67 research outputs found
Impact of COVID-19 on the Jordanian economy: Economic sectors, food systems, and households
No full textEconomic growth in Jordan potentially will come to a halt this year. This comes as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic outbreak. Government imposed an economic lockdown which restricted non-essential economic activities and people’s movement in order to contain the virus. A SAM multiplier model was used to estimate the economic impact of the lockdown and to explore potential recovery pathways for the Jordanian economy. Some of the key findings from this modeling exercise are:
• National GDP is estimated to have fallen by 23 percent during the lockdown period. The services sector was hardest hit, seeing an estimated drop in output of almost 30 percent.
• Food systems in Jordan are estimated to have experienced a reduction in output by almost 40 percent.
• Employment losses during the lockdown were estimated at over 20 percent, mainly driven by job losses in services, followed by agriculture.
• Household income fell on average by around one-fifth due to the lockdown, mainly driven by contraction in service sector activities, by slowdown in manufacturing activity, and by lower remittances from abroad.
• GDP growth rates for Jordan’s economy will continue to be negative through 2020, ranging from -5.7 to -7.4 percent, depending on the speed of economic recovery. A slow pace of recovery is expected.
This economic recovery offers opportunities for fostering sustainable economic transformation and structural change. Economic policies and incentives should be directed towards more economic diversification, greater resilience to withstand economic shocks, and job creation.Non-PRIFPRI1; CRP2; 4 Transforming Agricultural and Rural Economies; EgyptSSP; COVID-19 Measuring Impacts and Prioritizing Policies for Recovery; Agricultural Investment Data Analyzer (AIDA); UNFSSDSGD; PIMCGIAR Research Program on Policies, Institutions, and Markets (PIM
Prioritizing agricultural value chains for reviving the food system in Yemen: Input for an agricultural strategy update
No full textIn addition to the unprecedented humanitarian crisis and the creation of space for militant groups, the conflict in Yemen is also taking a heavy toll on the economy. According to estimates from the International Monetary Fund (IMF 2018) together with information on physical damages from the World Bank-led Yemen Dynamic Damage and Needs Assessment (World Bank et al. 2018), the accumulated impact of the conflict from 2015 to 2018 is estimated to be USD47 billion (in 2014 prices), nearly one and a half times total GDP in 2014. The poverty headcount for Yemen is estimated to have increased from 49 percent in 2014 to 77 percent in 2018. The results of economic recovery scenarios run within a recursive dynamic computable general equilibrium (DCGE) model of the Yemeni economy suggest that unless significant support is provided by the international community for reconstruction, poverty in coming years, even if the conflict ends, will remain high or increase even further. Poverty outcomes of alternative post-conflict transition options range between a national poverty rate of 84 percent in the worst-case scenario of economic stagnation and 50 percent in the best-case scenario that involves the recovery of physical capital, total factor productivity (TFP) growth increases in all sectors, and significant inflows of foreign aid. Under a recovery scenario with lower foreign aid, the poverty headcount is projected to fall, but only modestly. Only under a recovery scenario with high aid inflows are poverty levels projected to be below pre-conflict levels by 2025.Non-PRIFPRI1; EgyptSSP; CRP2; Agricultural Investment Data Analyzer (AIDA); UNFSSDSGD; PIMCGIAR Research Program on Policies, Institutions, and Markets (PIM
COVID-19 and the Egyptian economy: From reopening to recovery: Alternative pathways and impacts on sectors, jobs, and households
No full textAlthough the global economy is forecasted to shrink by 4.4 percent in 2020 (IMF 2020), the Egyptian economy is proving resilient to the immense human and financial costs caused by the global COVID-19 pandemic. This resilience is mainly explained by the successful implementation of the economic reform program since 2016 that provided more fiscal space to withstand the adverse impact of the COVID-19 crisis. However, that Egypt’s economy is holding up is also due to the rapid response and proactive measures to limit the impact of the virus that were implemented by the Egyptian Government since March 2020 (MPED 2020). These enabled the country to avoid a full lockdown policy (Figure 1). While Egypt posted negative economic growth rates from April to June 2020 at the height of the crisis, overall economic growth was still positive at 3.6 percent for fiscal year (FY) 2019/20. This estimate is only slightly lower than the initial projection of the impact of the pandemic on Egypt’s economy of an annual economic growth equal to 3.8 percent, as estimated by staff of the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and the Ministry of Planning and Economic Development (MPED) (Breisinger et al. 2020). The deviation between the early and final estimate can be mainly explained by the lower than expected growth rates in the manufacturing and health services sectors and the better than expected performance of the trade and transport sectors.Non-PRIFPRI1; CRP2; EgyptSSP; 3 Building Inclusive and Efficient Markets, Trade Systems, and Food Industry; 4 Transforming Agricultural and Rural Economies; DCA; Evaluating Impact and Building Capacity (EIBC); COVID-19 Measuring Impacts and Prioritizing Policies for RecoveryDSGD; PIMCGIAR Research Program on Policies, Institutions, and Markets (PIM
COVID-19 and the Egyptian economy: Estimating the impacts of expected reductions in tourism, Suez Canal revenues, and remittances
No full textEgypt’s recent economic success will almost certainly be interrupted by the COVID-19 pandemic. We examine the likely impact on the Egyptian economy of a significant reduction in tourism, payments received from the Suez Canal, and remittances from Egyptians working abroad because of the slowdown in the global economy due to the COVID-19 virus.
