1,113 research outputs found
Archeologia euristica e fecondità sociologica di due concetti complementari : impatto di norme e nomotropismo di azioni
No full textHeuristic archaeology and sociological fruitfulness of two complementary concepts: impact of norms and nomotropism of actions. In this essay the author proposes a heuristic archaeology of the concept of ‘impact’ of norms. If this term was first introduced by Lawrence Friedman, the corresponding concept is not new to legal sociologists. Its archaeology makes it possible to discover some unexpected and interesting socio-legal applications, and it is in this sense that Fittipaldi regards the archaeology presented here as a heuristic one. In the second part, Fittipaldi elaborates on the sociological fruitfulness of a concept first introduced by Amedeo G. Conte: nomotropism (of actions). This concept is complementary to that of impact. Fittipaldi shows its fruitfulness both for sociology of law and other sociologies. Finally, he summarizes the results of this study presenting the set-theoretical relations between impact (referred to with the Contean term “praxeotropism” in order to stress its complementarity with nomotropism), effectiveness, and ineffectiveness – all understood as qualities of norms –, on the one hand, and the set-theoretical relations between nomotropism, compliance, and non-compliance – all understood as qualities of behaviours –, on the other
ПРОТИВОРЕЧИЯ КАК ЭМПИРИЧЕСКИЕ НЕСОВМЕСТИМОСТИ В ПСИХОЛОГИИ ЭТИЧЕСКИХ ЭМОЦИЙ И В ПРАВОВОЙ (И НЕ ТОЛЬКО) ДОГМАТИКЕ: РАДИКАЛЬНО-ЭМПИРИЧЕСКИЙ ПОДХОД
No full textFITTIPALDI E. CONTRADICTIONS AS EMPIRICAL INCOMPATIBILITIES IN PSYCHOLOGY
OF ETHICAL EMOTIONS AND (BUT NOT ONLY LEGAL) DOGMATICS: A RADICAL-EMPIRICIST
APPROACH
Fittipaldi aims at bridging the psychology of ethical emotions and legal-dogmatic thinking
in the field of contradictions. To this end Fittipaldi relies on Łukasiewicz and Vasiliev, as
well as on classical radical empiricists (Berkeley and Hume). The general legal framework
is Petrażyckianism (i.e. the teachings of Petrażycki and his most faithful pupils).
Contradiction is defined as a phenomenon occurring when the same individual states that
a couple of empirically incompatible events (i.e. a conjunctive empirical incompatibility)
are both the case.
Fittipaldi brings to conjunctive empirical incompatibilities the following:
1) deontic contrarieties (something obligatory and prohibited at the same time) and deontic
contradictions (e.g. something prohibited and permitted at the same time),
2) “validity” contradictions (when, e.g., certain normative act is in force and repealed at
the same time).
Each of these three phenomena is analyzed from a psychological and from a dogmatic (or
an axiomatic) perspective. From a psychological perspective Fittipaldi shows that these
phenomena are perfectly possible within some Subject. From a dogmatic (or an axiomatic)
perspective, Fittipaldi shows that the Subject may adopt various kinds of axioms
(or dogmata) of non-contradiction and these axioms may play a crucial rule in both the
healthy child’s growth and in the technical improvement of a legal system
Dogmatica in Leon Petrażycki : giusrealismo e principio di legalità
No full textThe purpose of this article is to clarify Petrażycki’s distinction between on the one hand the general (psycho-sociological) theory of law and descriptive legal science and, on the other, legal dogmatics. The author first discusses some general statements of Petrażycki’s with regard to the purpose of legal dogmatics, then examines Petrażycki’s discussion of the concept of ‘statute’ for the general (psycho-sociological) theory of law, on one hand, and for the (general theory of) legal dog-matics on the other. The better to highlight Petrażycki’s theoretical tenets, Fittipaldi compares Petrażycki’s concept of ‘statute’ with Kelsen’s, thus showing that Petraży-cki’s distinction between descriptive legal science and legal dogmatics has remark-able theoretical advantages compared to Kelsen’s distinction between sociology of law and normative jurisprudence. He also shows, however, that Petrażycki’s ap-proach needs to be completed with Kelsen’s concept of ‘Grundnorm’. According to Fittipaldi, the general (psycho-sociological) theory of law and legal dogmatics both need their own concept of ‘Grundnorm’
Everyday Legal Ontology : A Psychological and Linguistic Investigation within the Framework of Leon Petrazycki's Theory of Law
No full textEveryday or naïve legal ontology is a branch of (general) naïve ontology. Naïve ontology is understood by the author as an empirical science dealing with the way naïve people conceive external reality – or, in the plural, realities. In this sense ontology can be viewed as a branch of psychology. In order to investigate how people conceive realities naïve ontology draws mainly on naïve language. The way we talk of realities is assumed to be indexical of the way we conceive them. Therefore naïve ontology, as a branch of psychology, is also closely related to cognitive linguistics. Addressing that special ontology that is naïve legal ontology – namely the way non-jurists conceive legal realities – presupposes a scientific (or, depending on the point of view, legal-metaphysical) theory as regards what legal phenomena really are. Only such a theory does make it possible to investigate the mismatches between the naïve legal conceptions and the scientific ones. As his theoretical frame Fittipaldi adopts Leon Petrażycki’s theory of law. Although Fittipaldi provides the reader with information about Petrażycki’s theory, the goal of this book is not to assess it, but rather to directly deal with the special challenges raised to it by naïve legal ontology. According to Petrażycki’s theory, legal phenomena are purely individual psychological experiences. External legal realities are therefore but illusions. Thus, naïve legal ontology is a challenge to legal solipsism as it raises the following question: if what we call ‘law’ is nothing else but the individuals’ legal-psychological experiences, why do individuals believe that there objectively exist legal realities, such as legal qualities and entities, independent of the subjects experiencing them? To answer this question Fittipaldi draws on general näive ontology as well as on the modern psychological theories concerning the development of the reality hypothesis and of such ethical emotions as shame, guilt, pride, anger and indignation. Among others the book contains a detailed discussion of modal verbs (considered by Fittipaldi as indexical of moral or legal qualities) and of the illusion of debts. Debts are viewed by Fittipaldi as the thickest näive legal illusion and a detailed analysis of the terms for this illusion in several languages is also provided
