1,721,149 research outputs found
Neoliberalism and the corruption of democracy
According to the predominant policy paradigm, corruption could be curbed by reducing monopoly rents and arbitrary power in their allocation, enhancing open competition in the private and public sectors, increasing meritocratic recruitment, transparency and accountability of public and private actors, introducing more effective controls and feedback mechanisms on the outcomes of public policies, and strengthening moral barriers and societal control over the public sphere. The adaptive characteristics of corruption networks -as above described- makes them increasingly appear as the locally deep-rooted expressions of a multifaceted phenomenon, common to most if not all democracies where weakened political institutions face rampant corporate and financial organized interests. The fight against systemic corruption, a factor of degeneration and injustice affecting an increasing number of representative democracy, as cannot be a single-issue policy, nor delegated only to experts’ advice to policy-makers, but rather must be linked to a wider rethinking of politics and participatio
La sicurezza nell’integrità
Il contributo esamina il legame tra il tema della sicurezza e quello delle politiche per l’integrità, volte a contenere e prevenire la maladministration.
Dopo un’analisi multidimensionale del concetto di sicurezza, letto in una
cornice teorica neo-istituzionalista, si mostra come forme di criminalità
politico-amministrativa ed economico-finanziaria, specie nelle manifestazioni di natura estorsivo-parassitaria, rappresentino un fattore di criticità
tanto rispetto a una condizione di ‘sicurezza primaria’ di cittadini e operatori economici, che rispetto a una più ampia nozione di ‘sicurezza integrata’ di una gamma più estesa di diritti, la cui garanzia viene intaccata da
abusi, inefficienze, corruzione. Viene infine presa in esame l’interazione
tra la sicurezza, nelle due declinazioni sopra richiamate, e le politiche per
l’integrità della Pubblica amministrazione in Italia, considerate nella loro
difficoltosa attuazione susseguente all’approvazione della legge n. 190 del
6 novembre 2012.This article examines the link between security issues and anticorruption
policies, with the aim of limiting and preventing maladministration. Following a multidimensional analysis of the concept of security within a
neo-institutionalist theoretical framework, it shows how political-bureaucratic and economic-financial crimes, especially in their extorsive and parasitic manifestions, represent a critical factor in the ‘primary security’ of
individuals and economic actors, as well as in the broader sense of the ‘integrated security’ of a wider range of rights, whose protection is negatively affected by abuses, inefficiencies and corruption. Finally, the article
explores the interaction between security (understood in both the above
dimensions) and anticorruption policies in Italy, as implemented following
the enactment of law 190/201
Costi di transazione e meccanismi di governance nel mercato della corruzione
The article aims at singling out the main analytical and policy implications from the application of transaction costs theory to the study of illegal markets, with a special focus on the market for corruption. The purpose is to shade light on governance structures which can contribute to the emergence of informal institutions in the interactions between corruptors and corruptees, reducing uncertainty in the fulfillment of reciprocal obligations. After reviewing the first, second and third-party enforcement mechanisms which can reduce ex-post transaction costs, main variables are discussed determinining their relative effectiveness in the market for corruption. Three potential equilibria can emerge in the informal regulation of hidden exchanges: petty, systemic and organized corruption. After a survey of the role of some individual and collective actors as providers of protection, a discussion is presented of the implication of previous analysis on policy tools which can undermine governance mechanisms of corruption, with a brief comparison with the main measures introduced in the Italian system after the approval of law 190/201
Grande opera, grande corruzione?
Il contributo esamina i fattori che incrementano il rischio corruzione nella realizzazione di grandi opere, esaminando sia le caratteristiche delle distorsioni che investono i processi decisionali che le dinamiche interne ai fenomeni corruttivi. Alcune considerazioni finali sui possibili strumenti di prevenzione sono presentati nella parte conclusiv
Tra cauto ottimismo e radicata sfiducia
Il sondaggio Demos-Libera conferma una prudente apertura di
credito verso gli effetti positivi di politiche antimafia e anticorruzione di una
piccola quota di cittadini, che però si inserisce in un contesto di perdurante
scetticismo, indirizzata soprattutto nei confronti della classe politica. Nel
trentennale di “mani pulite”, questa sfiducia per certi versi incondizionata
sembra costituire uno dei lasciti più duraturi di tangentopoli
The Secret Nexus. A Case Study of Deviant Masons, Mafia and Corruption in Italy
This paper wishes to explore some characteristics of the relevant interconnections between mafias/mafiosi and masonic lodges/masons in the Italian context. The paper sets out to study these interconnections from a social science perspective rooted in sociological and neo-institutional studies of organised crime and mafias, but also in criminological approaches to social constructionism, in the form of symbols and narratives. We will present a case study to reflect on the roles that (deviant) masons can assume in contexts where both mafias’ and personal, political, or economic interests are at play. The case study shows how masonic alliances can augment networking and enforcing capabilities: we call this process masonic deviance amplification. Additionally, the case study confirms the constitutive power that narratives around the masonic world hold today in the Italian context
Commento alle elezioni regionali 2010 in Toscana. Rossi e il centrosinistra unito vincono con il 60% dei voti exploit di Lega e Italia dei valori.
Federalismi.i
Commento alle elezioni regionali 2010 in Toscana. Rossi e il centrosinistra unito vincono con il 60% dei voti exploit di Lega e Italia dei valori
Federalismi.i
L’attività statutaria, legislativa e regolamentare della regione Toscana nella VIII legislatura (2005-2010)
Federalismi.i
- …
