53,095 research outputs found
Letter from Lorne W. Bell to Bishop James Chamberlain Baker, May 31, 1943
Typed correspondence from Lorne W. Bell, Chief Community Services Division, to Bishop James Chamberlain Baker discussing the reasoning for Rev. Mr. Goto leave from the Center.The Bishop James Chamberlain Baker Collection includes letters, documents, and articles about Japanese Americans during World War II. Subjects in the collection include Japanese Americans mass removal, Pearl Harbor and the aftermath, religion, and support from the non-Japanese American community. The collection was digitized and made accessible online by CSUDH Gerth Archives and Special Collections
Hypnotized by images of the past: dynamic interpretation and the flawed majoritarianism of statutory law
This paper assesses William N. Eskridge, Jr.'s dynamic statutory interpretation approach from the perspective of concerns about non-majoritarian decision-making. In particular, scholars have long expressed concern about the counter-majoritarian difficulty, i.e., non-elected judges invalidating statutes adopted by popularly elected legislatures, inherent in judicial review of statutes for constitutional infirmity. Dynamic statutory interpretation urges courts to abandon their role as "faithful agents" of enacting legislatures, arguing that courts should not merely discern and give effect to the intent of the legislatures, but also interpret statutes in light of changes in societal values that post-date the statute's enactment. Thus Eskridge's dynamic interpretation approach has been criticized as non-majoritarian. The paper notes that while courts are indeed not majoritarian, statutes are often not majoritarian either. First, they may be non-majoritarian because the text of the statute may encompass circumstances that legislators did not envision, or at least did not contemplate. The text of a statute may require a certain result in such circumstances, but that result is not attributable to any conscious decision by a legislative majority. Second, statutes may become non-majoritarian because of their longevity, particularly given the supermajority requirements for legislative action (including action to amend extant statutes) and the temporal constraints on legislative agendas. Thus, statutes may continue in effect after their supporting majorities disappear, or statutes, and the policies underlying them, may gain greater acceptance over time such that the intent of the enacting legislature may become anachronistic and unrepresentative of current majorities. Thus, the paper suggests that even if courts should act as "faithful agents" of the legislature when interpreting statutes, they must still determine to which of the various legislatures that exist over time they owe their allegiance. I suggest that enacting legislature's act of reducing a statute to writing does not entitle the enacting legislature to greater judicial fealty than later-in-time legislatures.
The paper suggests that at least two conventional interpretive techniques make statutory interpretation somewhat dynamic, but at the same time reflect a "faithful agent" theory of interpretation. In particular, while legislatures may leave particular statues, or particular provisions within statutes, unchanged for a long period of time (thus creating the possibility that the statutes have become non-majoritarian), legislatures nevertheless will likely have enacted or modified other statutes during that period of inactivity. Thus, certain techniques for resolving statutory conflicts between older and newer statutes, and the "extending statutes" technique of viewing statutes as creating common-law principles that may be used in construing older statutes, allows courts that adhere to the "faithful agent" theory of interpretation to introduce an element of dynamic statutory interpretation into their construction of statutes.Peer reviewe
Wiretapping's fruits, the first amendment, and the paradigms of privacy
This paper explores the legal system’s treatment of privacy along five dimensions. The dimensions focus on: (1) physical location, (2) the means of communication, (3) the means of intrusion, (4) subject matter, and (5) confidential relationships. The paper illustrates how reliance on some, but not others, in particular contexts serves to determine the results courts reach or statutes ordain. The papers shows the U.S. Supreme Court has systematically favored particular paradigms in ways that often make privacy protections porous. The paper then discusses the dimensions of privacy in the context of Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001), a U.S. Supreme Court case regarding liability for publishing material obtained from a private citizen who wiretapped a conversation in violation of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
Emma Bell Miles journal, 1911-1914
Journal authored by Walden's Ridge naturalist, artist, and author Emma Bell Miles from 1911 January 9 to 1914 May 3
Emma Bell Miles journal, 1908-1911
Journal authored by Walden's Ridge naturalist, artist, and author Emma Bell Miles from 1908 May 24 to 1911 April 25
Emma Bell Miles journal, 1915-1918
Journal authored by Walden's Ridge naturalist, artist, and author Emma Bell Miles from 1915 November 11 to 1918 August 8
Emma Bell Miles journal, 1915-1918
Journal authored by Walden's Ridge naturalist, artist, and author Emma Bell Miles from 1915 November 11 to 1918 August 8
Emma Bell Miles journal, 1911-1914
Journal authored by Walden's Ridge naturalist, artist, and author Emma Bell Miles from 1911 January 9 to 1914 May 3
Emma Bell Miles journal, 1908-1911
Journal authored by Walden's Ridge naturalist, artist, and author Emma Bell Miles from 1908 May 24 to 1911 April 25
Emma Bell Miles journal, 1915
Journal authored by Walden's Ridge naturalist, artist, and author Emma Bell Miles from 1915 June 15 to 1915 September 22. The journal also includes newspaper clippings of Miles' Fountain Square Conversation column authored for the Chattanooga News
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