Leon Petrazycki's Conception of Legal Dogmatics as Science at the Service of the Principle of Legality (in Russian with English abstract and English original at the end)
No full textPetrazycki ascribed to legal dogmatics a function and a task. Its function is to contribute to the unification of law while its task is to contribute to the realization of the ideal of the Rechtsstaat. Since these two goals are not always compatible, Fittipaldi focuses on the legality task and shows that Petrażycki devised a legal dogmatics that is purer than that of Hans Kelsen. Fittipaldi also shows that the pureness of Petrazycki’s legal dogmatics would lead, at least in some cases, to its practical impossibility. However, Fittipaldi believes that the proposal of Petrazycki to conceive legal dogmatics as a subjective-relational science, rather than an objective-cognitive one, if consistently developed, may provide a solution to this problem. Legal dogmatics should be completely subjectivized. In this case, the role of dogmata should be played, not by a certain set of normative facts, as both Petrazycki and Jerzy Lande believed, but rather by the axioms that the legal dogmatist chooses for his activity. These axioms may be substantive ones, such as some values of the dogmatist himself, or formal ones, such as certain normative facts or certain axioms concerning the way normative facts should be “produced” or “recognized”. In this regard, Petrazycki’s conception of legal dogmatics requires Kelsen’s concept of Grundnorm understood as choice of certain axioms on the part of the Subject (i.e. the dogmatist). Fittipaldi also notes that Petrażycki’s last writings seem to imply that the statements produced by legal dogmatics, despite their being false, can be evaluated in terms of their correctness or incorrectness (in a purely epistemological sense). Thus, according to Fittipaldi, Petrazycki’s conception should also be completed by the distinction made by Olivecrona between truth and correctness
Euristiche sociologico-giuridiche
No full textnduction, abduction and deduction are basic concepts in general epistemology as well as in the epistemology of legal sociology. Fittipaldi uses induction to refer to a kind of brainstorming aiming to the discovery of a new nomological hypothesis; abduction to refer to the set of heuristic tools whereby a researcher tries to single out which of the already available nomological hypotheses can be used in order make a hypothesis of retrodictive explanation, deduction to refer to the way a researcher can use some of the already available nomological hypotheses in order to predict future events. The author holds that both semantic and teleological comprehension (semasiologisches and teleologisches Verstehen) can be used among others as abductive methods by a legal sociologist who desires to single out which regularities, if any, feature the behaviour of chess players. Nonetheless in some cases even observation alone can play an abductive role. This happens when a legal sociologist has the choice between two different nomological hypotheses which both seem able to explain the very same fact. In this case he might try to deduce from these two nomological hypotheses, respectively, two different predictions about future behaviours of the same or similar chess players in order to try to discover which one is the wrong one. The abductive function of such an elimination procedure allows Fittipaldi to show that Ross’s analysis of this situation contains some epistemological misunderstandings which may endanger some of the main ideas of Scandinavian legal realism
Praxeotropismo
No full textHans Albert has used German expressions such as Verhaltenswirksamkeit einer Norm and verhaltenswirksame Norm to refer to norms which somehow affect actions. A norm can therefore be called verhaltenswirksam not only in some cases of compliance, but also in some cases of behaviour that is non-compliant or insignificant (from the point of view of some author of the norm), such as in the famous instance of Max Weber’s thief. Amedeo G. Conte has proposed translating verhaltenswirksam and Verhaltenswirksamkeit into Italian as praxeotropico and praxeotropismo respectively. In this article, Fittipaldi tries to analyse the re-lations among the usage of these words and the usage of other technical expres-sions of the sociology of law such as norma (norm), enunciato normativo (normative proposition), efficacia (efficacy), (nomotropismo ) etc
Psycho-Sociology of Fundamental Rights: Two Petrażyckian Perspectives (Articolo in russo con abstract, titolo e parole-chiave in inglese)
No full textFITTIPALDI E. PSYCHO-SOCIOLOGY OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: TWO NEOPETRAŻYCKIAN
PERSPECTIVES
In this article the author tries to put the psycho-social phenomenon of human
rights (or fundamental rights) into a strict Petrażyckian framework. Since the naïve
concept of human rights is an incoherent and practical one, the author proposes
two possible non-exhaustive stipulative definitions aimed at selecting sets of
phenomena somewhat intersecting with the set of phenomena designated by the
term “human rights” in different languages. Both definitions are inspired by the main
tenets of Petrażyckianism, but the second one is also based on the ideas of the
Italian scholar G. Palombella, as well as on certain ideas developed by A. G. Conte
and his school. The first definition re-defines human rights as humane rights,
namely imperative-attributive convictions (and relevant “projections”) caused
by the emergence or spreading of affiliative emotions in a certain society. The
second definition re-defines human rights as substantive convictions of the Subject
concerning the conditions of a binding character of a normative fact (human
rights as a subclass of substantive anankastic normative-factual convictions).
