2,874 research outputs found
Disparity in Sentencing–Race & Gender
No full textIn her comments, Professor Stith focused on the role of extralegal factors in sentencing, meaning factors that generally should not be considered in sentencing determinations under the Guidelines
Disparity in Sentencing–Race \u26 Gender
No full textIn her comments, Professor Stith focused on the role of extralegal factors in sentencing, meaning factors that generally should not be considered in sentencing determinations under the Guidelines
Congress' Power of the Purse
No full textIn view of the significance of Congress' power of the purse, it is surprising that there has been so little scholarly exploration of its contours. In this Article, Professor Stith draws upon constitutional structure, history, and practice to develop a general theory of Congress' appropriations power. She concludes that the appropriations clause of the Constitution imposes an obligation upon Congress as well as a limitation upon the executive branch: The Executive may not raise or spend funds not appropriated by explicit legislative action, and Congress has a constitutional duty to limit the amount and duration of each grant of spending authority. Professor Stith examines forms of spending authority that are constitutionally troubling, especially gift authority, through which Congress permits federal agencies to receive and spend private contributions without further legislative review. Other types of "backdoor" spending authority, including statutory entitlements and revolving funds, may also be inconsistent with Congress' duty to exercise control over the size and duration of appropriations. Finally, Professor Stith proposes that nonjudicial institutions such as the General Accounting Office play a larger role in enforcing and vindicating Congress' power of the purse
Congress\u27 Power of the Purse
No full textIn view of the significance of Congress\u27 power of the purse, it is surprising that there has been so little scholarly exploration of its contours. In this Article, Professor Stith draws upon constitutional structure, history, and practice to develop a general theory of Congress\u27 appropriations power. She concludes that the appropriations clause of the Constitution imposes an obligation upon Congress as well as a limitation upon the executive branch: The Executive may not raise or spend funds not appropriated by explicit legislative action, and Congress has a constitutional duty to limit the amount and duration of each grant of spending authority. Professor Stith examines forms of spending authority that are constitutionally troubling, especially gift authority, through which Congress permits federal agencies to receive and spend private contributions without further legislative review. Other types of backdoor spending authority, including statutory entitlements and revolving funds, may also be inconsistent with Congress\u27 duty to exercise control over the size and duration of appropriations. Finally, Professor Stith proposes that nonjudicial institutions such as the General Accounting Office play a larger role in enforcing and vindicating Congress\u27 power of the purse
Rewriting the Fiscal Constitution: The Case of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
No full textBecause the Constitution's fiscal provisions are not self-executing, federal budget processes have been shaped largely by an implicit 'fiscal constitution" composed of framework statutes and legislative and administrative practice. This Article contends that the ambition of the Gramm-Rudman- Hollings Act (GRH) was radically to redesign this constitution by creating an extralegislative mechanism ("sequestration") to enforce statutorily prescribed deficit limits. Professor Stith demonstrates how GRH alters several aspects of traditionalp ractice: It makes the annual budget deficit the driving concern of the legislative budget process, it makes the timing of outlays critically important to appropriations decisions, and it encourages greater participation by Congress in line-item allocation of appropriations. GRH does not, however, directly constrain spending in over half of the budget, which it exempts from sequestration. Moreover, there is an inherent limit to the effectiveness of sequestration as a deficit-reduction strategy. As the threat of sequestration becomes greater, the plausibility of the threat decreases because Congress can always repeal, amend, or suspend GRI. Professor Stith concludes that GRH is a constitutionally permissible way to constrain deficit growth, but it is neither a fundamental reordering of our fiscal processes nor a "solution" to the persistent deficit problem
Rewriting the Fiscal Constitution: The Case of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
No full textBecause the Constitution\u27s fiscal provisions are not self-executing, federal budget processes have been shaped largely by an implicit \u27fiscal constitution composed of framework statutes and legislative and administrative practice. This Article contends that the ambition of the Gramm-Rudman- Hollings Act (GRH) was radically to redesign this constitution by creating an extralegislative mechanism ( sequestration ) to enforce statutorily prescribed deficit limits. Professor Stith demonstrates how GRH alters several aspects of traditionalp ractice: It makes the annual budget deficit the driving concern of the legislative budget process, it makes the timing of outlays critically important to appropriations decisions, and it encourages greater participation by Congress in line-item allocation of appropriations. GRH does not, however, directly constrain spending in over half of the budget, which it exempts from sequestration. Moreover, there is an inherent limit to the effectiveness of sequestration as a deficit-reduction strategy. As the threat of sequestration becomes greater, the plausibility of the threat decreases because Congress can always repeal, amend, or suspend GRI. Professor Stith concludes that GRH is a constitutionally permissible way to constrain deficit growth, but it is neither a fundamental reordering of our fiscal processes nor a solution to the persistent deficit problem
Guidelines for Data Annotation
No full textIncluded here are a coding manual and supplementary examples of gesture forms (in still images and video recordings) that informed the coding of the first author (Kate Mesh) and four project reliability coders
Declining Unionization, Rising Inequality: an Interview with Kate Bronfenbrenner
No full textKate Bronfenbrenner is director of labor education research at the New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations at Cornell University. She worked for many years as an organizer with the United Woodcutters Association in Mississippi and the Service Employees International Union in Boston. She is the author, co-author and editor of numerous books and articles on union strategies
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