808 research outputs found
The Big Leap to the West: The Impact of EU on the Finnish Political System. ZEI Discussion Papers: 2001, C 89
No full textIntroduction. When analysing Finland’s integration policy, one is struck by the speed with which the political leadership turned its gaze from the East to the West. Within less than a decade Finland changed his status from a nonaligned country with close political relations with the Soviet Union to a full member of both the European Union (EU) and the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). It was not enough that Finland just joined the EU: the last three Finnish governments, starting from the centre-right coalition cabinet which took office in 1991, have decided that Finland’s place is in the inner core of the union. While rhetorically claiming to be interested in developing the EU as an intergovernmental project, the practical steps taken have shown that the recent governments have been willing to support and also put forward initiatives that strengthen the supranational nature of the Union. Finland has not at any instance seriously questioned the general development of integration: in this sense it has become a harmless participant in the inner core of the Union. Several observers have praised Finland’s commitment to integration. Finns have received credit from their European colleagues for their pragmatic and co-operative approach. For example, according to The Economist: Since joining the EU in 1995, and despite coming from its most distant edge, they [the Finns] have displayed an almost uncanny mastery of its workings. Many point to them as the very model of how a "small country" (vast in land mass, but with only 5.2 m people) should operate within the EU’s institutions: not preachy like the Swedes, not difficult like the Danes, not over-ambitious like the Austrians, merely modest and purposeful, matching a sense of principle with a sense of proportion. Another example was given by the European Voice, which in its leader, titled "Finnish presidency ends on triumphant note", argued among other things that ‘the Finnish presidency has proved once again that small countries are often the most adept at managing the EU’s business’ and that ‘the Finns have shown that a presidency which begins on an unauspicious note can end with plaudits from all sides’. The Finnish determined approach stands in contrast to the hesitant EU policies of both Denmark and Sweden. What explains this pragmatism and commitment to integration? Does the public share the commitment shown by the political elite? We argue that Finnish integration policy is very much driven by the need to secure her place among the Western European countries and to influence EU decisions in order to protect national interests. Support for the deepening of integration or for federalism is weak among the public and the parties, with integration primarily seen as an efficient way of furthering national economic and security objectives. The chapter is divided into six sections. In the next part we present the reasons that led Finland to apply for European Community (EC) membership. The third part focuses on the 1994 referendum and explores its main issues and cleavages. In the fourth section we analyse the impact of membership on party politics and administration. Europeanisation of the Finnish polity and public opinion are examined in section five. In the concluding section we discuss briefly the main aspects of Finnish integration policy, with emphasis on the future development of the Union
New Winners and Old Losers. A Priori Voting Power in the EU25. ZEI Discussion Papers C. 149, 2005
No full text[From the Introduction]. Analysis of the development of power distributions is one of the core tasks of political science. How much do the EU member states have a priori voting power in the Council of Ministers? In particular, what have the modifications in the voting weights after the various enlargements meant for the distribution of a priori voting power in the Council? We will in the following use the standardized Penrose-Banzhaf-index when analyzing the distribution of power among member-states (Banzhaf 1965 and Penrose 1946) (cf. Raunio and Wiberg 1998 and 2002)
Parliamentary Questioning in 17 European Parliaments: Some Steps towards Comparison
No full textAll democratic parliaments have some procedures to allow representatives to put questions to ministers. However, there are no two parliaments with exactly the same procedures. Cross-national comparisons are hindered by the lack of agreed-upon scientific criteria to group similar procedures, which are too often classified on the basis of their names rather than on their substantive characteristics. To overcome this problem, this article devises a typology of parliamentary questions based on relevant procedural features in 17 European countries. A ranking of parliaments according to the criteria of the effectiveness of procedures is developed and a discussion of the relationship of this ranking to the coalitional characteristics of the parliaments is provided. Finally, the article develops some tentative arguments to explain what influences the development of more or less effective questioning procedures, testing the hypothesis that countries dominated by coalition governments tend to have more effective procedures. In contrast with the authors' expectations, with regard to the countries included in the present analysis, the frequent presence of coalition government is associated with weaker procedures. © 2010 Taylor & Francis
The 2007-2013 European Cohesion Policy. A New Strategic Approach by the Commission? ZEI Discussion Paper. No. 190, 2008
No full text[From the Introduction]. ...this paper takes a closer look at the content of the new framework programme, trying to find out whether the European Commission has adopted a new strategic approach compared to the previous period. Since most of the literature devoted to this subject is restricted to a mere description of new features, this paper goes one step further trying to shed light on the reasons explaining the attempt of the Commission to keep some elements while changing others. Besides, special attention is given to the situation after eastward enlargment in 2004. In order to address these issues, the paper starts by outlining its main research questions and methodological framework, while also presenting some background information on EU cohesion policy. In the following chapters, the four main principles concentration, programming, additionality and partnership are examined for the periods 2000-06 and 2007-13 as described below. Finally, some concluding remarks will bring the paper to a close
The Difference Between Real and Potential Power: Voting Power, Attendance and Cohesion. ZEI Discussion Paper: 2004, 130
No full text[From the Introduction]. Applying power indices to the political process of the European Union has become fashionable. An increasing range of scholars has applied power indices to studying the institutions of the European Union (EU). However, their work has not gone without criticism. Critics argue that the use of power indices is of little value, since they ignore the preferences of the actors, such as party groups, and also the political dynamics of the decisionmaking processes, such as the EU legislative procedures (see particularly Garrett and Tsebelis 1996, 1999, Tsebelis and Garrett 1996). Advocates of power indices reply by arguing that one cannot know the preferences of the relevant actors in all possible contingencies. We do not always know the preferences of the actors, but we can still say something meaningful about their potential influence (see for example Lane and Berg 1999, Holler and Widgrén 1999).... This article analyses the distribution of voting power in the 1999-2002 EP, taking into account differential levels of attendance and cohesion among party groups. It does so – using the Shapley-Shubik -index (Shapley and Shubik 1954) – for two different kinds of votes: First, votes taken under absolute majority rule (i.e. a majority of all MEPs is necessary for a proposal to pass), second – and this is nowadays the empirically more relevant case – votes taken under simple majority rule (i.e. only a majority of the votes cast is necessary for a proposal to pass). However, before we start the actual discussion of the distribution of power, a few remarks concerning party groups in the EP – and especially their levels of cohesion and attendance – seem appropriate
Ensimmäinen askel politiikan sanakirjan suuntaan
No full textMatti Wiberg : Politiikan sanakirja – inhorealistin versio. Toimittanut Kalevi Koukkunen. Siltala 2011
Finland: Par Matti Wiberg
No full textinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedTraduction parue dans Jean Michel De Waele et Paul Magnette (eds.) Les démocraties européennes, Paris, Armand Colin, 2008
Roskatieteen vastaisku
No full textKirja-arvostelu: Geenien tulo yhteiskuntatieteisiin / Yrjö Ahmavaara, Tatu Vanhanen : Atena. Jyväskylä, 2001.Paluu politiikkaan / Matti Wiberg : Kunnallisalan kehittämissäätiö, 2001
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