In this connection the role of intuitive law is discussed. This second definition
also covers substantive convictions concerning the conditions at which a certain
Constitutional Court or the identical body is experienced as authorized to enact
a norm-annihilating normative fact directed at the removal of legal convictions
brought about by another normative fact (human rights as a subclass of substantive
paraanankastic normative-factual convictions).
KEYWORDS: human rights, Leon Petrażycki, affiliative emotions, anankasticconstitutive
convictions, Gianluigi Palombella, Amedeo G. Conte, intuitive law
A Defense of Strict Petrazyckianism (in Russian)
No full textIn Human rights in the context of a Petrażyckian perspective Prof. Polyakov criticized Fittipaldi’s “Strict Petrażyckianism”. Here Fittipaldi replies to Polyakov’s critiques. Fittipaldi argues that scientific concepts select classes of phenomena able to enter as causes into nomological hypotheses. Law, stipulatively defined as a particular class of psychical phenomena (psylaw)—namely, as perceptions/representations of actions coupled imperative-attributive emotions (a concept close to sense of entitlement)—is the proximate cause of conflicts and, in turn, of unifying tendencies somewhat counteracting them (positivization, formalizations, adjudication). Further, psylaw causes the emergence of soclaw, understood as a gradual phenomenon whose degrees of existence increase with the degree of compatibility of the jural phenomena (psylaw) occurring in a given society.
If psylaw is the distal cause of phenomena like states or market economies, soclaw can be regarded as their proximal cause, and so can be regarded as a scientific concept in its own right. In the remaining parts of this essay Fittipaldi defends the distinction between of intuitive and positive psylaw, and underscores the need both of legal dogmatics (understood as including deontic logic) and of sharply distinguishing it from psylaw and soclaw, thus implying that strict Petrażyckianism is incompatible with integral concepts of law
What Concept of Morality for Sociology of Morality? From Ossowska's Rejection of Substantive Definitions to a Formal (Psychoanalytic) Cross-Disciplinary One
No full textOssowska contended that it is impossible to give a coherent definition of
morality but at the same time she refused to adopt a stipulative definition for
it. In § 1 the author illustrates Ossowska's official attitude towards stipulative
definitions. In § 2 he shows that Ossowska was not always consistent with her
programme of abstaining from using stipulative definitions. In § 3 the author
asks whether Ossowska's rejection of stipulative definitions of morality can be
somewhat compared with Bourdieu's concept of illusio. In § 4 the author con-
tends that Ossowska's failure in finding satisfactory descriptive definitions for
morality is to be explained by her searching exclusively for substantive defini-
tions. The author argues, instead, that a formal definition for morality can be
given. Such a proposal was first made by the Polish scientist of law and moral-
ity, Leon Petra¿ycki, who provided a purely formal definition for both, and his
definition is compatible with the findings of psychoanalysis in this regard. Thus
Fittipaldi proposes a Freudian-Petra¿yckian stipulative definition of a moral
evaluation as an evaluation backed by a superegoic emotion. Superegoic emo-
tions may be addressed to virtually whatever object (hence the formal nature
of the definition) and all of them stem from the archaic helplessness of the
child via-à-vis his caregivers, caregivers whom the child at once loves, fears
and admires. According to the author, this definition is heuristically fruitful
and makes it possible to cover all the areas that according to Ossowska should
be investigated by her science or sociology of morality.
Keywords: Maria Ossowska, Pierre Bourdieu, Leon Petrazycki, Psychoanalysi
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