1,721,127 research outputs found

    The structure of Italian capitalism, 1952-1972: new evidence using the interlocking directorates technique

    No full text
    This article explores the structure of the Italian capitalistic system by focusing on the relationships between financial - banks, insurances and holdings - and industrial firms in Italy during the period 1952-72 through the analysis of the interlocks that existed between them. By an interlock is meant the link created between two firms when an individual belongs to the board of directors of both. The analysis is based on a database - Imita.db - containing data on over 300,000 directors of Italian joint-stock companies for the years 1952, 1960 and 1972. After showing a descriptive statistics of the firms and directors included in the database, the article develops a network connectivity analysis of the system. This is integrated by a prosopographic study about the big linkers, defined as those directors cumulating the highest number of offices in each benchmark year. The article confirms that Italian capitalism maintained substantial peculiarities in the period investigated. In particular, it argues thatinterlocks played an important role in guaranteeing the stability of the positions of control of the mahor private firms and their connections with State owned firms. In 1952 and 1960, the system, centred on larger electrical companies, showed the highest degree of cohesion. That centre dissolved after the natioanlisation of the electricity industry in 1962 and was replaced by a less strong and cohesive one, hinged on banks, insurances and the major finance companies

    The Italian Corporate Network, 1952-1983: New Evidence Using the Interlocking Directorates Technique

    Full text link
    This paper explores the structure of the Italian corporate network by focusing on the relationships between financial - banks, insurances and holdings - and industrial firms in Italy during the periodo 1952-83 through the analysis of the interlocks that existed between them. By an interlock is meant the link created between two firms when an individual belongs to the board of directors of both. The analysis is based on a database - Imita.db - containing data on more than 300,000 directors of Italian joint-stock companies for the years 1952, 1960, 1972 and 1983. After showing a descriptive statistics of the companies and directors included in the database, the paper develops a network connectivity analysis of the system. This is integrated by a prosopographic study about the big linkers, defined as those directors cumulating the highest number of offices in each benchmark year. The paper sonfirms that the Italian corporate network maintained substantial peculiarities in the period investigate. In particular, it argues that interlocks played an important role in guaranteeing the stability of the positions of control of the major private companies and their connections with State-owned enterprises. In 1952 and 1960 teh system, centred on the larger electrical companies, showed the highest degree of cohesion. That centre dissolved after the nationalisation of the electricity industry in 1962 and was replaced by a less strong and cohesive one, hinged on banks, insurances and the major finance companies. At the beginning of the 1980s, the centre appeared to have been further reshaped with the marginalisation of state-owned enterprises.The paper explores the structure of Italian corporate network by focusing on the relationships between financial – banks, insurances and holdings – and industrial companies in Italy during the period 1952-83 through the analysis of the interlocks that existed between them. By an interlock is meant the link created between two firms when an individual belongs to the board of directors of both. The analysis is based on a database – Imita.db – containing data on over 130,000 directors of Italian joint stock companies for the years 1952, 1960, 1972 and 1983. After showing a descriptive statistics of the companies and the directors included in the database, the paper develops a network connectivity analysis of the system. This is integrated by a prosopographic study about the big linkers, defined as those directors cumulating the highest number of offices in each benchmark year. The paper confirms that Italian corporate network maintained substantial peculiarities in the period investigated. In particular, it argues that interlocks played an important role in guaranteeing the stability of the positions of control of the major private companies and their connections with state-owned enterprises. In 1952 and 1960, the system, centred on the larger electrical companies, showed the highest degree of cohesion. That centre dissolved after nationalisation of the electricity industry in 1962 and was replaced by a less strong and cohesive one, hinged on banks, insurances and the major finance companies. At the beginning of the 1980s the centre appeared to have been further reshaped with the marginalisation of state-owned enterprises

    Ricchi per caso. La parabola dello sviluppo economico italiano

    No full text
    Nel secolo e mezzo trascorso dall’unificazione, l’Italia ha raggiunto livelli di ricchezza simili a quelli dei maggiori paesi industrializzati. L’ondata di globalizzazione degli ultimi decenni ha però fatto emergere la debolezza del nostro sistema produttivo. Secondo la lettura originale che ne danno gli autori di questo libro, il capitalismo italiano è stato negativamente influenzato da istituzioni inefficienti, che hanno avuto un forte impatto sulle dimensioni e sulla governance delle imprese, come anche sulla formazione di capitale umano e sulla capacità innovativa. In questa luce l’assetto istituzionale ha quindi rappresentato il principale freno per le potenzialità di sviluppo del paese

    Financing firms: Beyond the dichotomy between banks and markets

    Full text link
    This article provides a review of the different streams of literature that have contributed, since the seminal work by Alexander Gerschenkron, to the issue on firms’ financing. We show that, although the traditional dichotomy between bank and stock market is out of date, the Gerschenkronian thesis is still debated. We find that many microeconomic issues have yet to be explored. In particular, the interaction between bank and stock market in financing firms merits further attention. Finally, we show that the combinations of several approaches and the use of new techniques, such as the network analysis, can contribute to provide further results on this topic

    Financial Elites and the Italian Corporate Network, 1913-2001

    No full text
    This paper analyses the Italian corporate network from 1913 to 2001 focusing on seven benchmark years (1913, 1927, 1936, 1960, 1972, 1983, and 2001). For each benchmark year, the top 250 companies (50 financial and 200 non financial companies) by total assets have been selected. For each benchmark year, after showing some descriptive statistics, the paper develops a network connectivity analysis of the system. This is integrated by a prosopographic study of the big linkers, defined as those directors who had the highest number of board positions in each benchmark year. We assume that the big linkers who held directorships in both banks and industrial firms functioned as the nation’s financial elite. This seems a promising approach as it allows to show the interactions between structure and agency, that is, between the evolution of the structure of the corporate network and the profile of business leaders
    corecore