1,720,985 research outputs found
Quality choice for product recovery considering a trade-in program and third-party remanufacturing competition
As an effective mode for product recovery, trade-in programs have been widely implemented in practice. With a trade-in program, an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) often faces a dilemma of determining the quality of new products, where quality is defined as an observable characteristic that increases consumers' willingness to pay for a product. On the one hand, for the OEM, a choice of higher quality can increase the perceived value of new products; on the other hand, it can also raise the cost of product recovery. In response, we develop game models considering the duopoly situation where an OEM offers a trade-in program to collect used products and faces competition from a third-party remanufacturer (TPR). Specifically, the proposed models capture how an OEM utilizes product quality to compete with a TPR under the presence and absence of a trade-in program. We derive the OEM's optimal quality choice and investigate the effect of the trade-in program and third-party remanufacturing in the Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we examine how firms' profits and consumer surplus change in the trade-in program through a numerical study. Results indicate that the OEM almost always increases product quality in the trade-in context. Therefore, it is profitable for the OEM to implement the trade-in program to exploit repeat consumers and achieve price discrimination. Interestingly, the trade-in program is a profitable strategy against the TPR, but it is not necessarily detrimental to the TPR. Besides, the trade-in program can offset the positive effect of third-party remanufacturing on consumer surplus
Decision-making models for promoting consumption of low energy-intensive broadband terminal products in the Chinese telecommunication industry
PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to extend game analysis to explore decision-making mechanisms for promoting a specific type of products, low energy consumption for individual one while the total energy consumption is huge due to the high quantity of sales, that is, low for individual and high for total (LIHT) in terms of energy consumption.Design/methodology/approachGame models are developed to compare decisions of optimal prices for newly developed and environmentally friendly (NDEF) and regular products as well as associated sales quantity, profits, carbon emissions under different governmental policies, along with a case of low energy-intensive broadband terminal products in the Chinese telecommunication industry under the carbon tax and subsidy policies.FindingsFor both NDEF and regular products, optimal prices decrease under the subsidy policy while both increase under the tax policy. Manufacturers’ decision of optimal prices is highly relevant with unit carbon tax/subsidy and the consumers’ preference. Both the tax and subsidy policies can improve consumption of NDEF products while the subsidy policy can be more effective at the current initial stage.Research limitations/implicationsThis paper provides decision support for manufacturers to promote sustainable consumption of LIHT products. Research ideas on models development and solutions for optimal prices can be applied to other LIHT products.Practical implicationsThe results provide insights for governments on how to effectively evaluate and motivate sustainable consumption for LIHT products.Originality/valueThis paper first explores how to motivate sustainable consumption of LIHT products by developing models, examining effectiveness of potential governmental policies as well as associated carbon emissions
机械装备再制造供应链管理
本书将再制造理论与实践相结合,模型构建主要以重型载货汽车发动机为例,这是由于重型载货汽车发动机再制造行业起步早,与其他机械设备的再制造研究有共通性,可供行业发展借鉴。本书首先运用调查研究和数学优化的相关方法构建了再制造决策及合作模型,揭示再制造供应链上的各相关方在面对再制造供需不确定性的同时干扰下彼此如何协调冲突、共担风险等。其次,本书针对市场需求端的产品接受度问题,提出延长质保期限和实行保换服务的再制造产品销售新模式。本书针对如何解决授权再制造与外包再制造等再制造设计端面临的新问题进行了研究探索。
本书主要供再制造相关领域研究人员阅读参考
Remanufacturing supply chain coordination under the stochastic remanufacturability rate and the random demand
As an effective mode for resource recovery, remanufacturing has been widely recognized in practice and academia. However, coordination is needed and multi-uncertainties exist in a remanufacturing supply chain (RSC). Under a retailer collection mode, this paper extends the existing studies on a revenue-sharing mechanism for a forward supply chain to examine how to coordinate a RSC between a remanufacturer and a retailer by developing a mathematical model. This model considers two types of uncertainties, they are, the stochastic remanufacturability rate from the supply side of used products and the random demand occurring in remarketing of remanufactured products. This study fills the research gap on RSC coordination under the multi-uncertainty environment. Moreover, it introduces an iterative algorithm (the Newton–Raphson Method) to deal with difficulty in solving the implicit function of the payment to consumers under the non-uniform demand distribution by finding the approximate value. The research results show that a revenue-sharing contract for a RSC with multi-uncertainties can increase profit for the whole RSC as well as the remanufacturer and the retailer by eliminating double marginalization. Besides, the government subsidy to the remanufacturer can motivate the retailer to collect more used products under a revenue-sharing case since the retailer can share benefits of the whole RSC. A case study of remanufactured truck engines demonstrates benefits of the proposed revenue-sharing mechanism and the profit increase for the whole RSC with the government subsidy
