1,720,974 research outputs found
The international consequences of lower energy prices. Egmont Commentary, 17 November 2015
No full textEnergy prices are currently low. Various developments have influenced this situation. What are the consequences and how long will it last? The author tries to give some brief answers
EU Dependence on Russian gas: There is no short-term alternative. Egmont Commentary, 7 April 2014
No full textThe EU wants to break free of its gas imports from Russia. US natural gas was offered by Washington as an alternative. T. Zgajewski shows that the implementation of this ambitious project will be difficult to carryout, at least in the short-run
The European Union launches a new, risky 2030 strategy for climate and energy. Egmont Commentary, 26 November 2014
No full textAt its last meeting, the European Council agreed on the 2030 climate and energy strategy for the European Union. It foresees new targets for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, for renewables and for energy efficiency.
With this new strategy, what can we expect for the EU three essential objectives, i.e. sustainability, security and competitiveness
Is China–Russia energy cooperation a pipe dream? Egmont Commentary, 2 December 2015
No full textIn 2014, a gas agreement was concluded between Russia and China. This agreement was meant to mark a major step not only in the global energy market but also in geopolitics. It is now fascinating to observe what has happened during the last 18 months
According to the International Energy Agency’s climate projections, the EU 2030 Energy Strategy will be insufficient. Egmont Commentary, 22 September 2015
No full textAs COP 21 fast approaches, it has seemed interesting to have a quick look at the projections contained in the recent IEA report on energy and climate change in order to see what they mean for the climate negotiations to come
Renewables: The great uncertainty of the EU energy strategy. Egmont Paper No. 71, November 2014
Get PDFSummary.
For more than two decades, the development of renewable energy sources (RES) has
been an important aim of EU energy policy. It accelerated with the adoption of a
1997 White Paper and the setting a decade later of a 20% renewable energy target,
to be reached by 2020. The EU counts on renewable energy for multiple purposes: to
diversify its energy supply; to increase its security of supply; and to create new industries,
jobs, economic growth and export opportunities, while at the same time
reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Many expectations rest on its development.
Fossil fuels have been critical to the development of industrial nations, including EU
Member States, which are now deeply reliant upon coal, oil and gas for nearly every
aspect of their existence. Faced with some hard truths, however, the Member States
have begun to shelve fossil fuel. These hard truths are as follows: firstly, fossil fuels
are a finite resource, sometimes difficult to extract. This means that, at some point,
fossil fuels are going to be more difficult to access in Europe or too expensive to use.1
The problem is that you cannot just stop using fossil fuels when they become too
expensive; the existing infrastructure is profoundly reliant on fossil fuels. It is thus
almost normal that a fierce resistance to change exists. Secondly, fossil fuels
contribute to climate change. They emit GHG, which contribute greatly to climate
change. As a consequence, their use needs to be drastically reduced. Thirdly,
Member States are currently suffering a decline in their own fossil fuel production.
This increases their dependence on increasingly costly fossil fuel imports from
increasingly unstable countries. This problem is compounded by global developments:
the growing share of emerging economies in global energy demand (in
particular China and India but also the Middle East) and the development of unconventional
oil and gas production in the United States. All these elements endanger
the competitiveness of Member States’ economies and their security of supply.
Therefore, new indigenous sources of energy and a diversification of energy
suppliers and routes to convey energy need to be found.
To solve all these challenges, in 2008 the EU put in place a strategy based on three
objectives: sustainability (reduction of GHG), competitiveness and security of supply.
The adoption of a renewable energy policy was considered essential for reaching
these three strategic objectives. The adoption of the 20% renewable energy target has undeniably had a positive
effect in the EU on the growth in renewables, with the result that renewable energy
sources are steadily increasing their presence in the EU energy mix. They are now, it
can be said, an integral part of the EU energy system.
However, the necessity of reaching this 20% renewable energy target in 2020,
combined with other circumstances, has also engendered in many Member States a
certain number of difficulties, creating uncertainties for investors and postponing
benefits for consumers. The electricity sector is the clearest example of this downside.
Subsidies have become extremely abundant and vary from one Member State
to another, compromising both fair competition and single market. Networks
encountered many difficulties to develop and adapt. With technological progress
these subsidies have also become quite excessive. The growing impact of renewable
electricity fluctuations has made some traditional power plants unprofitable and
created disincentives for new investments. The EU does clearly need to reassess its
strategy. If it repeats the 2008 measures it will risk to provoke increased instability
and costs
Can the European Union survive without importing Russian energy sources? Egmont Commentary, 13 June 2014
No full textRussia is the biggest exporter of fossil energy sources on this Earth. It exports gas, petrol, coal, uranium to the European Union. The EU could feasibly abandon Russian energy sources, but this commentary explains why such a move would be considerably more difficult to bring about in the case of gas
The EU regime on biofuels in transport: Still in search of sustainability. Egmont Paper No. 68, July 2014
Get PDFLike other regions of the world, the EU is developing biofuels in the transport sector
to reduce oil consumption and mitigate climate change. To promote them, it has
adopted favourable legislation since the 2000s. In 2009 it even decided to oblige
each Member State to ensure that by 2020 the share of energy coming from renewable
sources reached at least 10% of their final consumption of energy in the transport
sector. Biofuels are considered the main instrument to reach that percentage
since the development of other alternatives (such as hydrogen and electricity) will
take much longer than expected.
Meanwhile, these various legislative initiatives have driven the production and
consumption of biofuels in the EU. Biofuels accounted for 4.7% of EU transport fuel
consumption in 2011. They have also led to trade and investment in biofuels on a
global scale.
