1,744,005 research outputs found
Wittgenstein über das Verstehen
Publications of the series include the official proceedings of the ALWS-conferences and of their special workshops. The series is open also for other high-quality publications, especially on the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein and its influence on contemporary analytic philosophy.Intro -- Einleitung -- I Wittgenstein über das Verstehen des logischen Symbolismus -- Erstes Kapitel Die Quellen von Wittgensteins Begriff des logischen Symbolismus -- 1. Frege über Prinzipien des Aufbaus des logischen Symbolismus -- 2. Russell über logische Konstanten. Die Typentheorie der Principia Mathematica -- 3. Russell über die logische Form des Urteilens -- 4. Wittgensteins Kritik -- 4a. Logische Konstanten und logisches Schließen -- 4b. Die Typentheorie -- 4c. Das Urteilen -- Zweites Kapitel Die Theorie des logischen Symbolismus als Hauptthema des Tractatus -- Drittes Kapitel Die Bildtheorie des Tractatus -- 1. Das Bild als Symbol -- 1a. Das Bild als Gebilde -- 1b. Das Bild als Symbol -- 1c. Der logische Symbolismus nach Wittgenstein -- 2. Die Problematik der Bildtheorie -- Viertes Kapitel Wittgenstein über logische Operationen -- 1. Wittgensteins Begriff der Operation und der Begriff der Operation in der algebraisch-logischen Tradition -- 1a. Konstruktive Operationen Wittgensteins -- 1b. Zu Geach-Fogelin Diskussion -- 1c. Wittgensteins bejahende Operationen -- 2. Das logische Schließen und der Begriff des Sinnes -- 3. Der logische Symbolismus und die logische Theorie -- 4. Logische Theorie Wittgensteins und die Entwicklung der Logik im 20ten Jahrhundert -- 4a. Logik als ein Kalkül -- Fünftes Kapitel Das Verstehen eines Symbols. Voraussetzungen des Verstehens -- 1. Ein Symbol verstehen -- 2. Das Verstehen als Kriterium der Unterscheidung von Symbolen -- 3. Der Verstehende -- 4. Wittgensteins Erkenntnistheorie -- Beilage 1 Tractatus logico-philosophicus Begriffliche Rekonstruktion -- II Der Begriff des Verstehens in den Philosophischen Untersuchungen -- Erster Abschnitt Der Begriff des Sprachspiels -- Erstes Kapitel1 Der Begriff des Sprachspiels als ein Modell1. Sprachspiel: Modell oder Tatsache -- 2. Modellbegriff -- 3. Mögliche Quellen des Begriffs des Sprachspiels -- 4. Sprachspiel als Spiel -- 4a. Huizinga über das Spiel -- 4c. Gadamer über das Spiel -- 4d. Sprachspiel als Spiel -- 5. Sprachspielbegriff als ein Modell -- Zweites Kapitel Der Begriff des Sprachspiels und Wittgensteins Theorie des Symbolismus -- 1. Sprachspiel als ein Symbol -- 1a. Gätschenberger über Symbole und Symbolsysteme -- 1b. Der symbolische Charakter des Sprachspiels -- 2. Von logischen Operationen zu symbolischen Operationen -- 2a. Grammatische Sätze -- 2b. Die Grammatik eines Wortes -- Zweiter Abschnitt Wittgenstein über das Verstehen und die Bedeutung eines Satzes -- Erstes Kapitel Philosophische Untersuchungen als hermeneutischer Versuch -- 1. Das Verstehen als hermeneutisches Phänomen -- 2. Fragen und ihre logischen Charakteristika -- 3. Ein Versuch der hermeneutischen Rekonstruktion der Auffassung Wittgensteins am Beispiel der 525-570 der Philosophischen Untersuchungen -- Zweites Kapitel Wittgenstein über das Verstehen -- 1. Husserl (Logische Untersuchungen) über das Verstehen -- a) Zeichen -- b) Intentionale Erlebnisse -- c) Intentionale Gegenstände -- d) Bedeutungen -- e) Husserl über das Verstehen -- 2. Wittgenstein über Voraussetzungen für das Verstehen eines Zeichens -- Anhang 1 Begriffliche Parallelen zwischen dem zweiten Band der Logischen Untersuchungen und dem Tractatuslogico-philosophicus -- Anhang 2 Begriffliche Parallelen zwischen dem zweiten Band der Logischen Untersuchungen und den Philosophischen Untersuchungen -- Beilage 2 Philosophische Untersuchungen, Teil I Begriffliche Rekonstruktion -- Namen- und SachregisterPublications of the series include the official proceedings of the ALWS-conferences and of their special workshops. The series is open also for other high-quality publications, especially on the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein and its influence on contemporary analytic philosophy.Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, YYYY. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries
Text-Genetic-Philosophical Notes About the Wittgenstein Nachlass: Band Series I Items MSS 105-122
The Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen (WAB) has commissioned Joachim Schulte to author text-genetic-philosophical descriptions for each single item of the Wittgenstein Nachlass. The descriptions, called “notes”, will be published successively in the metadata section (“m”) of the Bergen Nachlass Edition (BNE) on Wittgenstein Source http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/ (for an example see http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/Ms-105_m). Moreover, the descriptions will, beginning with this issue, be published in packets in the “From the Archives” section of the Nordic Wittgenstein Review. This first publication includes descriptions of each item pertaining to the first Band series of the Nachlass, numbered by Wittgenstein I–XVIII (MSS 105–122), as well as a description of the entire series as such
