1,721,004 research outputs found
Hierarchical task analysis of driving: a new research tool
ABSTRACTAdaptive cruise control, drive by wire technology, collision avoidance systems, and sophisticated driver monitoring are indicative of the increasing power of proposed invehicle technology. These technologies, amongst others, not only increasingly automate many of the functions previously performed by the driver, but they are realistically expected to enter vehicles in the coming 15 years (Walker, Stanton & Young, 2001). Given the dramatic effect that this is to have on the specific nature of the driving task, it is interesting to note that the only attempt at a systematic and exhaustive task analysis of driving quoted in contemporary literature (for example, Michon, 1993) remains the work of McKnight and Adams (1970). McKnight and Adam’s work was prepared for the U.S. Department of Transportation in order to “identify a set of driver performances that might be employed as terminal objectives in the development of driver education courses” (McKnight & Adams, 1970, p. vii). Whilst providing some extremely useful insights into the range and quantity of tasks enacted by drivers, it’s stated purpose severely limits its research applicability. A sizeable corpus of knowledge exists about what drivers are actually doing whilst they drive (for example Tijerina, et al, 1998; Lechner & Perrin, 1993) but thus far very little is actually known about the specific nature and structure of the driving task itself. Therefore to date, driving research lacks an important and valuable research tool
Definitions of synthetic environments
A synthetic environment is the collective term used to describe virtual reality, teleoperation, and augmented reality (Durlach and Mavor 1995). The distinctions and definitions used by researchers tend to be blurred. The definitions tend to contain reference to the form in which the technology manifests itself and/or the psychological characteristics of the environments and its effects on the person(s) using the technology. Durlach and Mavor (1995) distinguished between three sets of synthetic systems: virtual, teleoperator, and augmented. They argue that the term “synthetic environment” is the superset, which contains the sets of virtual, teleoperator and augmented reality systems. This relationship is illustrated in Figure 1
An on-road comparison of feedback and cognitive processing in motorcyclists and car drivers
Using the Event Analysis of Systemic Teamwork (EAST) to explore conflicts between different road user groups when making right hand turns at urban intersections
Collisions between different types of road users at intersections form a substantial component of the road toll. This paper presents an analysis of driver, cyclist, motorcyclist and pedestrian behaviour at intersections that involved the application of an integrated suite of ergonomics methods, the Event Analysis of Systemic Teamwork (EAST) framework, to on-road study data. EAST was used to analyse behaviour at three intersections using data derived from an on-road study of driver, cyclist, motorcyclist and pedestrian behaviour. The analysis shows the differences in behaviour and cognition across the different road user groups and pinpoints instances where this may be creating conflicts between different road users. The role of intersection design in creating these differences in behaviour and resulting conflicts is discussed. It is concluded that currently intersections are not designed in a way that supports behaviour across the four forms of road user studied. Interventions designed to improve intersection safety are discussed. Practitioner Summary: Intersection safety currently represents a key road safety issue worldwide. This paper presents a novel application of a framework of ergonomics methods for studying differences in road user behaviour at intersections. The findings support development of interventions that consider all road users as opposed to one group in isolation
Fitting methods to paradigms: are ergonomics methods fit for systems thinking?
The issues being tackled within ergonomics problem spaces are shifting. Although existing paradigms appear relevant for modern day systems, it is worth questioning whether our methods are. This paper asks whether the complexities of systems thinking, a currently ubiquitous ergonomics paradigm, are outpacing the capabilities of our methodological toolkit. This is achieved through examining the contemporary ergonomics problem space and the extent to which ergonomics methods can meet the challenges posed. Specifically, five key areas within the ergonomics paradigm of systems thinking are focused on: normal performance as a cause of accidents, accident prediction, system migration, systems concepts and ergonomics in design. The methods available for pursuing each line of inquiry are discussed, along with their ability to respond to key requirements. In doing so, a series of new methodological requirements and capabilities are identified. It is argued that further methodological development is required to provide researchers and practitioners with appropriate tools to explore both contemporary and future problems
Where is computing driving cars? A technology trajectory of vehicle design
Cars offer an excellent example of ubiquitous computing, and a technological revolution is currently underway that will eventually see in-vehicle computers empowered with increasingly complex sections of the driving task. In this article, we critically review the effect of ubiquitous computing in cars with reference to the psychology of the driver and present a survey of automotive researchers drawn from five major carmakers. The results illustrate the role of the computer in vehicles over the short, medium, and long term. Systems that are likely to be fitted into vehicles in the next 5 years include sophisticated electronic architectures and greater penetration of navigation and telematics systems. In the next 5 to 15 years drive by wire and collision sensing are anticipated. In the long term, 15 years and beyond, advanced driver-assistance systems will increasingly automate the driving task, and in-car personal computers and Internet will be commonplace. We conclude that the increased complexity and prominence of computing in cars requires further investigation of the needs, abilities, and limitations of the driver if the aims of safety, efficiency, and enjoyment, as well as greater ubiquity, are to be realized
Pilot error versus sociotechnical systems failure: a distributed situation awareness analysis of Air France 447
The Air France 447 crash occurred in 2009 when an Airbus A330 stalled and fell into the Atlantic Ocean, killing all on board. Following a major investigation, it was concluded that the incident resulted from a series of events that began when the autopilot disconnected after the aircraft's Pitot tubes froze in an adverse weather system. The findings place scrutiny on the aircrew's subsequent lack of awareness of what was going on and of what procedure was required, and their failure to control the aircraft. This article argues that this is inappropriate, instead offering a systems level view that can be used to demonstrate how systems, not individuals, lose situation awareness. This is demonstrated via a distributed situation awareness-based description of the events preceding the crash. The findings demonstrate that it was the sociotechnical system comprising aircrew, cockpit and aeroplane systems that lost situation awareness, rather than the aircrew alone
Broken components versus broken systems: why it is systems not people that lose situation awareness
This commentary is a response to Dekker’s insightful article in this issue on situation awareness (SA). This is a concept that continues to excite strong debate but only because of the profound implications for the theoretical foundations and the effects that different approaches have for the work of human factors practitioners. We argue that Dekker’s paper tacitly adopts one approach to SA, and in doing so will inevitably arrive at the point of questioning the concept in its entirety. If SA really is as deterministic and ‘broken component’ orientated as Dekker describes, then we would be in complete agreement, but instead we offer a counterpoint. We apply our distributed situation awareness approach to the key issues raised, answer all of Dekker’s concerns, and offer a useful way forwar
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