This large-scale expansion of biofuels has, however, revealed numerous negative
impacts. These stem from the fact that first-generation biofuels (i.e., those produced
from food crops), of which the most important types are biodiesel and bioethanol,
are used almost exclusively to meet the EU’s renewable 10% target in transport.
Their negative impacts are: socioeconomic (food price rises), legal (land-grabbing),
environmental (for instance, water stress and water pollution; soil erosion; reduction
of biodiversity), climatic (direct and indirect land-use effects resulting in more greenhouse
gas emissions) and public finance issues (subsidies and tax relief).
The extent of such negative impacts depends on how biofuel feedstocks are
produced and processed, the scale of production, and in particular, how they influence
direct land use change (DLUC) and indirect land use change (ILUC) and the international
trade.
These negative impacts have thus provoked mounting debates in recent years, with
a particular focus on ILUC. They have forced the EU to re-examine how it deals with
biofuels and submit amendments to update its legislation. So far, the EU legislation
foresees that only sustainable biofuels (produced in the EU or imported) can be used
to meet the 10% target and receive public support; and to that end, mandatory
sustainability criteria have been defined. Yet they have a huge flaw. Their measurement
of greenhouse gas savings from biofuels does not take into account greenhouse
gas emissions resulting from ILUC, which represent a major problem.
The Energy Council of June 2014 agreed to set a limit on the extent to which firstgeneration
biofuels can count towards the 10% target. But this limit appears to be
less stringent than the ones made previously by the European Commission and the
European Parliament. It also agreed to introduce incentives for the use of advanced (second- and third-generation) biofuels which would be allowed to count double
towards the 10% target. But this again appears extremely modest by comparison
with what was previously proposed. Finally, the approach chosen to take into
account the greenhouse gas emissions due to ILUC appears more than cautious. The
Energy Council agreed that the European Commission will carry out a reporting of
ILUC emissions by using provisional estimated factors. A review clause will permit the
later adjustment of these ILUC factors.
With such legislative orientations made by the Energy Council, one cannot consider
yet that there is a major shift in the EU biofuels policy. Bolder changes would have
probably meant risking the collapse of the high-emission conventional biodiesel
industry which currently makes up the majority of Europe’s biofuel production. The
interests of EU farmers would have also been affected.
There is nevertheless a tension between these legislative orientations and the new
Commission’s proposals beyond 2020. In any case, many uncertainties remain on this
issue. As long as solutions have not been found to minimize the important collateral
damages provoked by the first generation biofuels, more scientific studies and
caution are needed.
Meanwhile, it would be wise to improve alternative paths towards a sustainable
transport sector, i.e., stringent emission and energy standards for all vehicles, better
public transport systems, automobiles that run on renewable energy other than
biofuels, or other alternatives beyond the present imagination
The Energy Performance of Buildings: Promises Still Unfulfilled. Egmont Paper No. 78, May 2015
Get PDFEXECUTIVE SUMMARY
All observers agree that energy efficiency must be the cornerstone of any serious EU
energy strategy. In this general context, the EU building sector is critical. It represents
about 40% of EU final energy consumption (residential houses, public/private offices,
commercial buildings, etc.) and approximately 36% of EU CO2 emissions. This is
massive.
The EU has certainly not been inactive in this field. The Energy Performance in Buildings
Directive 2002/91/EC (EPBD) was the first and the main instrument to address
the problem of the energy performance of buildings. It has established numerous
principles: a reliable methodology which enables the calculation and rating of the
energy performance of buildings; minimum energy performance standards for new
buildings and existing buildings under major renovation; energy performance certificates;
regular inspection of heating and air-conditioning systems; and, finally,
quality standards for inspections and energy performance certificates. They were
strengthened in 2010 by the recast Directive 2010/31/EU. This directive also introduces
a decisive concept for the development of the building sector: ‘nearly zeroenergy
buildings’.
In 2012, the new Energy Efficiency Directive 2012/27/EU dealt with other aspects. In
the building sector, three of them are particularly important. They concern: (1) the
establishment of long-term strategies for mobilizing investment in the renovation of
the national building stocks; (2) the introduction of energy saving schemes for ‘designated’
energy companies with a view to reducing consumption among ‘final
consumers’ by 1.5% annually; and (3), as an option, the setting up of an Energy
Efficiency National Fund to support energy efficiency initiatives. This paper also
briefly examines the different instruments put in place to disseminate information
and consultation, and the EU funding for energy efficiency in buildings.
Results, however, have remained limited until now. The improvement of the energy
performance of buildings and the rhythm of renovation remain extremely weak.
Member States’ unwillingness to timely and properly transpose and implement the
Directives continues despite the high degree of flexibility permitted. The decentralized
approach chosen for some specific aspects and the differentiation in the application
of EPBD standards between Member States do not appear optimal either.
Adequate financial schemes remain rare. The permanent deficit of qualified and
trained personnel and the inertia of public authorities to make the public understand
the stakes in this domain remain problematic. Hence the need to take new initiatives
to reap the benefits that the building sector is meant to bring
The rise of capacity mechanisms: are they inevitable in the European Union? Egmont Paper 80, September 2015
Get PDFThese last years, in multiple Member States, the electricity markets have seen the rapid emergence of Capacity Remuneration Mechanisms (CRMs). They are meant to guarantee the stability of the electricity system in a more uncertain context. The reactions of the European Commission were late towards them. It is thus essential to bring some clarity here, otherwise the legal uncertainty could become a new impediment for investment
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