Our results suggest that COVID-19 could reduce national GDP by between 0.7 and 0.8 percent (EGP 36 to 41 billion) for each month that the global crisis continues.
Similarly, household consumption and expenditure is estimated to decline on average by between EGP 153 and EGP 180 per person per month, which is between 9.0 and 10.6 percent of average household income.
The cumulative loss in GDP from these three external shocks alone could amount to between 2.1 and 4.8 percent of annual GDP in 2020 if the crisis lasts for 3 to 6 months.
While the country’s focus currently is rightly on fighting the health crisis and mitigating its immediate impacts, planning on how to re-open the economy should also start now.Non-PRIFPRI1; EgyptSSP; CRP2; DCA; 4 Transforming Agricultural and Rural Economies; COVID-19 Measuring Impacts and Prioritizing Policies for RecoveryDSGD; PIMCGIAR Research Program on Policies, Institutions, and Markets (PIM
Economic impact of COVID-19 on tourism and remittances: Insights from Egypt
No full textUsing the SAM multiplier model for Egypt, we simulate the individual and combined effects of a collapse in the tourism sector and reductions in Suez Canal revenues and in foreign remittances under more and less pessimistic scenarios. SAM multiplier models are well-suited to measuring short-term direct and indirect impacts of unanticipated, rapid-onset demand- or supply-side economic shocks such as those caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. We model the demand shocks as the anticipated reductions in tourism, Suez Canal, and remittances revenues.Non-PRIFPRI4; DCA; EgyptSSP; CRP2; COVID-19 Measuring Impacts and Prioritizing Policies for RecoveryDSGD; PIMCGIAR Research Program on Policies, Institutions, and Markets (PIM
Impact of COVID-19 on the Egyptian economy: Economic sectors, jobs, and households
No full textThe COVID-19 crisis may lead to a 1.1 percent decline in Egypt’s GDP during the 4th quarter (April to June) of the 2019/20 fiscal year, compared to the same quarter in 2018/19. Without the Government of Egypt’s COVID-19 emergency response package, GDP in Q4 may have declined by 8.7 percent. Tak-ing the emergency response pack-age into account, we estimate an annual growth rate of 3.8 percent for FY 2019/20. Without the emer-gency response package, annual growth for FY 2019/20 may have been as low as 1.9 percent. The services sector is hit hardest, falling by 10.9 percent, followed by industry at -8.3 percent. Agriculture is the most resilient sector. However, these losses are lower than those expected in comparable countries, especially those that resorted to extended periods of full lockdowns. Impacts on Egypt’s agri-food system are less severe than elsewhere in the economy. Most damage will occur in nonfarm components of the agri-food system due to falling consumer demand. Although higher-income households face the largest income losses, lower-income households also will see their incomes decline significantly. The level of social protection required to fully offset the income losses of poor households is likely to be prohibitive, especially given falling revenues from reduced economic activity. Continuing to gradually open the economy again will be critical for avoiding permanent job losses and increases in poverty for the coming year. The process of re-opening the economy may also provide opportunities for fostering more private sector-driven and sustainable economic transformation.Non-PRIFPRI1; CRP2; EgyptSSP; Evaluating Impact and Building Capacity (EIBC); 4 Transforming Agricultural and Rural Economies; DCA; COVID-19 Measuring Impacts and Prioritizing Policies for RecoveryDSGD; PIMCGIAR Research Program on Policies, Institutions, and Markets (PIM
The economy-wide impact of Sudan’s ongoing conflict: Implications on economic activity, agrifood system and poverty [in Arabic]
No full textNon-PRIFPRI1; 4 Transforming Agricultural and Rural Economies; 5 Strengthening Institutions and Governance; SSSPDevelopment Strategies and Governance (DSG); Transformation Strategie
The economy-wide impact of Sudan’s ongoing conflict: Implications on economic activity, agrifood system and poverty
