1,721,335 research outputs found
A causal view of the sense of agency
Full text linkIf you expect that your action causes a near effect, you perceive the action and the effect as closer in time than they really are. This phenomenon is called temporal binding and is considered an implicit measure of the sense of agency, namely the sense of being the author of an action or action awareness. Recent studies, however, show that temporal binding occurs even without the agent executing any action and depends on the capacity to represent one event as the cause of another one. These studies demand the reexamination of the sense of agency, and of temporal binding as its diagnostic tool. I propose a causal view of the sense of agency, according to which action awareness arises when your action is represented as causing an effect. Because representing an action as causing outcomes affects time perception creating the illusion of event proximity, the causal view explains and operationalizes the sense of agency through the connection between causality and time, thus overcoming the indeterminacy of previous accounts. The causal view can pave the way to novel experimental perspectives in development and evolution and stimulate new thinking on the relationship between subjectivity, causal cognition, and time perception.Introduction - Temporal binding with intentions and causes - The causal representation involved in the binding effect - Sense of agency and variety of intentional actions - A causal view of the sense of agency - Action awareness and causal representations in development and evolution Conclusio
L'io e il tempo delle azioni
No full textLa durata temporale degli eventi del mondo è soggettiva. Ad esempio per chi la compie o la osserva, un’azione compiuta intenzionalmente dura meno di una involontaria. Questo fenomeno si chiama Temporal binding (TB) e mostra che il tempo si accorcia nella nostra percezione non solo per le azioni intenzionali, ma anche se considero qualcosa come la causa di qualcos’altro. La causalità e il tempo infatti sono legati nella nostra mente. Alla luce del legame tra percezione del tempo e causalità, si può usare il TB per capire se un individuo abbia consapevolezza di agire, a patto però che si definisca tale consapevolezza attraverso la comprensione che le nostre azioni causino conseguenze. La consapevolezza di agire diventa così un corollario della cognizione causale ed influenza la percezione del tempo creando l’illusione che i nostri obiettivi siano più vicini nel tempo di quello che in realtà sono. In questo articolo, analizzo il rapporto tra azioni intenzionali, percezione del tempo e causalità per esplorare l’origine della consapevolezza di agire. Provo poi a prevedere quando gli esseri umani e altri animali acquisiscono tale consapevolezza, offrendo proposte concrete per esplorarla nello sviluppo psicologico e nell’evoluzione.Introduzione 1 La percezione del tempo delle Azioni 2 Alla ricera del tempo delle Azioni 3 La consapevolezza minima dell'Agire 4 La consapevolezza dell'Agire intenzionale 5 La nascita Io immerso nel suo tempo 6 Percezione del tempo sviluppo dell'Essere umano Conclusion
Introduzione alle psicologie evoluzionistiche. L'origine della mente umana tra scienza e filosofia
No full textA very nice meal with an unsatisfying appetizer. Review of “The Making and Breaking of Minds: How Social Interactions shape the Human Mind” by Isabella Sarto-Jackson
No full textPutting microbiota-gut-brain research in a systemic developmental context: Focus on breast milk
No full textThe microbiota-gut-brain (MGB) field holds huge potential for understanding behavioral development and informing effective early interventions for psychological health. To realize this potential, factors that shape the MGB axis in infancy (i.e., breast milk) must be integrated into a systemic framework that considers salient behavioral outcomes. This is best accomplished applying network analyses in large prospective, longitudinal investigations in humans
Temporal binding: digging into animal minds through time perception
Full text linkTemporal binding is the phenomenon in which events related as cause and effect are perceived by humans to be closer in time than they actually are (Haggard et al. in Nat Neurosci 5(4):382–385, 2002, https://doi.org/10.1038/nn827). Despite the fact that temporal binding experiments with humans have relied on verbal instructions, we argue that they are adaptable to nonhuman animals, and that a finding of temporal binding from such experiments would provide evidence of causal reasoning that cannot be reduced to associative learning. Our argument depends on describing and theoretically motivating an intermediate level of representations between the lower levels of associations of sensory features and higher symbolic representations. This intermediate level of representations makes it possible to challenge arguments given by some comparative psychologists that animals lack higher-level abstract and explicit forms of causal reasoning because their cognitive capacities are limited to learning and reasoning at the basic level of perceptual associations. Our multi-level account connects time perception with causal reasoning and provides a philosophically defensible framework for experimental investigations that have not yet been pursued. We describe the structure of some possible experiments and consider the implications that would follow from a positive finding of temporal binding in nonhuman animals. Such a finding would provide evidence of explicit awareness of causal relationships and would warrant attribution of intermediate representations that are more abstract and sophisticated than the associations allowed by the lower level of the two-level account
Reconsidering the Role of Manual Imitation in Language Evolution
No full textIn this paper, we distinguish between a number of different phenomena that have been called imitation, and identify one form—a high fidelity mechanism for social learning—considered to be crucial for the development of language. Subsequently, we consider a common claim in the language evolution literature, which is that prior to the emergence of vocal language our ancestors communicated using a sophisticated gestural protolanguage (the ‘gesture-first view’), the learning of some parts of which required manual imitation. Drawing upon evidence from recent work in neuroscience, primatology, and archeology, we argue that while gestural communication undoubtedly played a crucial role in language evolution, the grounds for thinking that manual imitation did are currently unconvincing
Cognitive Twists: The Coevolution of Learning and Genes in Human Cognition
No full textIn this paper, we propose the expression cognitive twists for cognitive mechanisms that result from the coevolution of genes and learning. Evidence is available that at least some cultural learning mechanisms, such as imitation and language, have evolved genetically under the pressure produced by culture, even though they are mostly acquired through domain-general learning during development. Although the existence of these mechanisms is consistent with evolutionary theory, their importance has not been sufficiently emphasized by mind-centered accounts of human cognitive evolution, namely evolutionary psychology and cultural evolutionary psychology. We provide concrete examples of cognitive twists, such as vocal imitation. Genetic changes in action-perception matching circuits suggest that human imitation and perhaps language are cognitive twists, namely plastic, learnable, yet genetically evolved cognitive mechanisms. We conclude that cognitive twists depict plausible evolutionary scenarios for the evolution of cognition in Homo sapiens
Investigazione geoelettrica profonda.
No full textIn "Il Graben di Siena. Studi geologici, idrogeologici e geofisici finalizzati alla ricerca di fluidi caldi nel sottosuolo", P.F. "Energetica", S.P. "Energia Geotermica
Distributed Loci of Control: Overcoming Stale Dichotomies in Biology and Cognitive Science
No full textWe argue that theoretical debates in biology and cognitive science often are based around differences in the posited locus of control for biological and cognitive phenomena. Internalists about locus of control posit that specific causal control over the phenomenon is exerted by factors internal to the (relevant subsystem) of an organism. Externalists posit that causally specific influence is due to external factors. In theoretical biology, we suggest, a minimal agreement has developed that the locus of control for heritable variation is distributed – that is, both internal and external factors exert specific, non-redundant causal influence on evolved traits. We suggest that debates in cognitive science, particularly surrounding “enactivism,” should also embrace a distributed locus of control. We show how both internal and external factors contribute non-redundantly to psychological capacities and behavior. We further suggest that embracing a distributed locus of control provides a basis for a revisionary, but substantive account of “mental representation.
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