Nordic Wittgenstein Review Symposium on James R. Shaw’s Wittgenstein on Rules: Justification, Grammar, and Agreement
Nordic Wittgenstein Review Symposium on James R. Shaw’s Wittgenstein on Rules: Justification, Grammar, and Agreement. With contributions by James R. Shaw, Oskari Kuusela, Alex Miller, and Hannah Ginsborg
Wittgenstein on Vaihinger and Frazer
In this paper I demonstrate the connection between the single remark Wittgenstein made explicitly on Hans Vaihinger’s Die Philosophie des als ob and the remarks he made on Sir James George Frazer’s The Golden Bough. After a critical-genetic exposition of the relevant material, I offer an interpretation of that connection, which will require that I interpret the remark on the philosophy of “as if” relative to how Wittgenstein seems to regard Vaihinger’s fictionalism and relative to how Wittgenstein reads Frazer
Thinking about Animals: James, Wittgenstein, Hearne
In this paper I reconsider James and Wittgenstein, not in the quest for what Wittgenstein might have learned from James, or for an answer to the question whether Wittgenstein was a pragmatist, but in an effort to see what these and other related but quite different thinkers can help us to see about animals, including ourselves. I follow Cora Diamond’s lead in discussing a late paper by Vicki Hearne entitled “A Taxonomy of Knowing: Animals Captive, Free-Ranging, and at Liberty” (1995), which draws on Wittgenstein and offers some insights that accord with pragmatist accounts of knowledge
Wittgenstein\u27s Critical Physiognomy
In saying that meaning is a physiognomy, Wittgenstein invokes a philosophical tradition of critical physiognomy, one that developed in opposition to a scientific physiognomy. The form of a critical physiognomic judgment is one of reasoning that is circular and dynamic, grasping intention, thoughts, and emotions in seeing the expressive movements of bodies in action. In identifying our capacities for meaning with our capacities for physiognomic perception, Wittgenstein develops an understanding of perception and meaning as oriented and structured by our shared practical concerns and needs. For Wittgenstein, critical physiognomy is both fundamental for any meaningful interaction with others and a capacity we cultivate, and so expressive of taste in actions and ways of living. In recognizing how fundamental our capacity for physiognomic perception is to our form of life Wittgenstein inherits and radicalizes a tradition of critical physiognomy that stretches back to Kant and Lessing. Aesthetic experiences such as painting, poetry, and movies can be vital to the cultivation of taste in actions and in ways of living
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus by Ludwig Wittgenstein: three parallel tree-structured editions. (1) Tree-structured arrangement of the German text, edited by David G. Stern, Joachim Schulte and Katia Saporiti. (2) Tree-structured arrangement of the English translation by Ogden and Ramsey, edited by David G. Stern. (3) Tree-structured arrangement of the English translation by Pears and McGuinness, edited by David G. Stern
A List of Meetings between Wittgenstein and Sraffa
This paper presents a list of meetings between Wittgenstein and Sraffa during the period 1929-1951. It was compiled using Sraffa’s notes from his pocket diaries and including supplement appointments noted by Wittgenstein. The information - like addresses or names of other speakers - added by Sraffa to some appointments have been here explained in the footnotes. As it is shown, it emerges by the list that the meetings between Wittgenstein and Sraffa can be divided in several different periods
Sulle lettere di Wittgenstein e su come (e perché) leggerle
Viene discusso il significato che lo studio delle lettere di Ludwig Wittgenstein può avere al fine di una migliore (o diversa) comprensione della sua filosofia e del suo atteggiamento nei confronti della vita e del suo tempo. A tal fine vengono, daun lato, considerati alcuni modi in cui è stato affrontato il problema del rapporto tra dato biografico e contenuto filosofico; da un altro, ci si domanda se, rispetto a questo problema, Wittgenstein costituisca un caso peculiare non riconducibile a qualche tipicità filosofica
Wittgenstein and the Complexities of Semio-Translation – Wittgenstein in Translation (2012) by Dinda L. Gorlée
Review of Dinda L. Gorlée: Wittgenstein in Translation (2012
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