287 research outputs found
Financing of Public Goods through Taxation in a General Equilibrium Economy: Theory and Experimental Evidence
Get PDFWe compare general equilibrium economies in which building and maintenance of a depreciating public facility is financed either by anonymous voluntary contributions or by taxing agents on their income from private production. Agents start with an endowment of private goods and money, while the government starts with an endowment of public good and money. All private goods produced are tendered for sale in exchange for money in a sell-all market mechanism. Agents' proceeds from sale are taxed, and they individually allocate their private goods between current consumption and investment in production for the following period. The optimal levels of supply of the public good, and tax rate to sustain it over time, are defined and calculated for infinite and finite horizons. These equilibrium theoretical predications are compared to the outcomes of laboratory economies when (1) the starting public facility is either at or below the optimal level; and (2) the tax rate is either exogenously set at the optimal level, or at the median of rates proposed by individual agents. We find that the experimental economies sustain public goods at about 70-90 percent of the infinite horizon but considerably more than the finite horizon optimum. Payoffs (efficiency) is at 90 percent of the infinite horizon equilibrium level even when the rate of taxation is determined by voting. Starting conditions play only a minor role for outcomes of the economies, as efficiency and the stock of public good adjusts to about the same level irrespective of the starting level. These results contrast with rapid decline in provision of public goods under anonymous voluntary contributions, and point to the possibility that the social institution of government enforced taxation may have evolved to address the problem of under-production of public goods through anonymous voluntary contributions.Public goods, Experimental gaming, Voting, taxation, Evolution of institutions
Coronary artery fistula (CAF) clinical, hemodynamic, angiographic profile and follow up.(1)Dobutamine stress echocardiography for detection of coronary artery disease.(2)
No full textRisky Curves: From Unobservable Utility to Observable Opportunity Sets
Get PDFMost theories of risky choice postulate that a decision maker maximizes the expectation of a Bernoulli (or utility or similar) function. We tour 60 years of empirical search and conclude that no such functions have yet been found that are useful for out-of-sample prediction. Nor do we find practical applications of Bernoulli functions in major risk-based industries such as finance, insurance and gambling. We sketch an alternative approach to modeling risky choice that focuses on potentially observable opportunities rather than on unobservable Bernoulli functions.Expected utility, Risk aversion, St. Petersburg Paradox, Decisions under uncertainty, Option theory
The Folio: F. C. C. Magazine
No full textGhei, R. L.-Editorial. pp. 1-2; Ball, P. N.-Essay-Shakespeare's Theatre. pp. 2-9; Romesh-Play-Murdress. pp. 9-13; Rajendra Behari Mathur-Essay-The Laboratory Method in Religion. pp. 14-16; Ghei, R. L.-Up and Down. pp. 16; Essay-virtuous Indignation. pp. 17-18; The Co-Ed's Corner. pp. 19; Our Results. pp. 19; Siraj-ud-Din-The Records of the Lalls. pp. 20-21; Shashpal Singh-Originality. pp. 21-22; Har Narain-Essay-Rural Crisis. pp. 23-24; Wadhwaney Shyam-Fight Against Mr. Theta. pp. 24-25; Story-Wrongs, Injuries, Outrages. pp. 25-27; Aggarwal, M. G.-Essay-English Language and India. pp. 27; W. P. B.. pp. 28-29; Gargoyles. pp. 30-31; Sant Ram Bhatia-Encouraging a Personal Reading. pp. 31-33; A Word Before we Part. pp. 33-34; [Hindi]. 17 p.; Punjabi Phulvari [Punjabi]. 8 p.; The Folio [Urdu]. 23 p
European Pharmaceutical Price Regulation, Firm Profitability, and R&D Spending
Get PDFEU countries closely regulate pharmaceutical prices whereas the U.S. does not. This paper shows how price constraints affect the profitability, stock returns, and R&D spending of EU and U.S. firms. Compared to EU firms, U.S. firms are more profitable, earn higher stock returns, and spend more on research and development (R&D). Some differences have increased over time. In 1986, EU pharmaceutical R&D exceeded U.S. R&D by about 24 percent, but by 2004, EU R&D trailed U.S. R&D by about 15 percent. During these 19 years, U.S. R&D spending grew at a real annual compound rate of 8.8 percent, while EU R&D spending grew at a real 5.4 percent rate. Results show that EU consumers enjoyed much lower pharmaceutical price inflation, however, at a cost of 46 fewer new medicines introduced by EU firms and 1680 fewer EU research jobs.
Three Minimal Market Institutions with Human and Algorithmic Agents: Theory and Experimental Evidence
Get PDFWe define and examine three minimal market games (sell-all, buy-sell, and double auction) in the laboratory relative to the predictions of theory. These closed exchange economies have some cash to facilitate transactions, and include feedback. The experiment reveals that (1) the competitive general equilibrium (CGE) and non-cooperative (NCE) models are reasonable anchors to locate most but not all the observed outcomes of the three market mechanisms; (2) outcomes tend to get closer to CGE predictions as the number of players increases; (3) prices and allocations in double auctions deviate persistently from CGE predictions; (4) the outcome paths across the three market mechanisms differ significantly and persistently; (5) importance of market structures for outcomes is reinforced by algorithmic trader simulations; and (6) none of the three markets dominates the others across six measures of performance. Inclusion of some mechanism differences into theory may enhance our understanding of important aspects of markets.Strategic market games, Laboratory experiments, Minimally intelligent agents, Adaptive learning agents, General equilibrium
Default Penalty as a Disciplinary and Selection Mechanism in Presence of Multiple Equilibria
Get PDFClosed exchange and production-and-exchange economies may have multiple equilibria, a fact that is usually ignored in macroeconomic models. Our basic argument is that default and bankruptcy laws are required to prevent strategic default, and these laws can also serve to provide the conditions for uniqueness. In this paper we report experimental evidence on the effectiveness of this approach to resolving multiplicity: society can assign default penalties on fiat money so the economy selects one of the equilibria. Our data show that the choice of default penalty takes the economy to the neighborhood of the chosen equilibrium. The theory and evidence together reinforce the idea that accounting, bankruptcy and possibly other aspects of social mechanisms play an important role in resolving the otherwise mathematically intractable challenges associated with multiplicity of equilibria in closed economies. Additionally we discuss the meaning and experimental implications of default penalties that support an active bankruptcy-modified competitive equilibrium.Bankruptcy penalty, Financial institutions, Fiat money, Multiple equilibria, Experimental gaming
Agent-Based Modeling: The Right Mathematics for the Social Sciences?
Get PDFThis study provides a basic introduction to agent-based modeling (ABM) as a powerful blend of classical and constructive mathematics, with a primary focus on its applicability for social science research.� The typical goals of ABM social science researchers are discussed along with the culture-dish nature of their computer experiments. The applicability of ABM for science more generally is also considered, with special attention to physics. Finally, two distinct types of ABM applications are summarized in order to illustrate concretely the duality of ABM: Real-world systems can not only be simulated with verisimilitude using ABM; they can also be efficiently and robustly designed and constructed on the basis of ABM principles. �
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