1,721,022 research outputs found
Giuseppe Sergi’s peripheral theory of emotion and the response of William James. Some critical remarks on Dolore e Piacere (1894)
No full textIn 1894 Giuseppe Sergi, one of the chief representatives of the late 19th- and early 20th-century mind sciences in Italy, published Dolore e piacere – a book outlining a theory of emotions that attempted to define their origin, nature, development, and anatomical loci. In Sergi’s own words, the book represented an advancement in the discussion (begun some years before by William James and Carl Lange) on the peripheral theory of emotions. James’ response to Sergi’s study was quite harsh: in 1895, he published a review of Sergi’s book that emphasized its outdatedness and the superficiality of the theory it introduced. This paper offers a detailed analysis of Sergi’s theory of emotions – which has not yet received significant attention by scholars – by evaluating it in light of James’ critical remark
Abitudine organica e memoria spontanea. Il dibattito filosofico francese nella seconda metà dell’Ottocento
No full textThe paper aims to retrace the genealogy of the notion of involuntary memory in nineteenth-
century philosophy, by pointing out its relationship with the concept of habit. During
the 1850s, some spiritualist thinkers (Joseph Tissot, Antoine Gratacap, Albert Lemoine,
Paul Janet) acknowledged the presence of a form of habit within some workings of the
memory. In their views, this form of habit, showing a tight connection with corporeal
habits because of its spontaneous and unconscious activity, demonstrated the essential
unity of body and soul
Hippocrate. Le médecin face à la maladie
No full textThis essay analyses an extract of Hippocrates' text On Winds, with regards to the problem of pathology and the the role of physician
Espace tactile et espace visuel. L'origine de la notion d'étendue chez Jules Lachelier
No full textAt the end of the 18th century, the German physician and philosopher Ernst Platner, reporting an observation made on a man born blind, states that a man deprived of the sense of sight cannot have the category of space. This brief observation soon becomes a privileged reference in the debate on the acquired or innate nature of knowledge. One of the main contributions published in France on this subject is a text by Jules Lachelier on the origin of the notion of space. Although quite unknown, “L’Observation de Platner” (1903) showcases some interesting insights on the problem.
By relying on an in-depth understanding of the era’s psychological debate, Lachelier gives a new shape to the spiritualist positions formulated on the subject, and ends up reconceptualising the dualism between nativism and empiricism.À la fin du XVIIIe siècle, le médecin et philosophe allemand Ernst Platner, en rapportant une observation faite sur un aveugle-né, affirme qu’un homme privé de la vue depuis la naissance ne peut pas posséder la catégorie de l’espace. Cette courte observation s’affirme bientôt comme référence privilégiée du débat sur la nature acquise ou innée de la connaissance. L’une des principales contributions publiées en France est le texte de Jules Lachelier sur la genèse de la notion d’espace. Texte fort peu connu de la production de l’auteur, « L’Observation de Platner » (1903) renferme des vues originales sur la question. Sur la base d’une connaissance approfondie du débat psychologique de l’époque, Lachelier donne ici une nouvelle forme aux positions spiritualistes formulées sur le problème, en finissant par reconceptualiser le dualisme entre nativisme et empirisme
Félix Ravaisson lettore di Aristotele. Il concetto di abitudine nell’Essai sur la «Métaphysique» d’Aristote (1837)
No full textFélix Ravaisson reader of Aristotle. The notion of habit in the Essai sur la «Métaphysique» d’Aristote (1837)
This paper analyses Félix Ravaisson’s conception of habit by relying not only on his renowned text De l’habitude (1838) – entirely devoted to this topic –, but also on his first work on Aristotle’s Metaphysics (1837). The aim is to examine to what extent Ravaisson’s reading of Aristotle had shaped his philosophical views and informed his text on habit
Bergson e la non-intenzionalità della coscienza. Riflessioni sulla critica sartriana all'inespressività spirituale
No full textNell'opera L’Imagination, Jean-Paul Sartre mette a punto una serrata critica alla teoria dell'immagine di Henri Bergson, licenziando la natura inespressiva e non-intenzionale della coscienza bergsoniana. Al fondo della questione, è tuttavia facile rilevare l'opporsi di due concezioni profondamente antitetiche del rapporto coscienza-mondo, che potrebbero essere ridefinite in termini di impressionismo ed espressionismo coscienziale: se in Bergson ogni distanza tra soggetto ed oggetto parrebbe annullarsi secondo i modi di una psicologia alimentare, nella quale si dà contatto immediato (di in-pressione) col mondo, in Sartre la tematizzazione di una distanza ontologica (di ex-pressione) vorrebbe al contrario garantire una presa efficace sul reale. Alla coscienza bergsoniana non rimane allora che scoprirsi preda di un’illusione proiettiva ed allucinatoria? Importanti osservazioni contenute in Matière et Mémoire e nell'Effort intellectuel paiono al contrario dimostrare che è solo attraverso un movimento di tipo espressivo che la coscienza può espletare le proprie funzioni percettive e rammemorative
Il problema estetico in Henri Bergson: la critica di Raymond Bayer alla teoria della percezione pura
No full textIn 1941, namely the year of Henri Bergson’s death, Raymond Bayer publishes in Revue philosophique an inflammatory article on Bergson’s philosophy, wondering whether the French philosopher had ever delivered an actual aesthetic theory. Although it is well known that Bergson recurred, along his entire corpus, to several examples borrowed from art, and based his metaphysical assumptions on the psychological act of intuition, he never wrote a treatise on aesthetics, nor he dealt minutely with the problem of beauty. As shown by Bayer, this characteristic of Bergson’s philosophy raises several doubts: being his metaphysics essentially anchored on the concept of pure perception, and being this very perception a form of knowledge that primarily belongs to the artist, Bergson should have elaborated an aesthetic theory. Now the problem is to understand why he did not do that
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