1,721,112 research outputs found
The ‘me’ in meat: Does affirming the self make eating animals seem more morally wrong?
Full text linkPeople typically extend limited moral standing to animals reared for food. Prominent perspectives in the literature on animal-human relations characterize this phenomenon as an outcome of moral disengagement: in other words, a strategy that protects people from moral self-condemnation. To provide a direct test of this hypothesis, we exposed people to a self-affirmation manipulation, and hypothesized that this would lead them to be more critical of their own meat eating and be more appreciative of animals’ minds and suffering. Three experiments tested this idea in meat-eaters from the United Kingdom. Two initial experiments (n = 244, n = 247) found that affirming the self made eating animals seem more morally wrong. However, a subsequent pre-registered experiment (n = 719) failed to replicate this effect. In addition, this experiment found no effects of the affirmationprocedure on specific beliefs about eating animals that participants consume compared to animals they do not consume. A mini-meta analysis of all the experiments found only weak evidence in support of the idea that affirming the self makes eating meat seem more morally wrong. There was no evidence that the affirmation procedure affected beliefs about animal minds
Word embeddings reveal growing moral concern for people, animals, and the environment
Full text linkThe Enlightenment idea of historical moral progress asserts that civil societies become more moral over time. This is often understood as an expanding moral circle and is argued to be tightly linked with language use, with some suggesting that shifts in how we express concern for others can be considered an important indicator of moral progress. Our research explores these notions by examining historical trends in natural language use during the 19th and 20th centuries. We found that the associations between words denoting moral concern and words referring to people, animals, and the environment grew stronger over time. The findings support widely-held views about the nature of moral progress by showing that language has changed in a way that reflects greater concern for others
Speciesism in everyday language
Full text linkSpeciesism, like other forms of prejudice, is thought to be underpinned by biased patterns of language use. Thus far, however, psychological science has primarily focused on how speciesism is reflected in individuals' thoughts as opposed to wider collective systems of meaning such as language. We present a large-scale quantitative test of speciesism by applying machine-learning methods (word embeddings) to billions of English words derived from conversation, film, books, and the Internet. We found evidence of anthropocentric speciesism: words denoting concern (vs. indifference) and value (vs. valueless) were more closely associated with words denoting humans compared to many other animals. We also found evidence of companion animal speciesism: the same words were more closely associated with words denoting companion animals compared to most other animals. The work describes speciesism as a pervasive collective phenomenon that is evident in a naturally occurring expression of human psychology – everyday language
When is it wrong to eat animals? The relevance of different animal traits and behaviours
Full text linkResearch suggests that animals’ capacity for agency, experience, and benevolence predict beliefs about their moral treatment. Four studies built on this work by examining how fine‐grained information about animals’ traits and behaviours (e.g., can store food for later vs. can use tools) shifted moral beliefs about eating and harming animals. The information that most strongly affected moral beliefs was related to secondary emotions (e.g., can feel nostalgia), morality (e.g., will share food with others), empathy (e.g., can feel others pain), social connections (e.g., will look for deceased family members), and moral patiency (e.g., can feel pain). In addition, information affected moral judgements in line with how it affected superordinate representations about animals’ capacity for experience/feeling but not agency/thinking. The results provide a fine‐grained outline of how, and why, information about animals’ traits and behaviours informs moral judgements
Changing minds about minds: Evidence that people are too sceptical about animal sentience
Full text linkOur relationships with other animals are governed by how we view their capacity for sentience and suffering. However, there is currently little agreement as to whether people's beliefs about animal minds are largely accurate or inaccurate. We used an innovative task to examine how people update their beliefs in response to noisy but informative clues about animal minds. This allowed us to compare participants' posterior beliefs to what a normative participant ought to believe if they conform to Bayes' theorem. Five studies (four pre-registered; n = 2417) found that participants shifted their beliefs too far in response to clues that suggested animals do not have minds (i.e., overshooting what a normative participant ought to believe), but not far enough in response to clues that suggested animals have minds (i.e., falling short of what a normative participant ought to believe). A final study demonstrated that this effect was attenuated when humans were the targets of belief. The findings demonstrate that people underestimate animal minds in a way that can be said to be inaccurate and highlight the role of belief updating in downplaying evidence of animal minds. The findings are discussed in relation to speciesist beliefs about the supremacy of humans over animals
Someone is pulling the strings: Hypersensitive agency detection and belief in conspiracy theories
Full text linkWe hypothesized that belief in conspiracy theories would be predicted by the general tendency to attribute agency and intentionality where it is unlikely to exist. We further hypothesized that this tendency would explain the relationship between education level and belief in conspiracy theories, where lower levels of education have been found to be associated with higher conspiracy belief. In Study 1 (N=202) participants were more likely to agree with a range of conspiracy theories if they also tended to attribute intentionality and agency to inanimate objects. As predicted, this relationship accounted for the link between education level and belief in conspiracy theories. We replicated this finding in Study 2 (N=330), whilst taking into account beliefs in paranormal phenomena. These results suggest that education may undermine the reasoning processes and assumptions that are reflected in conspiracy belief
Are we smart enough to remember how smart animals are?
Full text linkSome theoretical perspectives suggest people overestimate animals’ mental capacities (anthropomorphism), while others suggest they underestimate them (mind-denial). However, studies have generally not employed objective criteria against which the accuracy or appropriateness of people’s judgements about animals can be tested. We employed memory paradigms, in which judgments are clearly right or wrong, in 9 experiments (8 pre-registered; n = 3162). When tested shortly after exposure, meat-eaters’ memory about companion-animals (e.g., dogs) but not food-animals (e.g., pigs) showed an anthropomorphic bias: more information consistent with animals having vs. lacking a mind was correctly remembered (Experiments 1-4). Vegetarians and vegans memory, on the other hand, consistently showed an anthropomorphic bias regarding food and companion animals alike (Experiments 5 and 6). When tested a week after exposure, both those who eat meat and those who do not showed signs of shifting toward a mind-denying bias (Experiments 2, 3, and 6). These biases had important consequences for beliefs about animal minds. Inducing mind-denying memory biases caused participants to see animals as possessing less sophisticated minds (Experiments 7-9). The work demonstrates that judgments about animals’ minds can depart predictably from reality and that such departures can contribute to biased perceptions of their minds
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