1,721,100 research outputs found
Fighting Power: Interpretive Issues. The 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, 1950
Full text linkFighting Power: Interpretive Issues The 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, 1950 Hammes, Thomas Xavier Lincoln College Submitted for Doctor of Philosophy in History Trinity Term 2008 When the Korean War broke out on 25 June 1950, the Marine Corps was ordered to deploy an air-ground brigade from California in less than ten days. Due to five years of massive budget and manpower cuts, the Marine Corps did not have even a brigade immediately available. The only way to meet the sailing timeline was to organize, man and equip the force while actually embarking it. As it embarked, the brigade had to incorporate marines flown in from posts all over the western United States; draw equipment from war reserves held hundreds of miles away; reorganize many of the existing units under new tables of organization; and add an experimental helicopter detachment from the east coast of the United States. Despite these enormous handicaps and numerically superior enemy forces, the brigade won every engagement. This performance was in stark contrast to the performance of all other US forces at this stage of the war. The brigade’s brief existence (7 July to 6 Sept 1950), combined with its exceptional combat record under adverse conditions, provides the opportunity to study the impact of institutional culture, education, doctrine, organization, training and leadership on performance in combat. Research showed that a key element of the brigade’s success was the Marine Corps’ institutional culture. In particular, the culture of remembering ensured marines understood the unchanging aspects of war and provided its men with the education, training, doctrine and organization to cope with its enduring friction, fog and chance. At the same time, the culture of learning ensured the marines understood what was changing in the character and tools of war so the brigade was well adapted to the realities of modern war from its first day in combat
On all fronts: EOKA and the Cyprus insurgency, 1955-1959
Full text linkAbstract Thesis Title: On All Fronts: Cyprus and the EOKA Insurgency, 1955-1959 Andrew Novo, St. Antony’s College Submitted in Hilary Term 2010 to satisfy the requirements of a DPhil in Modern History On All Fronts is a thesis focused on the EOKA insurgency in Cyprus (1955-1959), which aimed at overturning British rule and unifying the island with Greece. EOKA’s campaign was one of several insurgencies carried out against Britain in the two decades following the Second World War. This allowed British policymakers and soldiers to apply lessons learned in other colonies on the island. These lessons included pursuing a political solution in tandem with military operations, unifying command and control, improving intelligence capabilities, and increasing the number of police and soldiers on the ground. Cyprus also presented distinctive challenges. The insurgency was not inspired by communism, like many other anti-colonial struggles, but by right-wing nationalism. The campaign was also intimately linked to the strategic reorganisation undertaken by Britain after 1945. Retreat from India and Palestine increased the importance of the Middle East and Africa, making a presence in Cyprus central to Britain’s post-war plans. Finally, Cypriot demographics meant that the island’s Turkish minority (some eighteen percent) – supported by Ankara – opposed union with Greece. An ethnic-based civil war on the island was possible, as was a regional war between Greece and Turkey. British policy sought to avoid both of these potential conflicts while maintaining the strength of NATO and positive relations with both Athens and Ankara. Utilizing newly declassified papers from the British government, in conjunction with evidence from Greek-Cypriot sources, this study offers insights into the campaign from the perspective of both insurgent and counter-insurgent forces. Parallel to the military analysis, the thesis addresses the political aspect of the insurgency, demonstrating the deep connection in insurgency war between military operations and diplomatic negotiation. While counter-insurgency operations failed to destroy EOKA, the success of government forces created pressure for a diplomatic solution and highlighted the reality that there were insurmountable military and strategic obstacles to union with Greece
War Finance
No full textFinance during the First World War might seem an arid topic, but in fact it mainlines us deep into Britain’s twentieth-century history, on at least four different levels. Firstly, and most obviously, it helps us understand the character and conduct of the war itself. Since at least the time of Thucydides, war has been ‘a matter not so much of arms as of money’, and grasping how efforts – successful or not – were made to obtain that money has been crucial to understanding any conflict.1 Secondly, by analysing the enthusiasm with which the public accepted an increased tax burden, and subscribed to war loans, we can perhaps explore levels of popular support for the war
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