86,714 research outputs found
Human group behavior: The ideal free distribution in a three-patch situation
No full textA group of 15 college students was exposed to repeated trials of a task in which money was available for choosing among three colors (blue, red, and green). The amount of winning tokens for each color was varied across phases to test whether group distribution would track the ratio of winning tokens between patches. Confirming previous reports on ideal free performance in humans, group choice proved sensitive to the available resources but tended to undermatch the ratio of winning tokens. The difference-equalization rule of Sokolowski, Tonneau, and Freixa i Baqu� [Psychonom. Bull. Rev. 6 (1999) 157] gave a satisfactory fit to the data. � 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved
Antirealist arguments in behavior analysis
No full textSome operant theorists have argued that the most fundamental concepts of behavior analysis have antirealist implications: for example, that stimuli have no physical properties, that we have no epistemic access to a physical world, that the world exists only in behavior, and that we are locked in our behavior. In this article, I show that such beliefs do not derive from behavior analysis. In particular, the concepts of stimulus and response employed in behavior analysis have no antirealist implications. Putative proofs to the contrary are seriously confused. Zapotitlán 2005 Cambridge Center for Behavioral Studies
Antirealist arguments in behavior analysis
No full textSome operant theorists have argued that the most fundamental concepts of behavior analysis have antirealist implications: for example, that stimuli have no physical properties, that we have no epistemic access to a physical world, that the world exists only in behavior, and that we are locked in our behavior. In this article, I show that such beliefs do not derive from behavior analysis. In particular, the concepts of stimulus and response employed in behavior analysis have no antirealist implications. Putative proofs to the contrary are seriously confused. © 2005 Cambridge Center for Behavioral Studies
Consciousness outside the head
No full textBrain-centered theories of consciousness seem to face insuperable difficulties. While some philosophers now doubt that the hard problem of consciousness will ever be solved, other call for radically new approaches to conscious experience. In this article I resurrect a largely forgotten approach to consciousness known as neorealism. According to neorealism, consciousness is merely a part, or cross-section, of the environment. Neorealism implies that all conscious experiences, veridical or otherwise, exist outside of the brain and are wholly independent of being perceived or not; nonveridical perceptions of the environment over an arbitrarily short period of time are supposed to be objective constituents of the environment over a more extended time scale. I argue here that neorealism fares at least as well as brain-centered theories of consciousness on a number of fundamental issues. On one fundamental issue-the nature of the relation between veridical and nonveridical perceptions-neorealism outperforms its competitors
Behavior analysis, common sense, and logic: Reply to Barnes-Holmes
No full textBarnes-Holmes characterizes his views as a-ontological, not antirealist. My criticisms still apply. Barnes-Holmes has not given any good reason to accept antirealism, nor has he given any good reason to accept an a-ontological position. Because his views, a-ontological or otherwise, are contradicted by ubiquitous aspects of the theory and practice of behavior analysis, these views should be rejected until supported by new and better arguments. Zapotitlán 2005 Cambridge Center for Behavioral Studies
Behaviorism and chisholm's challenge
No full textFoxall's intentional behaviorism is supposed to provide explanation and understanding where radical behaviorism provides only prediction and control. Foxall does identify empirical and conceptual issues with the operant reinforcement framework, but he underestimates the extent of its flaws and partly misidentifies their nature. His intentional behaviorism suffers from conceptual difficulties, and its adherence to a form of instrumentalism may actually make it harder to understand intentional phenomena
Behaviorism and chisholm's challenge
No full textFoxall's intentional behaviorism is supposed to provide explanation and understanding where radical behaviorism provides only prediction and control. Foxall does identify empirical and conceptual issues with the operant reinforcement framework, but he underestimates the extent of its flaws and partly misidentifies their nature. His intentional behaviorism suffers from conceptual difficulties, and its adherence to a form of instrumentalism may actually make it harder to understand intentional phenomena
Windows
No full textSome models of performance assume that behavior depends on environmental quantities (for example, rates of reinforcement) that are defined over intervals of fixed duration. Although such window models may serve as useful approximations, they are incompatible with well-known properties of behavior (for instance, sensitivity to delay). Window models with variable window length, however, are more difficult to refute. This article examines some implications of the assumption of random window length. Variable windows are shown to produce continuous forgetting and temporal discounting functions, to display properties analogous to parallel aggregation, and to make reasonable predictions about steady-state relations between reinforcement and responding. Issues of interpretation nonetheless suggest that alternatives to window models should be developed. © 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved
Y-Chromosome haplotypes for six short tandem repeats (STRs) in a Mexican population
No full textSome models of performance assume that behavior depends on environmental quantities (for example, rates of reinforcement) that are defined over intervals of fixed duration. Although such window models may serve as useful approximations, they are incompatible with well-known properties of behavior (for instance, sensitivity to delay). Window models with variable window length, however, are more difficult to refute. This article examines some implications of the assumption of random window length. Variable windows are shown to produce continuous forgetting and temporal discounting functions, to display properties analogous to parallel aggregation, and to make reasonable predictions about steady-state relations between reinforcement and responding. Issues of interpretation nonetheless suggest that alternatives to window models should be developed. " 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.",,,,,,"10.1016/j.beproc.2005.02.007",,,"http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12104/45741","http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?eid=2-s2.0-17444411575&partnerID=40&md5=f548078979c9313b25d4b4dfd41dbc4
Behaviorism in 1942: A précis of Tilquin's le behaviorisme: Origine et développement de la psychologie de réaction en Amérique
No full textBook-length treatments of behaviorism from a philosophical and historical perspective are few in number. Tilquin's (1942) is one of these, but its publication in French during World War II and the limited number of available copies make for difficult access. In this paper, I summarize the contents of the book for a general audience of behavior analysts. Tilquin's work is a useful tour of the behaviorism of its time, and most of the topics discussed in it remain relevant to behavior analysis
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