1,720,973 research outputs found
Animals: A History
Get PDF© 2019, The author(s). The attached document (embargoed until 11/02/2021) is an author produced version of a paper published in BRITISH JOURNAL FOR THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY uploaded in accordance with the publisher’s self- archiving policy. The final published version (version of record) is available online at the link. Some minor differences between this version and the final published version may remain. We suggest you refer to the final published version should you wish to cite from it
Kidnapping an ugly child: is Willliam James a pragmaticist?
No full textSince the term ‘pragmatism’ was first coined, there have been debates about who is or is not a ‘real’ pragmatist, and what that might mean. The division most often drawn in contemporary pragmatist scholarship is between William James and Charles Peirce. Peirce is said to present a version of pragmatism which is scientific, logical and objective about truth, whereas James presents a version which is nominalistic, subjectivistic and leads to relativism. The first person to set out this division was in fact Peirce himself, when he distinguished his own ‘pragmaticism’ from the broad pragmatism of James and others. Peirce sets out six criteria which defines ‘pragmaticism’: the pragmatic maxim; a number of ‘preliminary propositions’; prope-positivism; metaphysical inquiry; critical common-sensism; and scholastic realism. This paper sets out to argue that in fact James meets each of these criteria, and should be seen as a ‘pragmaticist’ by Peirce’s own lights.© 2019, BSHP. The attached document (embargoed until 04/03/2019) is an author produced version of a paper published in BRITISH JOURNAL FOR THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY uploaded in accordance with the publisher’s self- archiving policy. The final published version (version of record) is available online at the link below. Some minor differences between this version and the final published version may remain. We suggest you refer to the final published version should you wish to cite from it
The role of temperaments in philosophical inquiry: a pragmatic approach
No full textIn his Pragmatism lectures, William James famously argued that personal temperaments had an important role to play in philosophical inquiry. Our temperamental natures help determine which philosophical theories we find satisfying and their influence explains persistent disagreement in the history of philosophy. Crucially, James was not just making a descriptive claim about the formation of our philosophical preferences. James was also making a radical normative claim: that temperaments could play a legitimate epistemic role in our philosophical inquiries. This paper aims to evaluate and defend this more radical claim. This temperamental metaphilosophy has been roundly criticised both in James’ own time and in our own. This paper identifies three key problems for James’ view: (1) that allowing temperaments to play a role in our inquiry would dissolve that inquiry by replacing philosophical disagreements with psychological differences; (2) that introducing temperamental differences into our inquiries would allow entirely arbitrary elements to influence the outcome of those inquiries; and (3) that a view in which our temperamental natures could have an epistemic role would assume an implausible metaphysical picture. Through clarifying the exact nature of temperaments, and what would count as a satisfactory philosophical theory on a pragmatist account, this paper argues that there is an available interpretation of James’ metaphilosophical claims which can provide satisfactory responses to these problems. In addition, this interpretation has the benefit of connecting James’ position with a wider pragmatist tradition in which affective states ground philosophical inquiry
Prophets, plumbers, and philosophers: a pragmatic argument for public philosophy
No full textWhat is the value of public philosophy? “Philosopher-first” accounts suggest that the ideas that academic philosophers produce can, when disseminated, be useful to the wider public. However, such accounts assume that there is a gap between the interests and activities of professional philosophers and those of the wider public, which must be overcome by translating philosophy into more accessible terms. This article offers an alternative account—the “public-first” account. On this account, philosophy is a necessary part of everyday life. Each of us relies upon a background of conceptual resources that shape our interpretations, expectations, and behaviours in the world. Professional philosophers might be useful in analysing, maintaining, and fixing our conceptual infrastructure. However, there is no gap between philosophy and everyday life, which must be overcome. Whilst most defences of public philosophy argue that it is beneficial to the public, on the “public-first” account, public philosophy is also vital for the discipline of philosophy itself. If philosophers want to adequately evaluate their philosophical theories, they must appeal to a much wider and more diverse range of human experience than that of professional philosophers themselves. As such, public philosophy is necessary for properly conducted philosophical inquiry
The no interest argument and the rights of nature