A risk-averse marketing strategy and its effect on coordination activities in a remanufacturing supply chain under market fluctuation
The market fluctuation, usually caused by macro-economic shrinking/boom and ever-changing consumers' preferences/acceptance, brings a high managing challenge for remanufacturers and retailers’ collection efforts and their coordination activities. Besides increasing profit, a market strategy also aims to reduce risk, i.e., profit variations. Thus, apart from the “maximum-profit” marketing strategy, this study tries to explore a risk-averse marketing strategy for a remanufacturer and a retailer in a remanufacturing supply chain. The proposed strategy satisfies the need of reducing risk of shortage/inventory under heavy remanufacturing market fluctuation. By adding the risk-averse factor into objective functions and using a concept of risk tolerance as a risk measurement, this paper investigates the effect of risk attitude for the remanufacturer and the retailer on remanufacturing quantity, expected profit and coordination activities. This paper finds that the proposed risk-averse marketing strategy brings more profit for both the remanufacturers and retailers than that for the “maximum-profit” marketing strategy in a heavier market fluctuation environment. Further, a coordination mechanism with risk attitude is designed and certain conditions are identified for inspiring the remanufacturer and the retailer to participate in supply chain contract coordination, which is of use for remanufacturing practitioners as well as academics. When the remanufacturer and the retailer develop their remanufacturing supply chain contracts in a heavier market fluctuation environment, the proposed strategy succeeds in balancing the expectation of benefits and the risk of market fluctuation. A truck engine remanufacturing case demonstrates that the risk-averse marketing strategy is relatively insensitive to market fluctuation
Research on the coordination of the power battery echelon utilization supply chain considering recycling outsourcing
In the year 2020, the cumulative production and sales of new energy vehicles in China have reached 1.366, and 1.367 million units, which have increased by 7.5% and 10.9% over the previous year. To solve the problem of used batteries, the power battery echelon use system has been proposed. This paper constructs a three-party game supply chain model for one battery manufacturer, one car manufacturer, and one third-party recycler to analyze the impact of the external environment on the supply chain and to a new coordination contract. The research results show that: the retail price of the high-capacity used battery always changes in the same direction as the retail price of the low-capacity used battery. The profit of the battery manufacturer and third-party recycler in the decentralized decision-making model is affected by the retail price of the low-capacity used battery, but the car manufacturers are not affected by it. With the increase in the retail price of the low-capacity used battery, the profits of the third-party recycler will be greater than that of the car manufacturer. The use of profit transfer contracts and the cost-sharing contract can coordinate the supply chain and increase the demand for automobiles and the actual recycling volume. Interestingly, for the third-party recycler, the smaller the cost-shared, the more additional benefits it will get. The actual recycling volume is mainly affected by the market environment.</p
Contract design for a closed-loop supply chain considering information asymmetry of remanufacturing process innovation
Purpose: asymmetric cost information exists between a supplier and a manufacturer regarding the manufacturer's process innovation for remanufacturing (PIR), which may hurt the supplier's profit. The authors therefore seek to develop a menu of nonlinear pricing contracts for channel information sharing.Design/methodology/approach: based on principal–agent theory, the supplier, acting as a Stackelberg leader, designs a menu of nonlinear pricing contracts to impel the manufacturer to disclose its private cost information on PIR (i.e. PIR efficiency). In addition, the authors compare the equilibrium outcomes under asymmetric and symmetric information to examine the effects of asymmetric PIR information on the production policies and profits of the supplier and the manufacturer.Findings: the proposed contract menu encourages th4e manufacturer to spontaneously share PIR efficiency information with the supplier. Asymmetric PIR information may distort the output of new products upward or downward, but the output of remanufactured products may only be distorted downward. In addition, the manufacturer with high PIR efficiency gains information rent, and interestingly, the increase in the probability of low PIR efficiency amplifies its information rent. Finally, an asymmetric information environment may increase the threshold for the manufacturer to enter remanufacturing.Originality/value: the authors probe the issue of the supplier's contract design by jointly considering remanufacturing, process innovation and information asymmetry. The paper expands the influencing mechanism of process innovation information in the remanufacturing field. The authors also observe new results that may offer guidance to decision makers.</p
