337 research outputs found
In a nutshell : the book of charm, by far the best book the author has written /
No full textAlso available online http://nla.gov.au/nla.aus-vn449757; FERG copy from Ferguson First World War, 1914-1919 pamphlet collection
T.M. Scanlon: Contractualism, Reasonableness, and Moral Intuition
No full textIn his article “Contractualism and Utilitarianism”, T. M. Scanlon formulates a contractualist account of moral wrongness. For Scanlon, a morally permissible principle is one that cannot be reasonably rejected within the context of an “informed, unforced general agreement.”1 Scanlon posits a hypothetical situation between agents who share a mutual recognition of each other’s value as persons. These persons are assumed to be rational individuals who are capable of formulating their own particular visions of the good; this situation is the figurative space in which a principle can be held up to the standard of reasonable rejection. Scanlon’s formulation of moral wrongness hinges on this notion of reasonableness. If we are to use it as a standard of rejection, it must be clear what Scanlon considers reasonableness to be. The goal of this paper is to clarify the meaning of reasonableness in Scanlon’s contractualism, consider how it functions within the hypothetical space of mutual recognition, and challenge its sufficiency as a standard of moral wrongness in relation to our moral intuition
The Diversity of Objections to Inequality
No full textThis is the text of The Lindley Lecture for 1996, given by T.M. Scanlon, an American philosopher
Moral Contractualism in T.M. Scanlon: On Justification and Moral Motivation
No full textUnder the tutelage of contractualism, there is a diversity of political and moral theories. A political theory questions the justification for the existence of a State, as well as whether the State can be a source of legitimate political authority. In turn, moral theories seek to elucidate a broader issue, since the question about the legitimacy of the State is not the issue, but the justification of any norm of a moral character is the focus of its investigations. For some thinkers, asking about the justification of a moral norm is asking about the reasons we have for accepting it, that is, whether we have a sufficient set of reasons to compel each other to participate in this moral system. Moral contractualism emerges in this context, raising questions about how to ensure the link between the agents' motivation and the obligation to carry out the appropriate action. The purpose of this dissertation is to elucidate what reasons (motivations) we have for accepting morality as a legitimate system of mutual restrictions. For that, this project will be based on the analysis of the normative theory proposed by T.M. Scanlon in his book What we owe to each other, in order to verify whether the deflation made by his moral contractualism ensures the link between motivation, justification and obligation.Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa e Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico - CNPqSob a tutela do contratualismo se reúne uma diversidade de teorias políticas e morais. Uma teoria política questiona a justificação da existência do Estado, bem como se esse Estado pode se constituir em uma fonte de autoridade política legítima. Por sua vez, teorias morais buscam elucidar uma questão mais ampla, uma vez que não está em questão a pergunta sobre a legitimidade do Estado, mas a justificação de qualquer norma de caráter moral. Para alguns autores, perguntar pela justificação de uma norma moral é perguntar sobre as razões que temos para aceitá-la, ou seja, se possuímos um conjunto suficiente de razões para obrigarmos uns aos outros a participar desse sistema moral. O contratualismo moral emerge nesse contexto despertando questionamentos sobre como assegurar o vínculo entre a motivação dos agentes e a obrigatoriedade da realização da ação correta. O propósito dessa dissertação é elucidar quais razões (motivações) temos para aceitar a moralidade como um sistema legítimo de restrições mútuas. Para isso, este projeto se apoiará na análise da teoria normativa proposta por T.M. Scanlon em seu livro What we owe to each other, de forma a verificar se a deflação feita pelo seu contratualismo moral assegura o vínculo entre motivação, justificação e obrigação
Moral Contractualism in T.M. Scanlon: On Justification and Moral Motivation
No full textUnder the tutelage of contractualism, there is a diversity of political and moral theories. A political theory questions the justification for the existence of a State, as well as whether the State can be a source of legitimate political authority. In turn, moral theories seek to elucidate a broader issue, since the question about the legitimacy of the State is not the issue, but the justification of any norm of a moral character is the focus of its investigations. For some thinkers, asking about the justification of a moral norm is asking about the reasons we have for accepting it, that is, whether we have a sufficient set of reasons to compel each other to participate in this moral system. Moral contractualism emerges in this context, raising questions about how to ensure the link between the agents' motivation and the obligation to carry out the appropriate action. The purpose of this dissertation is to elucidate what reasons (motivations) we have for accepting morality as a legitimate system of mutual restrictions. For that, this project will be based on the analysis of the normative theory proposed by T.M. Scanlon in his book What we owe to each other, in order to verify whether the deflation made by his moral contractualism ensures the link between motivation, justification and obligation.Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa e Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico - CNPqSob a tutela do contratualismo se reúne uma diversidade de teorias políticas e morais. Uma teoria política questiona a justificação da existência do Estado, bem como se esse Estado pode se constituir em uma fonte de autoridade política legítima. Por sua vez, teorias morais buscam elucidar uma questão mais ampla, uma vez que não está em questão a pergunta sobre a legitimidade do Estado, mas a justificação de qualquer norma de caráter moral. Para alguns autores, perguntar pela justificação de uma norma moral é perguntar sobre as razões que temos para aceitá-la, ou seja, se possuímos um conjunto suficiente de razões para obrigarmos uns aos outros a participar desse sistema moral. O contratualismo moral emerge nesse contexto despertando questionamentos sobre como assegurar o vínculo entre a motivação dos agentes e a obrigatoriedade da realização da ação correta. O propósito dessa dissertação é elucidar quais razões (motivações) temos para aceitar a moralidade como um sistema legítimo de restrições mútuas. Para isso, este projeto se apoiará na análise da teoria normativa proposta por T.M. Scanlon em seu livro What we owe to each other, de forma a verificar se a deflação feita pelo seu contratualismo moral assegura o vínculo entre motivação, justificação e obrigação
Scanlon on Promising
No full textLegal orthodoxy has it that the wrong involved in breaking a promise, like that involved in breaking a contract, depends essentially on the making of a binding promise. It is in this sense sui generis. But philosophers are not so sanguine. T.M. Scanlon is the latest in a long line of moral philosophers who have sought to reduce the wrong of promise-breaking to a wider class of wrongs associated with a duty, variously formulated, not to disappoint the expectations one induces in another. I argue that Scanlon's theory founders on a logical impasse that plages all such reductionist accounts
Comment on Baker's Autonomy and free speech
No full textPart of Symposium: Individual autonomy and free speech.Scanlon, T.M.. (2011). Comment on Baker's Autonomy and free speech. Retrieved from the University Digital Conservancy, https://hdl.handle.net/11299/163438
Comment on Shiffrin's Thinker-based approach to freedom of speech
No full textPart of Symposium: Individual autonomy and free speech.Scanlon, T.M.. (2011). Comment on Shiffrin's Thinker-based approach to freedom of speech. Retrieved from the University Digital Conservancy, https://hdl.handle.net/11299/163439
The Dogma of Reasons Fundamentalism A Critique of Thomas M. Scanlon¿s Metaethics
No full textIn his book Being Realistic About Reasons, T.M. Scanlon argues for a form of normative realism known as ¿reasons fundamentalism.¿ I attack the integrity of the domain-dependent metaphysics he adopts to support this view, and argue that a sufficiently sophisticated form of expressivism might be preferable to reasons fundamentalism
The path to What We Owe to Each Other. An interview of Luc Foisneau and Véronique Munoz-Dardé with Tim Scanlon
No full texthttps://www.politika.io/fr/notice/the-path-to-what-we-owe-to-each-otherT.M. Scanlon is Alford Professor of Natural Religion, Moral Philosophy, and Civil Polity. He received his B.A. from Princeton in 1962 and his Ph.D. from Harvard. In between, he studied for a year at Oxford as a Fulbright Fellow. He taught at Princeton from 1966 before coming to Harvard in 1984. Professor Scanlon’s dissertation and some of his first papers were in mathematical logic, but the bulk of his teaching and writing has been in moral and political philosophy. He has published papers on freedom of expression, the nature of rights, conceptions of welfare, and theories of justice, as well as on foundational questions in moral theory. In the present interview he talks about how he first became interested in moral philosophy, his evolving judgement about Kantian moral ideas, the genesis of his ideas concerning the centrality of reasons in normative philosophy and the idea of justifiability to others as a basis for morality.He was invited at EHESS on the 13th November 2017 for a one-day long discussion of the manuscript of his book, Why does Inequality Matter? (Oxford, 2018), and on the 14th November he participated in the CESPRA seminar on Normative political philosophy with a text on “Contractualism and justification”.The interview was conducted by Luc Foisneau (CNRS director of research) with the collaboration of Véronique Munoz-Dardé (UCL/Berkeley) before the seminar given by Tim Scanlon at EHESS, 105 boulevard Raspail, in Paris. The transcription of the interview is due to Victor Mardellat (PhD candidate in philosophy, CESPRA).T.M. Scanlon est professeur de religion naturelle, de philosophie morale et de politique civile à Harvard University. Il a obtenu son B.A. à Princeton en 1962 et son doctorat à Harvard. Dans l'intervalle, il a étudié pendant un an à Oxford en tant que boursier Fulbright. Il a enseigné à Princeton à partir de 1966 avant de venir à Harvard en 1984. La thèse du professeur Scanlon et certains de ses premiers articles portaient sur la logique mathématique, mais l'essentiel de son enseignement et de ses écrits a été consacré à la philosophie morale et politique. Il a publié des articles sur la liberté d'expression, la nature des droits, les conceptions du bien-être et les théories de la justice, ainsi que sur des questions fondamentales de la théorie morale. Dans l'entretien que nous publions, il explique comment il s'est intéressé pour la première fois à la philosophie morale, l'évolution de son jugement sur les idées morales kantiennes, la genèse de ses idées concernant le caractère central des raisons dans la philosophie normative et l'idée de la justifiabilité à autrui comme fondement de la moralité.Il a été invité à l'EHESS le 13 novembre 2017 pour une journée de discussion sur le manuscrit de son livre, Why does Inequality Matter ? (Oxford, 2018), et le 14 novembre il a participé au séminaire du CESPRA sur la philosophie politique normative avec un texte sur "Le contractualisme et la justification".L'entretien a été réalisé par Luc Foisneau (directeur de recherche au CNRS) avec la collaboration de Véronique Munoz-Dardé (UCL/Berkeley) avant le séminaire donné par Tim Scanlon à l'EHESS, 105 boulevard Raspail, à Paris. La transcription de l'entretien est due à Victor Mardellat (doctorant en philosophie, CESPRA, EHESS)
- …
