1,721,107 research outputs found
IF I WERE KRIPKE ... ATTRIBUTIVE NAMES AND THE NECESSARY A POSTERIORI
No full textAccording to Naming and Necessity, proper names usually work referentially as rigid designators. In this paper, I argue that proper names have also attributive uses that systematically emerge in particular contexts. Attributive uses are then exploited to show that simple identity claims (such as “Hesperus is Phosphorus”) are open to a double interpretation. The main aim of the paper is arguing that the impression that certain true identities are a posteriori is mostly due to one of the two readings, a reading according to which, however, the expressed truth is only contingently true
TRUTH PLURALISM AND MANY-VALUED LOGIC: LESSON FROM SUSZKO’S THESIS
Full text linkAccording to truth pluralism, sentences from different areas of discourse can be true in different ways. This view has been challenged to make sense of logical validity, understood as necessary truth preservation, when inferences involving different areas are considered. To solve this problem, a natural temptation is that of replicating the standard practice in many-valued logic by appealing to the notion of designated values. Such a simple approach, however, is usually considered a non-starter for strong versions of truth pluralism, since designation seems to embody nothing but a notion of generic truth. In this paper, I explore the analogy with many-valued logic by comparing the problem of mixed inferences with Suszko’s thesis, and argue that the strong pluralist has room to resist the commitment to a generic property of truth by undermining the semantic significance of Suszko’s reduction
A case for satisfaction classes: model theoretic vs axiomatic approaches to the notion of truth
No full textAlethic Pluralism, Logical Validity, and Natural Truth
No full textAlethic pluralism holds that there are many ways of being true. The view has been accused of being unable to do justice to the traditional account of logical validity, understood as necessary truth preservation. In this paper I reformulate the debate in terms of the naturalness of generic truth, and discuss some notable consequences of this more careful reformulation. I show not only that some alleged solutions, like the resort to plural quantification, are ineffective, but also that the problem is not really posed by mixed inferences, as usually thought. Finally, I argue that the traditional account of logical validity does carry a commitment to generic truth, so that a strong version of alethic pluralism can hardly vindicate it
THE FORCE OF ALETHIC PLURALISM: TRUTH PLURALISM AND THE AIM OF BELIEF
No full textBelief, according to many philosophers, aims at truth. In this paper I discuss in what measure a
pluralist conception of truth is compatible with this claim. In particular, I argue that if the idea is
understood according to a teleological account, alethic pluralism can be adopted also in a strong
form. I contend that while the teleological account of belief requires a generic concept of truth, it
poses a few constraints on the property (or the properties) of truth. By contrast, at least a moderate
version of alethic pluralism is commanded by a normativist interpretation of the aim
HOW SIMPLE IS THE SIMPLICITY OF TRUTH? RECONCILING THE MATHEMATICS AND THE METAPHYSICS OF TRUTH
No full textThe notion of truth is a central subject both in Philosophy and
Mathematical Logic. The logical approach on the one side and the
philosophical one on the other, however, mostly deal with problems
which, apparently, require different tools to be tackled. In this paper I
argue that such a separation can and should be overcome, and, in order to
build a bridge, I focus on the philosophical issue of the insubstantiality of
truth, which is a crucial topic to distinguish inflationist from deflationist
proposals.
Elaborating on the interpretation of insubstantiality in terms of the
sparse/abundant classification of properties, I put forward a refined version
in which certain flaws afflicting other formulations are solved. Then, I
show how, using this improved variant, the philosophical notion of
abundance can be fruitfully related to the formal notion of expandability of
models, if a logical framework is adopted. Among other virtues, the
obtained link can shed new light on the debate of deflationism and
conservativity
VALIDITÀ LOGICA E PLURALISMO ALETICO: DUE PROBLEMI E UN’UNICA SOLUZIONE
No full textAccording to a standard formulation, alethic pluralism holds that there are many properties of
truth. The position has been challenged to make sense of the traditional definition of logical
validity, understood as a necessary truth preservation. The challenge consists of two problems:
one, well known, posed by mixed inferences, and another, new, related to the unity of
logical validity. In this paper, I argue that a pluralist semantics for compounded sentences, put
forward by Douglas Edwards, can be used to overcome both difficulties
ALGEBRAIC SEMANTICS AND MIXED VALIDITIES. A REPLY TO COTNOIR
No full textAlethic pluralism holds that there are many ways of being true. Such a view has
been challenged to make sense of the standard account of logical validity as
necessary truth preservation. In this paper, the recent solution elaborated by
Aaron Cotnoir, based on an algebraic approach, is shown to be untenable. Some
reflections about the relation of many-valued logics with truth pluralism are also
discussed
A simple notion of validity for alethic pluralism
No full textAlethic pluralism holds that there are many truth properties. The view has been challenged to make sense of the notion of logical validity, understood as necessary truth preservation, when inferences involving different areas of discourse are concerned. I argue that the solution proposed by Edwards to solve the analogous problem of mixed compounds can straightforwardly be adapted to give alethic pluralists also a viable account of validity
Analytic metaphysics should not go
No full textRecently, analytic metaphysics has been attacked from a scientist’s perspective.
In Everything Must Go, James Ladyman and Don Ross argued that analytic metaphysics
should be dismissed and replaced with a naturalized metaphysics. In this paper, I critically
discuss the arguments proposed in the book in order to determine whether this critique
of analytic metaphysics is successful. In particular, Ladyman and Ross elaborate on three
main points: the role of intuitions and the ensuing misunderstanding of science, the demarcation
of science from non science, and the exclusive theoretical authority of science.
I argue that none of their arguments succeeds in excluding analytic metaphysics from the
list of respectable theoretical disciplines
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