11,076 research outputs found
Global Media Ideas - Infinite Pathways to Creative Succes - Tim Chang - Part One.mp4
No full textDuring the X Media Lab: Global Media Ideas summit in June 2011 media and technology writer Brad Howarth conducted interviews with industry experts for Creativeinnovation. This video is part one of Brad Howarth's interview with Tim Chang about his role as Partner at Norwest Venture Partners (Palo Alto). Tim focuses on investments in mobile, gaming, digital media, and also leads Norwest Venture Partners's investment practice in China and Asia-Pacific. Tim shares tips on how to get an introduction to a Venture Capital; the elements of a good pitch and follow-up. And what he looks at when considering a deal - The 3Ts: Team, Traction, Tier 1 co-investors
Global Media Ideas - Infinite Pathways to Creative Succes - Tim Chang - Part Two.mp4
No full textDuring the X Media Lab: Global Ideas summit in June 2011, media and technology writer Brad Howarth conducted interviews with industry experts for Creativeinnovation. This is part two of Brad Howarth's interview with Tim Chang, In the second part of his interview Tim speaks about the common mistakes of entrepreneurs and the importance of Team over Idea in start-ups. How second movers to platforms can be successful. Advice for getting started when seeking investment. Growth areas he's interested in and key trends in using new tools and mechanics to deliver business model innovation
Opportunities for linking young surveyors across professional surveying member organisations and FIG
No full textAustralia Day 2017: change the date mate?
No full textSummary
The majority of Australians don’t want to change the date of Australia Day, see us become a republic or change the national flag, according to a survey conducted following the recent controversies of Australia Day 2017.
The national poll was conducted in the wake of intense publicity surrounding the #changethedate campaign which led to protests on Australia Day demanding that it be held on a different date because of the atrocities suffered by Indige nous people after the landing of the First Fleet on January 26th.
Conducted among 1043 Australians by research firm Review Partners , in association with Survey Sampling International , the study looked in detail at Australians’ attitudes towards Australia Day and its link to our British origins.
\u27Images of protests and burning flags dominated the reporting on Australia Day, so we wanted to understand the truth of Australians attitudes towards the national day,’ said report author Paul Costantoura, of Review Partners.
Most people (85%) told us they had heard something in the news or social media about the campaign to change the date, but only 16% said we should change it to another date,’
‘However, t he majority (59%) said it shouldn’t be changed and about a quarter of the population (24%) didn’t really care what date Australia Day is held.’
‘To make sure people knew the arguments, we told them some people said it represents the day when Australia’s original Indigenous peoples were invaded by the British, had their land stolen from them and were slaughtered in their thousands by the early British settlers.’
‘After reading this, the number wanting a new date inc reased to 28%, but 53% still said the date should stay the same and 20% still didn’t really care about the date.’
‘Asked to rate the importance of changing the date, becoming a republic, or changing the flag, 53% of people didn’t want to make any changes , 30% said a republic was most important, 11% gave top priority to changing the date , while only 6% nominated changing the flag .
Optimal ownership in joint ventures with contributions of asymmetric partners
No full textThis paper faces two questions concerning Joint Ventures (JV) agreements. First, we study how the partners contribution affect the creation and the profit sharing of a JV when partners' effort is not observable. Then, we see whether such agreements are easier to enforce when the decision on JV profit sharing among partners is either delegated to the independent JV management (Management Sharing) or jointly taken by partners (Coordinated Sharing). We find that the firm whose effort has a higher impact on the JV's profits should have a larger profit shares. Moreover, a Management sharing ensures, at least in some cases, a wider range of self-enforceable JV agreements.D43, L13, L14, L22
Optimal ownership in joint ventures with contributions of asymmetric partners
No full textThis paper faces two questions concerning Joint Ventures (JV) agreements. First, we study how the partners contribution affect the creation and the profit sharing of a JV when partners' effort is not observable. Then, we see whether such agreements are easier to enforce when the decision on JV profit sharing among partners is either delegated to the independent JV management (Management Sharing) or jointly taken by partners (Coordinated Sharing). We find that the firm whose effort has a higher impact on the JV's profits should have a larger profit shares. Moreover, a Management sharing ensures, at least in some cases, a wider range of self-enforceable JV agreements.joint ventures, strategic alliances, ownership structure, asymmetries.
Optimal ownership in joint ventures with contributions of asymmetric partners
No full textThis paper faces two questions concerning Joint Ventures (JV) agreements. First, we study how the partners contribution affect the creation and the profit sharing of a JV when partners' effort is not observable. Then, we see whether such agreements are easier to enforce when the decision on JV profit sharing among partners is either delegated to the independent JV management (Management Sharing) or jointly taken by partners (Coordinated Sharing). We find that the firm whose effort has a higher impact on the JV's profits should have a larger profit shares. Moreover, a Management sharing ensures, at least in some cases, a wider range of self-enforceable JV agreements.joint ventures, strategic alliances, ownership structure, asymmetries
Satisfaction with a fly-in/fly-out (FIFO) lifestyle: Is it related to rosters, children and support resources utilised by Australian employees and partners and does it impact on relationship quality and stress?
No full textThe phenomenal growth currently being experienced in the Australian resources industry has seen unprecedented interest in the practice of fly-in/fly-out (FIFO) work practices. This study explores a number of factors that have been previously identified as having possible negative impacts on those involved in FIFO. A sample of 314 FIFO partners and 245 workers were surveyed on roster satisfaction, roster length, relationship quality, children, perceived stress and perceived social support. Resources and supports were also examined to determine awareness, utilisation and usefulness to partners and workers. This study found that overall workers were satisfied with their rosters and relationships, including those on longer rosters. Partners however, were less satisfied with rosters and relationships, particularly those who had children between six and twelve years of age, although roster length was not a factor. Children’s ages did not influence partners’ perceived stress however partners without children reported higher perceived stress than those with children. Less than half of the partners were aware of Employee Assistance Programs (EAPs) however personal supports, such as family, friends, co-workers, and FIFO specific support websites, had a positive effect on partners’ perceived stress. When compared to other resources, both partners and workers rated personal support as the most useful.
Keywords: FIFO; rosters, relationships; children; stress; suppor
Optimal ownership in joint ventures with contributions of asymmetric partners
No full textThis paper faces two questions concerning Joint Ventures (JV) agreements. First, we study how the partners contribution affect the creation and the profit sharing of a JV when partners’ effort is not obervable. Then, we see whether such agreements are easier to enforce when the decision on JV profit sharing among partners is either delegated to the independent JV management (Management Sharing) or jointly taken by partners (Coordinated Sharing). We find that the firm whose effort has a higher impact on the JV’s profits should have a larger profit shares. Moreover, a Management sharing ensures, at least in some cases, a wider range of self-enforceable JV agreementsJoint ventures, strategic alliances, ownership structure, asymmetries
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