153 research outputs found
Network Competition and Entry Deterrence
No full textWe develop a model of logit demand that extends the traditional duopoly framework of network competition to a multi-firm industry. First, we show that incumbents establish the reciprocal access charge inefficiently below cost when they compete in prices but they behave efficiently if they compete in utilities. Secondly, we study how incumbents determine the industry-wide access charge under the threat of entry. We show that incumbents may accommodate all possible entrants, only a group of them, or may completely deter entry. When entry deterrence is the preferred option, incumbents distort the access charge upwards. Copyright (C) The Author(s). Journal compilation (C) Royal Economic Society 2008.
Strategic Price Discrimination in Compulsory Insurance Markets
No full textThis paper considers price discrimination when competing firms do not observe a customer’s type but only some other variable correlated to it. This is a typical situation in many insurance markets—such as motor insurance—where it is also often the case that insurance is compulsory. We characterise the equilibria and their welfare properties under various price regimes. We show that discrimination based on immutable characteristics such as gender is a dominant strategy, either when firms offer policies at a fixed price or when they charge according to some consumption variable that is correlated to costs. In the latter case, gender discrimination can be an outcome of strategic interaction alone in situations where it would not be adopted by a monopolist. Strategic price discrimination may also increase cross subsidies between types, contrary to expectations. Copyright The Geneva Association 2005price discrimination, insurance classification, equity, variable insurance charges,
Content and advertising in the media: pay-tv versus free-to-air
No full textWe compare the advertising intensity and content of programming in a market with competing media platforms. With pay-tv, media platforms have two sources of revenues, advertising revenues and revenues from viewers. With free-to-air, media platforms receive all revenues from advertising. We show that if viewers strongly dislike advertising, the advertising intensity is greater under free-to-air television. We also show that free-to-air television tends to provide less differentiated content whereas pay-tv stations always maximally differentiate their content. In addition, we compare the welfare properties of the two different scheme
Parallel trade, international exhaustion and intellectual property rights: a welfare analysis
No full text
Third-degree price discrimination with buyer power
No full textThis paper introduces a model of third-degree price discrimination where a seller's pricing power is constrained by buyers' outside options. Price uniformity performs more efficiently than discriminatory pricing, as uniform pricing allows weaker buyers to exploit the more attractive outside option of stronger buyers. This mechanism is markedly different from the mechanisms that are at work in case uniform pricing is imposed on an unconstrained monopolist
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