5,413 research outputs found
Fonds Louis Bertrand. Fonds numérisé. Correspondance de Louis Bertrand. [Lettre manuscrite de Xavier de Magallon à Louis Bertrand]
Numérisation effectuée à partir d'un document original : LBC1127.Appartient à l'ensemble documentaire : 3M000Appartient à l'ensemble documentaire : 3M007Magallon, Xavier de (1866-1956).Bertrand, Louis (1866-1941).Paris (France).Lieu de copie : Pari
Fonds Louis Bertrand. Fonds numérisé. Correspondance de Louis Bertrand. [Lettre manuscrite de Xavier Magallon à Louis Bertrand]
Numérisation effectuée à partir d'un document original : LBC1212.Appartient à l'ensemble documentaire : 3M000Appartient à l'ensemble documentaire : 3M007Magallon, Xavier de (1866-1956).Bertrand, Louis (1866-1941).Paris (France).Lieu de copie : Paris (252 rue de Rivoli
Bertrand and Price-Taking Equilibria in Markets with Product Differentiation
In this paper we show that a homogeneous-product market with multiple Bertrand equilibria becomes a market with a single Bertrand equilibrium when we introduce a small degree of product differentiation. When differentiation tends to zero, that Bertrand equilibrium converges to the unique price-taking equilibrium of the homogeneous-product market, which is in turn one of the multiple Bertrand equilibria for that market.Bertrand equilibrium, price-taking equilibrium, product differentiation
Export Taxes under Bertrand Duopoly
This article analyses export taxes in a Bertrand duopoly with product differentiation, where a home and a foreign firm both export to a third-country market. It is shown that the maximum-revenue export tax always exceeds the optimum-welfare export tax. In a Nash equilibrium in export taxes, the country with the low cost firm imposes the largest export tax. The results under Bertrand duopoly are compared with those under Cournot duopoly. It is shown that the absolute value of the export subsidy or tax under Cournot duopoly exceeds the export tax under Bertrand duopoly.
Comparing Cournot and Bertrand equilibria revisited
This paper compares Cournot and Bertrand equilibria with mixed products, linear demand and cost functions. It is found that a firm's price (output) need not be higher (lower) in Cournot equilibrium. However, given any number of firms and a mixture of complement and substitute products, every firm's price margin/output ratio is always higher in Cournot equilibrium, and the weighted squared outputs (price margins) are higher (lower) in Bertrand equilibrium. When price (quantity) competition is a supermodular game, consumer surplus (social welfare) is higher in price competition. Nevertheless, price competition results in more market concentration measured by Herfindahl index. -- In diesem Beitrag werden Cournot- und Bertrand-Gleichgewichte für den Fall des Produktemix, linearer Nachfrage- und Kostenfunktionen verglichen. Als Ergebnis kann festgestellt werden, daß der Preis (Output) eines Unternehmens im Cournot-Gleichgewicht nicht höher (niedriger) sein muß. Angenommen, es gibt eine beliebige Zahl von Unternehmen und ein Produktemix von Komplementär- und Substitutionsgütern, dann ist der Quotient aus Preisspanne/Output immer höher im Cournot-Gleichgewicht und die gewichteten Quadrate der Outputs (Preisspannen) sind höher (niedriger) im Bertrand- Gleichgewicht. Wenn Preis-(Mengen)-Wettbewerb als supermodulares Spiel betrachtet wird, dann ist der Konsumentenüberschuß (soziale Wohlfahrt) im Falle des Preiswettbewerbs höher. Trotzdem führt Preiswettbewerb zur höherer Marktkonzentration, gemessen am Herfindahl-Index.
Product Differentiation and the Gains from Trade under Bertrand Duopoly
In the literature on the welfare effects of free trade under imperfect competition, one important case seems to have been overlooked and that is the Bertrand duopoly model with differentiated products. Although many authors have analysed the welfare effects of free trade under Cournot duopoly, and demonstrated the possibility of losses from trade, there has been no thorough analysis of the welfare effects of free trade under Bertrand duopoly. This paper presents a thorough analysis of the welfare effects of free trade under Bertrand duopoly with differentiated products, and it is shown that there are always gains from trade.gains from trade, Bertrand Oligopoly
Some forgotten equilibria of the Bertrand duopoly!?
This note analyzes the Bertrand duopoly with constant but asymmetric marginal costs on a market with homogenous products. It is shown that there exist some equilibria that are ignored in the literature on IO. In addition, in this setting (perfectly or nearly perfectly) competitive equilibria exist.
A Model-To-Model Analysis of Bertrand Competition
This paper studies a version of the classical Bertrand model in which consumers exhibit some strategic behavior when deciding from what seller they will buy. We use two related but different tools. Both consider a probabilistic learning (or evolutionary) mechanism, and in the two of them consumers\' behavior influences the competition between the sellers. The results obtained show that, in general, developing some sort of loyalty is a good strategy for the buyers as it works in their best interest. First, we consider a learning procedure described by a deterministic dynamic system and, using strong simplifying assumptions, we can produce a description of the behavior of the process. Second, we use finite automata to represent the strategies played by the agents and an adaptive process based on genetic algorithms to simulate the stochastic process of learning. By doing so we can relax some of the strong assumptions used in the first approach and still obtain the same basic results. It is suggested that the limitations of the first approach (analytical) provide a good motivation for the second approach (Agent-Based). Indeed, although both approaches address the same problem, the use of Agent-Based computational techniques allows us to relax hypothesis and overcome the limitations of the analytical approach while obtaining the same basic results.Agent-Based Computational Economics, Model-To-Model Analysis,
Fonds Louis Bertrand. Fonds numérisé. Correspondance de Louis Bertrand. [Lettre autographe de René-Xavier Prinet à Louis Bertrand]
Numérisation effectuée à partir d'un document original : LBC0613.Appartient à l'ensemble documentaire : 3M000Appartient à l'ensemble documentaire : 3M007Prinet, René (1861-1946).Bertrand, Louis (1866-1941).Suaucourt-et-Pisseloup (Haute-Saône, France).Lieu de copie : Suaucourt (Haute Saône
Livres et archives dans le diocèse de Liège, XIVe-XVIe siècle
Bertrand Paul, Hermand Xavier. Livres et archives dans le diocèse de Liège, XIVe-XVIe siècle. In: Gazette du livre médiéval, n°35. Automne 1999. pp. 1-9
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