3,188 research outputs found
Educational Development under the Wang Jingwei Regime
No full textThis paper clarifies the education policies and conditions of the Wang Jingwei regime through an examination of historical materials and compares it with other regimes that ruled in modern China at various times and places. The Wang Jingwei regime had no influence on its troops, the business sector took a neutral stand, and the rural administration tended to operate autonomously. Furthermore, the Wang Jingwei regime failed to develop party organizations due to Japanese interference and lack of funding. In contrast, teachers were an important faction supporting the Wang Jingwei regime, and the regime therefore valued the teachers and gave impetus to the educational development. Today, many researchers (especially Chinese researchers) believe that education under the Wang Jingwei regime was “education for enslavement” that served the Japanese empire. However, this paper reveals that the content of the education and the ideology promoted by the Wang Jingwei regime was a Chinese nationalism that might even be termed cultural nationalism. The Wang Jingwei regime emphasized such Chinese nationalism in promoting its ideology and legitimacy. This was on the one hand, due to the fact that the Wang Jingwei regime aimed to gain the support of the general public, teachers and students, while on the other hand it was an expression of a spirit of resistance within its “collaboration”. The promotion of educational development under the Wang Jingwei regime tended towards publicity and mobilization, and the regime ultimately failed to solve the shortcomings of school education in the 1930s summed up by the words “graduation mean, unemployment, ” which had existed since early Republican times. Therefore, even though the Wang Jingwei regime emphasized “Chinese nationalism, ” it could not gain the support of the majority. Furthermore, the rule of Wang Jingwei regime could not penetrate local society. In contrast, the contemporary Chongqing Nationalist Government was able to successfully extend its rule through local society by linking education with its administration
American studies of Wang Jingwei: Defining nationalism
No full textWang Jingwei, “veteran revolutionary leader, [and] champion of republicanism, democracy, and national independence,” has remained one of the most controversial figures in the history of republican China because he ended up as the head of the Chinese collaborationist government during World War II.1 Ever since both the Communist and Nationalist governments have condemned Wang as a national traitor (hanjian) as both claim to solely represent the nation. Chinese scholars who have written along the “party lines” have downplayed, if not totally omitted or twisted, Wang’s earlier contributions to modern China.2 Little wonder that Wang has been among the very few Guomindang leaders “still hovering in historical obscurity.
From traitor to martyr: drawing lessons from the death and burial of Wang Jingwei, 1944
No full textBased on recently re-opened files and publications in Nanjing, as well as published and newsreel accounts from the 1940s, this paper represents the first scholarly analysis of the rituals surrounding the death and burial of Wang Jingwei in Japanese-occupied China. Rather than locating this analysis purely in the literature on the history of the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945), however, this paper asks what Wang Jingwei's Re-organized National Government might tell us about personality cults in the political culture of modern China. While Wang's burial was one which drew heavily on the precedent of Sun Yat-sen's funerals of the 1920s, it also presaged later spectacles of public mourning and post-mortem commemoration, such as Chiang Kai-shek's funeral in 1975 in Taipei. In focusing on this one specific event in the life of a "puppet government" then, this paper hopes to re-ignite scholarly interest in the study of "dead leaders" and their posthumous lives in modern Chinese history more generally
Les relations entre l'Indochine de Decoux et le gouvernement de Wang Jingwei pendant la deuxième guerre mondiale
No full textLes relations entre l'Indochine de Decoux et le gouvernement de Wang Jingwei pendant la deuxième guerre mondial
Les relations entre l'Indochine de Decoux et le gouvernement de Wang Jingwei pendant la deuxième guerre mondiale
No full textLes relations entre l'Indochine de Decoux et le gouvernement de Wang Jingwei pendant la deuxième guerre mondial
From Traitor to Martyr: drawing lessons from the death and burial of Wang Jingwei, 1944
No full textTaylor, Jeremy E. From Traitor to Martyr: drawing lessons from the death and burial of Wang Jingwei, 1944. Journal of Chinese History, vol. 3, n° 1 (January 2019), pp. 137-158. Publié en ligne en mars 2018. DOI:10.1017/jch.2017.43 Jeremy E. Taylor (Université de Nottingham) est directeur du projet COTCA : Cultures of Occupation in Twentieth Century Asia. Résumé/Abstract Based on recently reopened files and publications in Nanjing, as well as published and newsreel accounts from the 1940s, th..
The collaborating government of Wang Jingwei : aspects of the state of occupation during the Sino-Japanese War, 1940-1945.
