1,721,018 research outputs found
Equilibrium and Disequilibrium Dynamics in the 1930s
No full textThe paper deals with some methodological proposals which emerged in the 1930s in the works of the founders of modern analysis of equilibrium over time. Just after the introduction of the notions of intertemporal and temporary equilibrium Hayek, Hicks and Lindahl moved towards an analysis of the disequilibrium process in order to incorporate the interplay between expectations of individual agents and actual realisation of relevant economic variables. The main part of the paper discusses the respective role of Hayek and Lindahl in the development of a dynamic theory. It is argued that while Lindahl's approach can be considered more revealing for the study of disequilibrium than Hayek's discussion of how order may emerge, Hayek's insights on the analogy between economic theory and neural network theory have not yet received enough consideration
After the crisis: financial economics and decision theory
No full textThis paper reviews the classics of financial economics with the benefit of insight offered by the recent financial crisis. The failure of mainstream financial models to explain the observed behavior of markets is put in relation with Itzhak Gilboa’s critique of the
decisional model used for assessing choice under uncertainty. The paper argues that Gilboa’s attempt to develop an alternative theory of decision under uncertainty has a clear Keynesian derivation
Temi, problemi e scuole nel pensiero economico: un commento
No full textReview article sulla recente storiografia critica relativa alla scuola di pensiero austriaca
L’approccio austriaco alla teoria economica: un commento su alcuni recenti contributi
No full textReview article sulla analisi recente del contributo della scuola austriaca all'evoluzione del pensiero economic
L'incertezza in economia. Una storia delle teorie da Keynes ai giorni nostri
No full textL’incertezza sugli esiti delle azioni degli agenti economici pervade la discussione pubblica, non solo fra economisti, ma anche nel dibattito politico e sociale in generale. Crisi finanziarie e nuove tecnologie, per non parlare di pandemie e guerre, ci ricordano costantemente che la teoria economica della scelta razionale deve tener conto degli eventi che sono difficili da prevedere. Almeno sin dagli anni Venti del secolo scorso, con i lavori di John Maynard Keynes e Frank Knight, gli studiosi di economia hanno cercato di dare una risposta a questa esigenza. La scienza economica ha però affrontato il problema della scelta in condizioni di incertezza in modo non univoco, tra impostazioni formalizzate che hanno proposto soluzioni precise e teorie alternative che hanno sostenuto che ciò non è possibile, perché non tutte le incertezze sono riconducibili ai rischi probabilistici. Il volume ripercorre le teorie economiche che hanno messo in primo piano il tema dell’incertezza. Il modo di rappresentarla e gli strumenti per affrontarla hanno una storia complessa, che condiziona le risposte che offriamo alle grandi domande del presente, e il libro la ricostruisce in modo sintetico ed esaustiv
Keynesian interpretations of the financial crisis
No full textA by-product of the recent financial crisis has been the renewed interest in Keynes's works. Both in the press and in scientific journals, a crowd of commentators has emphasised the need to scrutinise the General Theory in order to gain a better understanding of the actual macro-dynamics of the economy and of the policy measures apt to help the economy recover from the downturn. But Keynes's thought has been given central prominence also with respect to the understanding of what went wrong at the microeconomic level, with specific reference to the role played by “irrational” agents animated by animal spirits. This paper supplements the influential analysis of George Akerlof and Robert Shiller’s Animal Spirits by arguing that a Keynesian explanation of the actual behaviour of individual agents is to be based more on the Treatise on Probability than on the General Theory itself. Indeed, while it is well-know that the rationale of Keynes's rejection of “Benthamite calculus” is best provided in the Treatise, less attention is usually given to the constructive analysis emerging from his criticism of contemporary probability theory. Through an assessment of Keynes's examination of “the application of probability to conduct” in the Treatise, the paper shows that most of the developments of what is usually referred to as behavioural finance have a Keynesian origin. In particular Keynes hinted at a decision rule different from mathematical expectation, a rule intended to mimic the behaviour of actual agents making decisions under uncertainty. The understanding of the current financial crisis, the paper concludes, would gain from a Keynesian assessment of the rationale for actual decisions as much as from the usual one concerning macroeconomic policy
The economics of information, market socialism and Hayek’s legacy
No full textHayek's advocacy of capitalism has been recently questioned by a new generation of models of market socialism. These models take stock of the recent developments in the economics of information which are critical of the Walrasian view of the market mechanism. This paper focuses on Hayek's interpretation of the market mechanism by making reference to the main issues which emerge from the socialist calculation debate in the 1930s. lt is argued that Hayek's notion of knowledge can be applied to an analysis of the functions performed by competitive markets which is compatible with the post-Walrasian developments of the economics of information. As a result, a tentative assessment of the relevance of Hayek's arguments for the new generation of market socialism models is provided
Leonard Savage, the Ellsberg Paradox and the Debate on Subjective Probabilities: Evidence from the Archives
Full text linkThis paper explores archival material concerning the reception of Leonard J. Savage’s foundational work of rational choice theory in its subjective-Bayesian form. The focus is on the criticism raised in the early 1960s by Daniel Ellsberg, William Fellner and Cedric Smith, who were supporters of the newly developed subjective approach, but could not understand Savage’s insistence on the strict
version he shared with Bruno de Finetti. The episode is well-known, thanks to the so-called Ellsberg Paradox and the extensive reference made to it in current decision theory. But Savage’s reaction to his critics has never been examined. Although Savage never really engaged with the issue in his published writings, the private exchange with Ellsberg and Fellner, and with de Finetti about how to deal with Smith, shows that Savage’s attention to the generalization advocated by his correspondents was substantive. In particular, Savage’s defence of the normative value of rational choice theory against counterexamples such as Ellsberg’s did not prevent him from admitting that he would give careful consideration to a more realistic axiomatic system, should the critics be able to provide one
L'influenza di Sraffa sull'evoluzione della teoria di Hayek
No full textThe paper deals with the effect of Piero Sraffa's review of "Prices and Production" on the evolution of Hayek's theory. It is contended that, though Hayek never referred to Sraffa's review in his reformulation of the theory of trade cycle and capital in the 1930s, an important shift in emphasis concerning Hayek's assessment of non-monetary causes of the business cycle must be related to Hayek's reply to a specific question raised by Sraffa. In particular, it is argued that Hayek's first mention that the model of a real economy on which his trade cycle theory is based is not satisfying, a theme which pervades almost the whole of Hayek's work until "The Pure Theory of Capital", is to be found in his reply to Sraffa's argument that investment may be abortive with or without money
Hayek, Lucas e la teoria dell'informazione
No full textIl paper discute la possibile discendenza della teoria delle aspettative razionali dalla teoria del ciclo economico d Hayek. Il paper argomenta che il ciclo economico di Hayek non è ascrivibile alla nozione di ciclo economico in equilibrio
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