1,721,002 research outputs found
Between Science and Logic: Securing the Legitimacy of Analytic Metaphysics
Full text linkAnalytic metaphysics has been criticized for its dubious epistemological status. Today, anti-metaphysical sentiments often promote naturalized metaphysics as the only viable way to metaphysical theorizing. In this paper, I argue that analytic metaphysics (or at least a significant portion of it) has the same kind of legitimacy that naturalized metaphysics exhibits. I first point out that naturalized metaphysics is secured by the de facto legitimacy of natural science and its continuity with it.
Then, I argue that analytic metaphysics can pursue a similar strategy by relying on the de facto legitimacy of logic. To achieve this result I propose to interpret analytic metaphysics as philosophy of logic
Truth and the Unity of Logical Validity
Full text linkAccording to a traditional view, logical validity consists in nec-
essary truth preservation. Such an account has been argued to carry an
apparent commitment to a unique property of truth to be preserved from
premises to conclusion. Recent discussions, however, have concluded that
if the metaphor of truth preservation is carefully unpacked, no need for
a unique property is there. All is needed is that certain structural rela-
tions among instantiations of truth properties hold. Against this view, we
argue that a unique general truth property is indeed required by logical
validity. We first show that the unpacking should be correctly understood,
since it imposes constraints on the concept and the properties of truth.
We then demonstrate that, under such constraints, a general property is
not imposed by truth preservation but by another feature of validity: its
uniformity. Finally, some options that could be attempted to resist this
result are discussed, showing that (strong) truth pluralism and deflationism
are affected in different ways
The metaphysics of Truth, by D. Edwards
No full textRecensione volume Dodd, Julian, Being True to Works of Music. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 202
Truth (bearers) pluralism
Full text linkAs for many other properties, to understand the nature of truth attention should be paid to the kind of entities that are apt to bear it. In particular, I argue that different kinds of truth bearers tend to support different properties of truth. After that, I show that there are reasons to admit a plurality of truth bearers. As a consequence of these two results, a plurality of truth properties may be naturally admitted. The general upshot of the paper is a new way to motivate alethic pluralism, which stems from considerations on the nature of representations rather than from considerations on what is represented. This new version of truth pluralism—truth (bearers) pluralism—is shown to be theoretically fertile and promising against some standard criticisms
DLEAC and the Rejection Paradox
No full textIn this paper we first develop a Dialetheic Logic with Exclusive Assumptions and Conclusions, DLEAC. We adopt the semantics of the logic of paradox (LP) extended with a notion of model suitable for DLEAC, and we modify its proof theory by refining the notions of assumption and conclusion, which are under-stood as speech acts. We introduce a new paradox – the rejectability paradox – first informally, then formally. We then provide its derivation in an extension of DLEAC contanining the rejectability predicate
On the non-substantiality of logic: a case study
Full text linkOne of the goals of the natural sciences– for example biology– is to provide new information about certain phenomena with previously unknown nature. Their contribution to our knowledge is substantial. From this perspective, logic is seemingly not substantial. Sometimes, logic’s insubstantiality is taken for granted while explaining the alleged insubstantiality of other notions. For example, according to truth deflationism, truth is a non-substantial notion in the sense of being a logical property. However, it is not fully clear to what such an insubstantiality amounts. It is also debatable whether logic really is insubstantial. In this paper, we aim to clarify this issue by proposing a formal way of looking at it. In particular, we used the notion of conservativity, which has already been used by truth deflationism, for a similar aim. We show that if insubstantiality is read in terms of conservativity, then classical logic is substantial. We then argue that such a verdict of substantia..
Area di impatto del consumo di suolo
No full textUna corretta valutazione dell’impatto del consumo del suolo non può prescindere dall’esaminare gli
effetti dello stesso nell’intorno della superficie direttamente coperta artificialmente. Sebbene una quota
importante degli effetti possa essere considerata diretta, e valutabile attraverso gli impatti diretti sugli
ecosistemi e sulla biodiversità, non sono da trascurare gli effetti indiretti e di disturbo, che interessano
alcuni importanti servizi ecosistemici di regolazione climatica ed idrogeologica (si veda anche la parte
III). Limitando l’analisi alla dimensione orizzontale della superficie terrestre, si è scelto di stimare la
superficie potenzialmente impattata dalla presenza di coperture artificiali considerando una distanza di
60, 100 e 200 metri. Tali misure, che si traducono operativamente in diversi buffer sulle aree costruite,
sono state scelte per generalizzare la questione degli impatti senza assegnare pesi specifici ai comparti
ambientali coinvolti
Assessing land take implications for environmental justice: a case study using the ecosystem services approach.
No full textBook of proceedings: Annual AESOP Congress, Definite Space – Fuzzy Responsibility, Prague, 13-16th July, 2015Land take is consuming a non-renewable resource and an essential one to human wellbeing?, with relevant social impacts and different implications as far as several sectors of the economy are concerned (EC, 2012). Assuming that (a) right livelihood is based on ecological balance and social justice (Shiva, 2008) land take may be considered as an unjust practice, in terms of fair share, equal opportunities, recognition and participation of present and future generations. Within the frame of the Land System Science (Verburg et al., 2013; Turner et al., 2013), the relationships between land take and environmental justice is analysed through the lens of the ecosystem services (ES) approach (MEA, 2005). ES evaluation is a challenge to be undertaken by planners (De Groot et al. 2010) because it enables the assessment of the benefits that the natural environment provides to human well-being and can help to assess environmental justice claims. A case study has been carried out for one of Rom 15 wards, the X Municipality, where large amount of green land was built up in recent years and more is expected in the future causing relevant impacts such as increasing flood risk, overloading of existing drainage and sewage systems, loss of agricultural land, natural area fragmentation. A GISbased semi quantitative assessment of relevant ES has been conducted, and a number of experts (including scientists and local administrators) have been consulted to gather their views on values and responsibilities connected to land use change occurred in the area. The case study draws out lessons for an analytical framework that operationalizes the ecosystem services approach to assess environmental justice land take implications.Published Versio
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