No full textCette thèse se propose d’étudier le gouvernement collaborateur dirigé par Wang Jingwei (1940-1945) à la croisée de deux trajectoires : celle de l’État chinois moderne et celle de l’Empire japonais. Au-delà d’un approfondissement des connaissances sur l’occupation japonaise en Chine, mon travail ambitionne d’enrichir le champ des études sur l’État lui-même. Une telle approche ne va pas de soi, tant le caractère « fantoche » attribué à ce régime par l’historiographie chinoise l’a longtemps isolé du reste de la période et cantonné à une histoire des tenants idéologiques de la collaboration. Sans évacuer cet aspect, mon approche consiste à l’inscrire dans une étude politique et sociale du gouvernement et de l'administration, afin de saisir le fonctionnement réel de la machine étatique en zone occupée. Pour ce faire, je développe le concept d’État d’occupation, qui désigne l’ensemble formé par les organisations japonaises (institutions militaires et civiles) et chinoises (gouvernements collaborateurs locaux), établies afin d’administrer la Chine occupée. La construction de cet État, qui visa, à partir de 1940, à intégrer ces organisations derrière la façade du gouvernement de Wang Jingwei, fut détournée par des logiques de formation, nées des contradictions entre ses différents acteurs. Ce processus est examiné en adoptant des focales différentes. La première partie étudie la mise en place de l’État d’occupation du point de vue japonais, en montrant l’impact qu’eurent, l’un sur l’autre, centre et périphérie au sein de l’Empire nippon. Je reviens ensuite sur la genèse de cet État d’occupation, jusqu’à la formation du gouvernement de Wang Jingwei. La deuxième partie réduit la focale pour s’intéresser à l’organisation particulière de ce dernier, dont la spécificité, par rapport aux autres régimes collaborateurs, provenait de l’ambition qu’avait le groupe de Wang de restaurer le Gouvernement nationaliste légitime dans le cadre d’un « retour à la capitale ». La troisième partie, enfin, se penche sur le cas de la fonction publique en zone occupée, dont le cadre institutionnel et idéologique est mis en regard avec les conditions de vie des agents.This dissertation studies the collaboration government headed by Wang Jingwei (1940-1945) at the crossroads of two trajectories: those of China’s modern state and Japan’s Empire. More broadly, my work aims at enriching the field of state-building research. Such an approach may seem counter-intuitive, as this regime is still labelled a "puppet" by Chinese historiography, which has cast it aside from the rest of the period and confined it to an ideological history of collaboration. I consider it within the context of a political and social study of government and administration, which tries to grasp the real functioning of the state machine in the occupied zone. For this purpose, I develop the concept of occupation state, i.e. a larger apparatus than the sole collaboration regimes, which included Japanese military and civilian agencies as well as Chinese local governments. From 1940 on, the state-building process aimed at integrating these organizations behind the façade of the Wang Jingwei government. However, it was diverted by a formation process, which resulted from the contradictions between its different actors. I explore this process from three different angles. The first part studies the establishment of the occupation state from the Japanese point of view, showing the mutual impact of centre and periphery within the Japanese Empire. Then, it follows the genesis of the occupation state up to the establishment of the Wang Jingwei government. The second part focuses on the experience of the latter, whose specificity, compared to other pro-Japanese regimes, was the ambition of the Wang group to restore the legitimate nationalist government as part of a "return to the capital". Thirdly, I look at the administrative personnel’s institutional and ideological framework as well as their living conditions
Yuan Shu and the Movement for Asiatic Regeneration and National Reconstruction: The Activities of Pro-Peace Advocates Before and After the Formation of the Reorganized National Government of China (Wang Jingwei Regime)
No full textThe Movement for Asiatic Regeneration and Nationa1 Reconstruction (MARNR 興亜建国運動, abbr. 興建運動) was organized in Shanghai in 1939 at the request of Army Lt. General Kagesa Sadaaki to support the peace efforts of Wang Jingwei, The core of the Movement was formed by Iwai Eiichi, vice-consul of the Shanghai Japanese Consulate and his Chinese friend Yuan Shu, a young Journalist and member of the Communist Party underground with connections to the Kuomintang’s Special Operations Agency. Although the Movement called for peace with Japan, both its ideals and activities emphasized Chinese autonomy, essentially with no Japanese involvement. The participants were mainly people affiliated with Yuan Shu, including Kuomintang special operations agents, university professors, lawyers, labor organizations and writers, who may have had experience in the anti-Japanese resistant movement and the Communist Party, but who now agreed with the ideals of the Movement. The Movement, which expanded by concentrating on the mobilization of students and workers, started out with the objective of forming a political party, but due to opposition from Wang’s Kuomintang faction, ended up functioning as a cultural and intellectual movement. The facts that the Movement l) was organized in the process of creating Japan’s policy towards China, 2) depended on Japanese funding and 3) was based on the personal relationship between Iwai and Yuan indicate similarities to other pro-Japanese citizens groups. On the other hand, its incorporation of social activists and organizing activities among students and workers differ markedly from other pro-Japanese groups, which were centered around anti-Jiang Jieshi and anti-Communist politicians, merchants and entrepreneurs. Immediately following the formation of the Wang Jingwei regime, MARNR continued to be active, introducing its opinion in Japan and drawing attention mainly from right-wing groups. However, when Wang decided to set up the Chinese General Assembly of the East Asian League (東亜聯盟中国総会), all the pro-Japanese factions were merged into a single organization, and MARNR was disbanded on 17 December 1940. Despite the absence of an organization, the former members continued to be actively involved in journalism under either the East Asian League, the counterinsurgency Qingxiang gongzuo (search the country and eliminate rebels 清郷工作) or the Wang Jingwei regime. The author concludes that MARNR's activities also had beneficial effects on Wang Jingwei regime’s governance.journal articl
- …
