587 research outputs found
Oil price instability, hedging, and an oil stabilization fund : the case of Venezuela
No full textThe Venezuelan government and PDVSA (Venezuela's state oil companies) are both exposed to oil price instability. Given the existing tax structure, PDVSA has a higher exposure than the government, especially when prices drop below $18-20 a barrel. The authors show that the volatility of prices for crude oil is higher (but not significant) than the volatility of prices for refined oil products. And both prices are highly correlated. So, there is not much strength to the argument that Venezuela, being now mainly an exporter of refined products, faces less volatility than when it was exporting mainly crude oil. The basis risk for hedging Venezuelan crude oil was founded to be higher than for other crudes of comparable quality in the region. One explanation could be the pricing policies Venezuela follows, which leads Venezuelan crude oil prices to deviate for long periods from international prices. The basis risk in Venezuelan refined products is much lower and at acceptable levels for risk management. The issue of liquidity is concentrated in contracts for periods of less than a year. For products, the liquidity is concentrated in the nearest 4-5 months. So, for short-term hedges (6-9 months ahead), there is sufficient liquidity for Venezuela to hedge a substantial part of its exports. For longer-term hedges, the over-the-counter market is the more appropriate vehicle. In either case, it will not usually be the case that all production or exports should be hedged. The authors also examined the issue of an oil stabilization fund. For an oil stabilization fund to be effective several preconditions must be met. Most notably: oil prices should not follow a random walk; financial markets are incomplete; and there are large adjustment costs. These conditions do likely apply in Venezuela. Venezuela's best strategy would be to remove as much short-term oil price risk as possible by using short-dated hedging instruments (such as futures, options, or short-dated swaps) and to also do some longer term hedging (using mainly over-the-counter options and long-dated swaps). They also find that an oil stabilization fund should be complemented by using market-based risk management tools. The oil stabilization fund could then be used to manage any remaining interperiod oil price risk to the extent considered necessary.Markets and Market Access,Environmental Economics&Policies,Oil Refining&Gas Industry,Energy and Environment,Energy Demand
Corrigendum: CT Angiography or Cardiac MRI for Detection of Coronary Artery Aneurysms in Kawasaki Disease (Frontiers in Pediatrics, (2021), 9, (630462), 10.3389/fped.2021.630462)
No full textAn author name was incorrectly spelled as Diana van Stijn-Bringas Dimitriades. The correct spelling is Diana van Stijn. The authors apologize for this error and state that this does not change the scientific conclusions of the article in any way. The original article has been updated
Correction to: Coronary artery assessment in Kawasaki disease with dual-source CT angiography to uncover vascular pathology (European Radiology, (2020), 30, 1, (432-441), 10.1007/s00330-019-06367-6)
No full textThe original version of this article, published on 19 August 2019, unfortunately contained a mistake. The following correction has therefore been made in the original: The author name D. van Stijn–Bringas Dimitriades was changed to D. van Stijn. The corrected author list is given above. The original article has been corrected
Banking reform in transition countries
No full textIn reforming the financial sector in transition economies, one important debate is whether governments should try to reform existing state-owned banks (the rehabilitation approach) or whether a new private banking system should be allowed to emerge (a new entry approach). Or should there be a mix of the two approaches, in which the state bank activities are restricted while a parallel private banking system develops? The authors'cross-country comparison of banks'institutional development in 25 transitional economies suggests that progress can be faster under the new entry approach, especiallyrelative to initial conditions. Progress under the rehabilitation approach appears to be inhibited by poor incentives. In most countries, even those with a good banking infrastructure and a large segment of good banks, a two track process has evolved, with differences between weak and strong banks. Weak banks have moved little beyond central planning. Regression estimates suggest that slow progress of weak banks is associated with: cover concentration, government preferential treatment, and limited new banks entry. The causality direction is often unclear. Policies and structural conditions can affect bank quality. The role of banks will remain limited in many transition economies due to weak legal infrastructures, much uncertainty and inside information, and problems associated with highly leveraged financial intermediaries - including fraud, political interference, and implicit guarantees. In the short run, self-finance and intermediation among enterprises and through nonbank financial institutions may prevail.Financial Intermediation,Banks&Banking Reform,Payment Systems&Infrastructure,Financial Crisis Management&Restructuring,Municipal Financial Management,Banks&Banking Reform,Financial Intermediation,Financial Crisis Management&Restructuring,Municipal Financial Management,Settlement of Investment Disputes
Revenue-productive income tax structures and tax reforms in emerging market economies - evidence from Bulgaria
No full textUsing a household budget survey for 1992, The author shows the poor revenue performance and distributional impact of Bulgaria's personal income tax system. He explores the implications for revenue and income distribution of two alternative tax systems - a flat tax and a progressive but simpler three-brackets tax system. He demonstrates that simpler tax structures with lower tax rates could achieve at least equal revenue and distributional objectives and are superior in terms of efficiency and equity. (The findings are robust when Bulgaria's significant tax evasion is included). But tax changes since 1992 have, if anything, moved Bulgaria even further from a simple income tax system: the number of rates and brackets increased from 7 to 10, and the levels of exemption remain unchanged. (Complex, higher rates complicate administration and enforcement and provide incentives for tax evasions. And in the alternative systems the author explores, the poor are protected with higher exemptions.) Fortunately, the country's personal income tax structure began to move toward less nominal progressivity after Bulgaria's 1997 tax reform program. The tax rate in thetop income bracket was reduced from 52 percent to 40 percent, the number of tax brackets was halved, and the exemption level was increased 20 percent (reducing tax burdens on the poor).Environmental Economics&Policies,Public Sector Economics&Finance,Regional Governance,Tax Policy and Administration,Economic Theory&Research,Governance Indicators,Economic Theory&Research,Public Sector Economics&Finance,Environmental Economics&Policies,Tax Policy and Administration
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