A decision-making model for remanufacturers: considering both consumers’ environmental preference and the government subsidy policy
Remanufactured products have the significantly low environmental impact through their life cycles, but consumers’ acceptance of remanufactured products is low and uncertain. To promote the use of remanufactured products, the governments in developing countries such as China have provided subsides for remanufacturers. However, how to understand consumers’ preferences and effectively use the government subsidy is still difficult for remanufacturers. This paper develops a decision-making model considering both consumers’ preference for remanufactured products and effect of the government subsidy. Using the price elasticity of demand (PED) of remanufactured products as an indicator to differentiate consumers’ environmental preference, it examines a joint decision problem for price determination of a remanufactured product and share of the subsidy between the remanufacturer and consumers. It is found that the optimal price and the subsidy-sharing percentage are inversely proportional to the weighted-sum of the price elasticity of demand (PED). Based on data from a leading remanufacturer in China, this study finds that if a remanufacturer shares a percentage of the subsidy with consumers, it can get more profit due to the increased market. In order to balance the trade-off of price and share of the subsidy effectively, the sharing percentage of the subsidy and the optimal price of remanufactured products should follow the certain rules, and the sharing percentage of the subsidy relies on the proportion of green consumers. In addition, it is necessary for remanufacturers to have a complete understanding of consumers’ environmental preference and its trends
Effects of asymmetric cost information on collection outsourcing of used products for remanufacturing
Due to environmental and economic benefits from remanufacturing as well as an existing or potential take-back regulation, a manufacturer often implements remanufacturing, but it often delegates a third-party (3P) to collect used products. However, the collection efficiency is the 3P's private information while the prior distribution of the 3P's collection efficiency is possessed by the manufacturer. To maximize its expected profit, the manufacturer can design nonlinear pricing contracts to stimulate the 3P to select one that corresponds to its true type, where the nonlinear pricing contracts consist of the wholesale price and the collecting quantity. Specifically, our modeling analysis reveals that asymmetric information can result in the downward distortion of quantities collected by the 3P with low collection efficiency, whereas the quantities collected by the 3P with high collection efficiency remain unchanged. Besides, faced with information asymmetry and collection outsourcing, the manufacturer may also bring the new product quantity down if the 3P has low collection efficiency. Moreover, the take-back regulation will indirectly reduce consumer surplus, and this negative effect will be amplified by asymmetric information.</p
Remanufacturing and the Supply Chain
Remanufacturing offers the advantages of energy consumption reduction, cost savings, and waste reduction. However, barriers exist along remanufacturing supply chains, from the supply of used products to consumers’ acceptance/preferences for remanufactured products. Thus, support and coordination activities are needed from supply chain members and related stakeholders. This chapter first introduces the background of remanufacturing, discussing current topics and issues with great concerns by practitioners and researchers such as governments’ efforts for remanufacturing, and collection of used products. Then, we introduce the topic of “competitiveness and uncertainties,” which explores how practitioners in a remanufacturing supply chain should face competition and how to coordinate remanufacturing supply chain players to ensure the stability and development of the remanufacturing supply chain. On the topic of “market acceptance,” we introduce how to measure consumers’ preferences, use government subsidies more efficiently, and provide an innovative service mode for remanufactured truck engines. This chapter ends by providing an overview of the evolving remanufacturing supply chain concept, significance, and practice
- …