No full textThe armed conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan entered its sixth month since it erupted on April 15th, 2023, with no signs of ending soon. The war has caused severe humanitarian catastrophe, destroyed key infrastructure, and constrained trade and production activities. Moreover, it disrupted access to public utilities, financial services, and markets, hence, triggering considerable scarcity of goods and services. In this paper, we utilize a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) Multiplier modeling framework to assess the economywide implications of these disruptions of economic activity, productive resources, and livelihoods. Results reveal that the economy would shrink to nearly half its size before the war, household incomes decline by more than 40 percent in urban and rural areas, and the number of poor people increase by 1.8 million if the war continues until the end of the year. The impact would have been two thirds less should the war have ended before July 2023 and would be one third less if it would end before October 2023. This study therefore calls for rapid interventions from all relevant parties to help reach an end to the fighting.Non-PRIFPRI1; 4 Transforming Agricultural and Rural Economies; 5 Strengthening Institutions and GovernanceDevelopment Strategies and Governance (DSG); Transformation Strategie
Egypt’s Haya Karima Initiative: An assessment of its rural and economywide impacts
No full textEgypt’s Haya Karima (HK) Initiative aims at improving the quality of life in the country’s rural communities through interventions related to human development, infrastructure, and economic sectors. This presidential initiative, whose name translates to “Decent Life” in English, has four strategic goals, all targeting Egypt’s rural population: building human capital, improving quality of life, improving the standard of living for the most vulnerable, and providing decent and productive job opportunities. The initiative is aligned with the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the objectives of Egypt Vision 2030.
HK aims to not only curb material poverty but also multidimensional poverty by expanding the umbrella of comprehensive social protection, with a focus on education, health, infrastructure, and employment. It also focuses on achieving the goal of geographical equity by addressing regional disparities that affect rural areas such as Upper Egypt. Here, we describe a recently completed study that assesses the economywide effects of the first phase of HK. The analysis was done by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), in collaboration with Egypt’s Ministry of Economic Planning and Development (MPED) under the project Evaluating Impact and Building Capacity (EIBC), funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).Non-PRIFPRI1; DCA; 4 Transforming Agricultural and Rural Economies; 5 Strengthening Institutions and Governance; Evaluating Impact and Building Capacity (EIBC); EgyptSSPDevelopment Strategies and Governance (DSG); Transformation Strategie
A 2019 nexus social accounting matrix for Sudan
No full textNexus SAMs aims to improve the quality and standardize the construction process of SAMs using a standard toolkit that enables tracing data sources and assumptions. The unified structure of nexus SAMs allows for more robust cross-country comparisons of economies, especially the sectoral composition, allocation of government spending and trade orientation. The 2019 SAM for Sudan is a snapshot capturing the structure of the Sudanese Economy and depicting the different transactions between the production activities, factors of production and other income generating and consuming entities in the economy besides the good and services (produced and consumed). The circular flow of income is completed by including the accounts for enterprises, government, and rest of the world. The International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) relied on both international and local data sources to develop the first Nexus SAM for Sudan for the year 2019. The leading domestic data sources are the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), the Central Bank of Sudan (CBoS), the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MFEP) and the Ministry of Human Resources Development and Labor (MHRDL). Like other Nexus SAMs, the Sudan SAM puts a strong emphasis on the household accounts by providing details on both income and expenditure sides as well as savings. We used a household income and expenditure survey to disaggregate the household account into income deciles both in rural and urban areas. The SAM also provides disaggregated representation of production activities including 77 activities producing 79 commodities. Production factors included in the Nexus SAM for Sudan are labor, capital, and land. Labor is further classified by location to rural and urban, by gender to male and female, and by the level education to unskilled, semi-skilled and skilled labor. Land and capital factors are left without further disaggregation.Non-PRIFPRI1; SSSP; 4 Transforming Agricultural and Rural Economies; 5 Strengthening Institutions and Governance; G Cross-cutting gender theme; Capacity Strengthening; Nexus SAMsDevelopment Strategies and Governance (DSG); Foresight and Policy Modeling (FPM); Transformation Strategie
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