 files, peer-to-peer software and digital technologies for copying have radically modified the music sector. In this paper I present a theoretical model, that investigates the consequences of the appearance of a pirate low quality good (typically a mp3 file) in the music market. In this paper I propose a model of sampling, consider the possibility that the firm modifies its business entering into the low quality segment and investigate the supposed conflict between the recording company, whose profit depends on the CD sold, and the artist, whose profits depend in part on the live performance, the demand of which can increase for the positive externality due to the illegal download of musi
Regulating Quality: a Comparison Between Minimum Quality Standard and Mixed Oligopoly
No full textThis paper compares two possible State interventions in a market where a vertical differentiable good is produced: minimum quality standards (MQS) and mixed competition. In the analysis of MQS I consider an endogenous standard, given by the maximization of the Social Welfare,and the possibility for the firms not to respect such a standard, sellinga low quality illegal good. In the study of the mixed oligopoly I concentratethe analysis on sectors where there might be separation betweenmanagers (who set the prices maximizing the profit) and employees (whoset the quality maximizing the social welfare). The main result is that inthese sectors the presence of the public firm allows to increase the SocialWelfare with respect to the case when the good is produced by privatefirms or by a firm regulated with MQS
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