1,721,100 research outputs found

    The Role of Community in Migration Dynamics

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    In this paper, I have presented a theoretical model that investigates the observable hysteresis process in migration dynamics. In the model the migration choice depends not only on wage differential, but also on a U-shaped benefit function of a community of homogenous ethnic individuals, according to the 'theory of clubs'. The results, based on real option theory, explain that observable 'jumps' in migration flows could depend not only on exogenous shocks, but also on two endogenous variables: the number of coordinated immigrants and the dimension of the community. Indeed, migration choice is delayed until a critical mass of immigrants is reached and possible rigidities of optimal district size could magnify this hysteresis process. Copyright 2008 The Author. Journal compilation 2008 CEIS, Fondazione Giacomo Brodolini and Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

    Entry and Exit Strategies in Migration Dynamics

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    Migration, Real option, Theory of clubs, Network effect, F22, H49, O15, R23,

    Un quadro istituzionale per lo sviluppo sostenibile

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    One of the two main themes for the Earth Summit is the «institutional framework for sustainable development». It requires agreement on plans, strategies and powers, both at global and local level, taking into accountthe differences among the countries, actors and socio-economic contexts involved. Moreover, it involves rethinking strategies for an effective change of the rules of development, reconciling the requirements of economic, social and environmental issues. Rio + 20 could therefore represent the opportunity for institutional actors to change the direction of development towards a sustainable one

    Time Overruns in Public Procurement and Concession Contracts: penalty fee and option value to delay

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    Evidence from ongoing procurement and concession contracts shows that time overruns are widespread. Two key elements, among others, can affect the delays in the execution of the contracts: a) uncertainty over production costs; b) inefficiency in the judicial system. In this article we summarize a couple of works (D'Alpaos et al., 2013 and D'Alpaos and Moretto, 2013), in which the authors theoretically and empirically investigate some causes of time overruns in public procurement and concession contracts and determine the trade-off between the supplier’s option value to delay and the penalty fee to be paid in the event of delay. The main results are tested on Italian public procurement data and show that the supplier's incentive to delay is greater the higher the volatility of production costs and the lower the "efficiency" of the judicial system
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