1,720,988 research outputs found
Su alcune ambiguità epistemologiche del pensiero sistemico
No full textSi cercherà di mostrare come il mancato confronto col problema della natura della matematica espone il pensiero sistemico a delle difficoltà notevoli nel far fronte ad almeno due sfide epistemologiche: 1) spiegare l’applicabilità della matematica alla natura; 2) resistere all'assimilazione da parte del realismo scientifico strutturalista
Between a bottom-up approach to mathematics and constructivism
No full textThe aim of this contribution is to show the compatibility of an embodied and bottom-up approach to mathematics, as developed by Carlo Cellucci, with a constructivist epistemological framework and with a non-adaptationist view of evolution. This different perspectives are shown to be connected with an antirealist stance in philosophy of science
Compte rendu: Discipline Filosofiche, vol. XIX, n. 1, Logiche del vivente. Evoluzione, sviluppo, cognizione nell'epistemologia francese contemporanea, Cavazzini, A.; Gualandi, A. (a cura di), Quodlibet, 2009
No full textLe volume édité par Andrea Cavazzini et Alberto Gualandi n’est aucunement une simple reconstruction de la pensée épistémologique française du XXe siècle, mais une confrontation continue, menée à partir de points de vue différents mais corrélés, avec des thèmes et des auteurs ayant partie liée avec les nœuds les plus controversés et sensibles de la théorie biologique contemporaine
Are evolutionary debunking arguments really self-defeating?
Full text linkEvolutionary Debunking Arguments (EDAs) are defined as arguments that appeal to the evolutionary genealogy of our beliefs to undermine their justification. Recently, Helen De Cruz and her coauthors supported the view that EDAs are selfdefeating: if EDAs claim that human arguments are not justified, because the evolutionary origin of the beliefs which figure in such arguments undermines those beliefs, and EDAs themselves are human arguments, then EDAs are not justified, and we should not accept their conclusions about the fact that human arguments are unjustified. De Cruz's objection to EDAs is similar to the objection raised by Reuben Hersh against the claim that, since by Gödel's second incompleteness theorem the purpose of mathematical logic to give a secure foundation for mathematics cannot be achieved, mathematics cannot be said to be absolutely certain. The response given by Carlo Cellucci to Hersh's objection shows that the claim that by Gödel's results mathematics cannot be said to be absolutely certain is not self-defeating, and can be adopted to show that EDAs are not selfdefeating as well in a twofold sense: an argument analogous to Cellucci's one may be developed to face De Cruz's objection, and such argument may be further refined incorporating Cellucci's response itself in it, to make it stronger. This paper aims at showing that the accusation of being self-defeating moved against EDAs is inadequate by elaborating an argument which can be considered an EDA and which can also be shown not to be self-defeating
Scientific Realism, Adaptationism and the Problem of the Criterion
Full text linkScientific Realism (SR) has three crucial aspects: 1) the centrality of the concept of truth, 2) the idea that success is a reliable indicator of truth, and 3) the idea that the Inference to the Best Explanation is a reliable inference rule. It will be outlined how some realists try to overcome the difficulties which arise in justifying such crucial aspects relying on an adaptationist view of evolutionism, and why such attempts are inadequate. Finally, we will briefly sketch some of the main difficulties the realist has to face in defending those crucial aspects, and how such difficulties are deeply related: they derive from the inability of SR to satisfyingly avoid the sceptical challenge of the criterion of truth. Indeed, SR seems not to be able to fill the so-called ‘epistemic gap’ (Sankey 2008). In fact, the epistemic gap cannot be filled in no way other than obtaining a criterion of truth, but such a criterion cannot be obtained if the epistemic gap obtains
On Mizrahi's argument against Stanford's instrumentalism
Full text linkMizrahi’s argument against Stanford’s challenge to scientific realism is analyzed. Mizrahi’s argument is worth of attention for at least two reasons: (1) unlike other criticisms that have been made to Stanford’s view so far, Mizrahi’s argument does not question any specific claim of Stanford’s argument, rather it puts into question the very coherence of Stanford’s position, because it argues that since Stanford’s argument rests on the problem of the unconceived alternatives, Stanford’s argument is self-defeating. Thus, if Mizrahi’s argument is effective in countering Stanford’s view, it may be able to question the validity of other philosophical positions which similarly rest on the problem of the unconceived alternatives; (2) Mizrahi’s argument against Stanford’s view is in part based on the development of a Stanford-like argument for the field of philosophy. This makes Mizrahi’s argument potentially relevant to the metaphilosophical debate. After careful examination, Mizrahi’s argument against Stanford’s instrumentalism is found wanting. Moreover, a Stanford-like argument is developed, which aims at challenging the metaphilosophical stance implied by Mizrahi’s argument against Stanford’s instrumentalism
On the nature of natural selection
Full text linkSome philosophers, known as statisticalists, claim that the concept of natural selection, as it is normally presented in population genetics, is statistical in character and cannot be construed in causal terms. On the contrary, other philosophers, known as causalists, argue against the statistical view and reaffirm the causal interpretation of natural selection. A key element in this debate is the dispute on the nature of drift. If drift is a cause of evolution, uncertainty in population genetics is due to some processes that make a population deviate from predicted outcomes. While causalists see drift as a distinct phenomenon originated by some set of natural processes, statisticalists claim that there is no process that accounts for this uncertainty, since the uncertainty lies not in the events but in the fact that natural selection in population genetics is modeled by a statistical theory. This article aims to illustrate the debate between causalists and statisticalists in order to present a challenge that statisticalists need to address if they wish to maintain a naturalist stance
- …
