118 research outputs found
The cluster analysis of rapeseed pod based on pod wall weight (A), 1000-seed weight (B) and the seed diameter (C).
No full textDigital 1–16 represent Huahang 901, Zhongshuang 12, Zhongshuang 9, Zhongshuang 11, 2012-C1107, Yangguang 2009, 2012-C1103, Huashuang 5, Zhongyouza 12, Zhongnongyou 9, Hayouza 10, Dadi 55, Huayouza 62, Huayouza 9, Zhongnongyou 6, Fengyou 520, respectively.</p
Address Privacy of Bluetooth Low Energy
No full textBluetooth low energy (LE) devices have been widely used in the Internet of Things (IoT) and wireless personal area networks (WPAN). However, attackers may compromise user privacy by tracking the addresses of the LE device. The resolvable private address (RPA) mechanism provides address privacy protection for the LE device. Similar to Zhang and Lin’s work in CCS 2022, we investigate the privacy of the RPA mechanism in this paper. Our contributions are threefold. First, we discover that the RPA mechanism has a privacy weakness. The attacker can track the targeted device by exploiting the runs of the RPA mechanism when he intercepts the targeted device’s obsolete RPA value. Second, we propose an improved RPA mechanism to overcome the privacy weakness in the RPA mechanism. The improved RPA mechanism leads to a small amount of extra overheads without requiring modification to the basic cryptographic tools used in the standard specification. Third, we formalize a privacy model to capture the address privacy of the RPA mechanisms. Our improved RPA mechanism provides enhanced privacy guarantees to Bluetooth LE devices in wireless personal applications
Member Tampering Attack on Burmester-Desmedt Group Key Exchange Protocol and Its Countermeasure
No full textWith the rapid development of cloud computing and mobile networks, more and more application scenarios require a secret group key for secure communication. Group Key Exchange (GKE) protocol provides a secret group key for three or more members. Burmester and Desmedt presented an influential GKE protocol, which has a broadcast version and a cyclic version. In this paper, we investigate the security weaknesses of the Burmester-Desmedt protocol. We report that both the broadcast version and the cyclic version of the Burmester-Desmedt protocol suffer member tampering attacks if the two members that belong to both group A and group B are corrupted. That is, two corrupted members can add some unknowing members of group A to group B and trick the legal members of group B to believe that these unknowing members share the secret group key with them after a protocol run. Furthermore, to defeat the member tampering attack, we propose digital signature-based improvements on the broadcast version and the cyclic version of the Burmester-Desmedt protocol. We hope our research results will encourage the development of more robust and effective GKE protocols that stand rigorous security analysis
Security of a PUF Mutual Authentication and Session Key Establishment Protocol for IoT Devices
No full textRecently, Zerrouki et al. proposed a Physically Unclonable Function (PUF) mutual authentication and session key establishment protocol for IoT (Internet of Things) devices. Zerrouki et al.’s PUF protocol is interesting because it does not require the storage of any sensitive information on the local memory of the IoT device, which avoids many potential attacks, especially side-channel attacks. Therefore, we carefully investigate the security of Zerrouki et al.’s PUF protocol under the leakage assumption of the session key. Our findings are in the following. First, Zerrouki et al.’s PUF protocol fails to provide known-key security. That is, the adversary can impersonate not only the server to cheat the IoT device but also the IoT device to cheat the server when the adversary corrupts a session key between the server and the IoT device. Second, Zerrouki et al.’s PUF protocol suffers from the key-compromise impersonation attack. It means that the adversary can impersonate the IoT device to cheat the server if the adversary discloses the server’s secret key. Third, Zerrouki et al.’s PUF protocol does not support backward secrecy for the session key. That is, the adversary is always able to derive the session key from the previous session key. We also suggest the root cause of these security flaws in Zerrouki et al.’s PUF protocol. As a case study, our cryptanalysis results would promote a security model for more robust and efficient PUF authentication and session key establishment protocol. Moreover, our idea of the key compromise can be used to evaluate other novel PUF protocol designs
Author response: Dual role for Jumu in the control of hematopoietic progenitors in the Drosophila lymph gland
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Brushless Doubly Salient machines with stator field winding for DC power generation applications
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