1,720,986 research outputs found
When does the game end? Public goods experiments with non-definite and non-commonly known time horizons
Satisficing and prior-free optimality in price competition
We apply a model of satisficing to oligopoly markets with price competition. Sellers have profit aspirations reflecting their conjectures about their competitors' behavior and search for a price guaranteeing these aspirations. Because it seems implausible that people have detailed priors on the others' actions, we postulate that sellers entertain multiple conjectures to which no probabilities can be assigned. This allows us to propose a theory of "prior-free" optimality and to examine experimentally whether people comply with it. We find that decision makers have difficulties in making prior free optimal choices. Most are content to just satisfice, although ways to aspire to more ambitious profits were obviously available
An experimental analysis of satisficing in saving decisions
Uncertainty of one's future is the essential problem of saving decisions. Unlike previous experimental studies, we capture this crucial uncertainty by a scenario-based satisficing approach. Decision makers first form aspirations for a few relevant scenarios, and then search for consumption plans guaranteeing these aspirations. Our aim is to investigate whether agents make satisficing choices and, if so, how satisficing relates to optimality. We find that satisficing allocations can be reached easily when aspirations are incentivized, although aspiration levels are rather far from what optimality suggests
On the relation between impulses to help and causes of neediness: An experimental study
A novel two-person "charity game", related to the "Samaritan's Dilemma" is used to experimentally investigate the relation between helpers’ behavior and poor recipients’ reaction to aid. We distinguish two treatments differing in whether the causes of neediness are verifiable or not. Helping behavior does not vary significantly between treatments, but is positively correlated with dictator giving, suggesting idiosyncratic attitudes to help. Needy subjects are unaffected by anticipated help, but react optimally to chance
Satisficing in strategic environments: a theoretical approach and experimental evidence
The satisficing approach is generalized and applied to finite n-person games. We formally define the concept of satisficing and propose a theory that allows satisficing players to make “optimal” decisions without being equipped with any prior.Wealso review some experiments on strategic games illustrating and partly supporting our theoretical approach
Social identity and trust - An experimental investigation
We experimentally examine how group identity affects trust behavior in an investment game. In one treatment, group identity is induced purely by minimal groups. In other treatments, group members are additionally related by outcome interdependence established in a prior public goods game. Moving from the standard investment game (where no group identity is prompted) to minimal group identity to two-dimensional group identity, we find no significant differences in trust decisions. However, trust is significantly and positively correlated with contribution decisions, suggesting that “social” trust is behaviorally important
Being of two minds: an ultimatum experiment investigating affective processes
We experimentally investigate how affective processes influence proposers' and responders' behaviour in the Ultimatum Game. Using a dualsystem approach, we tax cognitive resources through time pressure and cognitive load to enhance the influence of affective processes on behaviour. We find that proposers offer more under time pressure and this seems to be due to strategic considerations rather than to other-regarding concerns. We also find that responders are more likely to reject under time pressure. Surprisingly, both proposers and responders appear to be unaffected by cognitive load manipulation
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