1,720,968 research outputs found
Endogenous subsidies for cleaner products: the role of eco-friendly consumers.
No full textIn a vertically differentiated duopoly, we assume that environmental subsidies are endogenously determined by the demand for dirtier goods and the relative greenness of cleaner alternatives. By contemplating the possibility that a subsidy targets either consumers or firms, we study how the impact of a subsidy changes with its recipients, consumers versus firms. A consumer-based subsidy is environmentally enhancing and increases firms' profits at equilibrium, while it hurts consumers. Overall, however, it is welfare improving. A firm-based subsidy makes firms better off but may be environmentally harmful and has the paradoxical effect of hurting consumers buying the cleaner variant. Moreover, it is welfare detrimental on the whole
Asymmetric Complements in a Vertically Differentiated Market: Competition or Integration?
Get PDFWe study the effects of integration of asymmetric complements when they are vertically differentiated. While confirming the standard effects of integration, namely the internalization of the double marginalization externality and the reduction of competition, we point out a new positive quality effect, due to an increase in the average quality of the goods on sale. We also characterize the conditions under which integration turns out to be optimal for both firms' and consumers. We thus provide valuable directions for competition agencies when considering the joint ownership in vertically differentiated markets
Vertical Differentiation and Collusion: Pruning or Proliferation?
No full textThis paper studies the incentives for firms in a vertically differeniated market to merge
Hedonic and environmental quality: A hybrid model of product differentiation
Get PDFtIn this paper, we analyze how strategic competition between a green firm and a browncompetitor develops when their products are differentiated along two dimensions: hedonicquality and environmental quality. The former dimension refers to the pure (intrinsic) per-formance of the good, whereas the latter dimension has a positional content: buying greengoods satisfies the consumer’s desire to be portrayed as a socially worthy citizen. We con-sider the case in which these quality dimensions are in conflict with each other so that thehigher the hedonic quality of a good, the lower the corresponding environmental quality.We characterize the equilibrium configurations and discuss the policy implications deriving from ou model
How regional policies can affect growth: a macroeconometric model for the Southern Italian Regions, co-authors
No full textCan regional policies accelerate the convergence path of dualistic economic growth
in a single country, offsetting market failures and making growth transmission channels more
efficient? A structural dynamic econometric model has been set up in order to account for these
changes. Three are the main sources of growth playing a role in this context: the 'neigh bourhood'
effect, the interaction between the economic environment and the agents' expectations, and the
policy impact on economic take-off. The evidence shows that policies strongly boost economic growth
of a local area and narrow the gap between the regions of a dual economy
Measuring the Impact of the European Regional Policy on Economic Growth: a Regression Discontinuity Design Approach
No full textRegional macro-econometric modelling for dualistic countries: the case of the Southern Italian Regions
No full textAsymmetric Complements in a Vertically Differentiated Market: Competition or Integration?
No full textWe study the effects of integration of asymmetric complements when they are vertically differentiated. While confirming the standard effects of integration, namely the internalization of the double marginalization externality and the reduction of competition, we point out a new positive quality effect, due to an increase in the average quality of the goods on sale. We also characterize the conditions under which integration turns out to be optimal for both firms' and consumers. We thus provide valuable directions for competition agencies when considering the joint ownership in vertically differentiated markets. © 2014 The University of Manchester and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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