1,721,131 research outputs found
Introduzione alla Parte Seconda: La natura della giustificazione epistemica
No full textIl contributo introduce la nozione di giustificazione epistemica, presenta i principali problemi da essa sollevati e discute criticamente le principali soluzioni che vi sono state date commentando i saggi antologizzati nella Parte Seconda del volume
Prefazione
No full textLa Prefazione introduce brevemente la nozione di conoscenza proposizionale, sottolineando la continuità fra il dibattito contemporaneo di impronta analitica e la tradizionale filosofica occidentale
Hoping on insufficient evidence: how epistemically rational can action‐centred faith be?
Full text linkDaniel McKaughan has recently argued that conceiving faith as an ‘action-centred’ attitude whose cognitive component falls short of outright belief can play a central role in explaining how people who regard the truth of Christianity as significantly less probable than naturalism can respond with faith to the gospel proclamation without believing its core claims or presuppositions on insufficient evidence,
and without violating the requirements of either pragmatic or epistemic rationality. In this paper I object to McKaughan that hope—the attitude to which he assigns the cognitive role of action-centred
faith—is ill-suited for the intended purpose, and that having to the core claims and presuppositions of the gospel proclamation any attitude that is suited for the intended purpose is not going to leave a person who takes her overall evidence to run against some of those claims and presuppositions ‘free to follow the arguments and evidence where it leads’
A Contrastivist Response to Gerken’s Arguments for False Positives
Full text linkIn this paper, I defend epistemological contrastivism—the view that propositional knowledge is a three-place, contrastive relation between an agent, a proposition (or fact) and a contrast term—against two a priori arguments recently offered by Mikkel Gerken for the conclusion that intuitive judgements exhibiting a contrast effect on knowledge ascriptions are false positives. I show that the epistemic argument for false positives begs the question against contrastivism by assuming the independently implausible claim that knowledge of a contrastive proposition always presupposes knowledge of a related ordinary proposition. This claim is apparently also presupposed by the doxastic argument for false positives, the conclusion of which, I argue, is not only perfectly compatible with epistemological contrastivism but also heavily dependent on a (questionable) de dicto construal of the relevant knowledge ascriptions
Truth is One (No Need for Pluralism)
Full text linkIn this paper, I discuss the currently most popular argument for alethic pluralism, maintaining that the so-called scope problem provides no compelling reason for abandoning the traditional view that truth is one and the same (substantive) property across the various regions of thought or discourse in which it is ascribed or denied to the things we think or say. I disarm the argument by showing that the scope problem does not arise for a number of non-deflationary, monistic views of truth that meet certain semantic and metaphysical constraints, for one can accept any of these views and provide a plausible account of the fact that mental and linguistic tokenings belonging to different regions of discourse involve radically different ways of engaging with reality – from detecting pre-existing facts to constituting them
Ratio Juris
No full textRatio Juris is a leading international journal of philosophy of law and general jurisprudence. It provides a truly international and trans-cultural forum for the communication of philosophical ideas about law and legal questions. Ratio Juris is open to scholars from all backgrounds and traditions, legal, philosophical, political, cultural and linguistic.
Ratio Juris covers classical topics such as: the nature of law; law and morality; justice; rightness and natural law; law and reason; the logic of norms; artificial intelligence and law; law and language; legal obligation; rights validity and the legitimacy of law; the rule of law; legal epistemology; rules and principles; rules and acts; legal reasoning; interpretation; deontic logic and expert systems in law
S. Caputo, Verità
No full textViene recensito Verità, il volume di Stefano Caputo uscito nel 2015 da Laterza
Che cos'è (e come va affrontato) il relativismo aletico
No full textArgomento del contributo è il relativismo aletico. Dopo aver passato in rassegna le principali considerazioni che vengono addotte a sostegno della relatività della verità, in generale o nell'ambito di qualche particolare ambito di pensiero o di discorso, l'autore discute due diverse strategie antirelativistiche, giungendo alla conclusione che la posizione che è opportuno contrappore al relativismo aletico non è una forma di universalismo, ma quella che Herman Cappelen e John Hawthorne chiamano la tesi della "semplicità della verità"
Verità e morale: una panoramica
Full text linkIl contributo affronta la questione del rapporto fra verità e discorso (e pensiero) morale, fornendo una panoramica ragionata delle varie posizioni che le principali teorie filosofiche della verità oggi disponibili rendono possibile sostenere in merito al tipo di verità di cui possono godere le proposizioni morali. Dopo aver discusso le posizioni realiste e antirealiste associate alla teoria della corrispondenza, alle teorie epistemiche, alle concezioni deflazionistiche e al pluralismo aletico, il contributo si sofferma sulle prospettive aperte dall'adozione di una teoria della verità "pura e semplice", lungo le linee suggerite in modi diversi da autori come John L. Mackie, Christopher S. Hill e Wolfgang Kuenne
Extended Rationality: Some Queries about Warrant, Epistemic Closure, Truth and Scepticism
Full text linkThis contribution to the symposium on Annalisa Coliva’s Extended Rationality is largely sympathetic with the moderate view of the structure of epistemic warrant which is defended in the book. However, it takes issue with some aspects of Coliva’s Wittgenstein-inspired ‘hinge epistemology’, focussing especially on her conception of propositional warrant, her treatment of epistemic closure, her antirealist conception of truth, and the significance of her answer to so-called Humean scepticism
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