No full textAwarding rights to rivers, forests, and other environmental entities (EEs) is a new and increasingly popular approach to environmental protection. The distinctive feature of such rights of nature (RoN) legislation is that direct duties are owed to the EEs.This paper presents a novel rebuttal of the strongest argument against RoN: the no interest argument. The crux of this argument is that because EEs are not sentient, they cannot possess the kinds of interests necessary to ground direct duties. Therefore, they cannot be legitimate rights-bearers. After considering and rejecting standard responses to this argument, the paper challenges its fundamental assumption: that rights-correlative duties must be grounded in the interests of the rights-bearer. The paper then presents the RoN critic with a dilemma. The critic must either accept that EEs are legitimate rights-bearers or delegitimise many well-established rights-bearers along with EEs. Either way,the no interest argument loses its force
Radical Empiricism, British Idealism, and the Reality of Relations
No full textThis chapter focuses on the relationship between James and Bradley, and their metaphysical disputes around the reality of relations and the nature of immediate experience. The respect that Bradley accorded to radical empiricism was clearly in part due to the similarity he saw between it and his own monistic idealism. James also appreciated this similarity. In fact, both the public and private correspondence between the two is haunted by a palpable frustration – a frustration which comes from the lurking sense that it is only one or two confusions or misinterpretations which block the two thinkers from heartfelt agreement. According to James, both the classical empiricists and the idealists make the same mistake: they assume that the manifold of feeling is discontinuous. The final feature of James’s radical empiricism to note is that experience is neutral between subject and object:The instant field of the present is at all times what I call the ‘pure experience’
The future of the rights of nature: an interdisciplinary scoping analysis
No full textThe Earth is facing multiple interdependent social and ecological crises including climate change, biodiversity loss and habitat loss, necessitating an urgent rethink of the ways in which humankind conserve and manage natural environments. In such a context, the proposal of recognising the rights of nature (RoN) offers a possible paradigm change in our approach to and relationship with nature. RoN is increasingly being recognized in laws, legal decisions, and declarations worldwide. The reasons for this are complex and place-specific, but relate to issues of social equity and representational justice, the (in)effectiveness and/or (non)enforcement of environmental regulation, and the pressing concerns for global socio-ecological challenges. RoN is seen by many as the paradigm shift needed to embed ecology and the environment into nature-based policy and management solutions to address biodiversity loss, climate change, and sustainable development. Our scoping study highlights that despite its promising role to offer a revolutionary approach to our relationship with nature, academic research and funding have yet to engage meaningfully with this emerging field of research. Existing research projects are grappling with RoN from specific disciplinary perspectives and the truly transformative nature of this new approach to our environment must still be explored. Although rights of nature have been introduced in various countries across the world, research linking humanities, social sciences and environmental sciences is still lacking. As our report highlights, the potentially transformative impact of RoN on social and ecological systems warrants such interdisciplinary research. To fully understand how human beings and societies relate to the non-human environment, how to comprehend and act upon the obligations we have towards nature and to each other, and how to navigate and creatively re-think our social, legal, and political approaches to non-human nature, we need methodologies and approaches that transcend humanities, social sciences and environmental sciences as well as ones that can better link theories with practice. To fill this gap, our scoping study offers first ideas and methodologies to undertake interdisciplinary research, notably between humanities, social sciences, and environmental sciences. The study suggests that recognising RoN could enhance local communities’ participatory role by recognising their ‘guardianship’ role towards nature, which could contribute to a better socio-cultural and ecological model of social-environmental governance, and as such could offer a solid platform to bring a real transformative approach to address some of the most urgent social-environmental challenges of our planet. To address these challenges, our report suggests common areas of focus for interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary research, whilst also examining possible avenues to support the funding of this research. We also highlight the need for more research in a European context as research on RoN and how it could be developed in Europe is lagging behind compared to research in other parts of the globe. Due to the urgency of the social-ecological challenges at the heart of this research (e.g., biodiversity, climate change, sustainable development), the study highlights the required funding interventions that span a range of types, scales, and timelines to support the strong and growing pipeline of transdisciplinary research needed to understand, evaluate, and put into practice the potential truly revolutionary nature of RoN
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