491 research outputs found

    Endowments, patience types, and uniqueness in two-good HARA utility economies

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    This paper establishes a link between endowments, patience types, and the parameters of the HARA Bernoulli utility function that ensure equilibrium uniqueness in an economy with two goods and two impatience types with additive separable preferences. We provide sufficient conditions that guarantee uniqueness of equilibrium for any possible value of γ in the HARA utility function γ 1−γ b+ a γx 1−γ. The analysis contributes to the literature on uniqueness in pure exchange economies with two-goods and two agent types and extends the result in Loi and Matta (2022)

    Stefano Graziani : Documents from Gordon Matta-Clark's Personal Library

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    "This book recounts Stefano Graziani’s experience of finding Gordon Matta-Clark’s personal library while exploring the CCA Collection. The library consists of seventy publications that cover a wide range of subjects from architecture and art history to alchemy, communications, cultural studies, literature, philosophy, and psychology." -- Publisher's website

    Increasing complexity in structurally stable models: an application to a pure exchange economy

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    A model M is defined (see Anderlini and Canning (2001) and Yu et al. (2009)) as a quadruple M = {Lambda, X, F, R}, where Lambda and X represent the parameter and actions spaces, respectively, F is a correspondence defining the feasible actions and R is a real-valued function which measures the degree of rationality of the feasible actions. We recall that structural stability means the continuity of the equilibrium set with respect to small perturbations of the parameters and that robustness to bounded rationality holds if small deviations from rationality imply small changes in the equilibrium set. In this paper we extend to a model (M) over bar = {(Lambda) over bar, (X) over bar, (F) over bar, (R) over bar}, where (Lambda) over bar is defined as the set of all compact subsets of A, (X) over bar = X, (F) over bar and (R) over bar are the feasibility and rationality correspondences which extend F and R, respectively. (M) over bar is more complex than M, since M is embedded into (M) over bar in a natural way. We show that the structural stability of A implies the structural stability of (M) over bar and that (M) over bar is robust to bounded rationality if (R) over bar is lower semi-continuous. This abstract characterization of complexity is important because it can be used to appraise the nontrivial issue of whether structural stability and robustness to bounded rationality are preserved when a structurally stable model M is extended to (M) over bar. By applying this abstract construction to a pure exchange economy, the result by Loi and Matta (2010), concerning the stability of the equilibrium set with respect to perturbations of endowments along a given path, is extended to perturbations of paths under bounded rationality. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved

    A note on local uniqueness of equilibria: How isolated is a local equilibrium?

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    The motivation of this note is to show how singular values affect local uniqueness. More precisely, Theorem 3.1 shows how to construct a neighborhood (a ball) of a regular equilibrium whose diameter represents an estimate of local uniqueness, hence providing a measure of how isolated a (local) unique equilibrium can be. The result, whose relevance in terms of comparative statics is evident, is based on reasonable and natural assumptions and hence is applicable in many different settings, ranging from pure exchange economies to non-cooperative games

    Manipulation of endowments and sunspot equilibria

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    We study the connection between occurrence of manipulation via reallocating endowments by coalitions and sunspot equilibria. The uncertainty about which coalition will form introduces extrinsic uncertainty into the economy. Under certain conditions, manipulation of endowments by coalitions can occur if and only if sunspots matter

    A riemannian metric on the equilibrium manifold

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    Under the assumption that the utility function is real analytic, we construct a complete metric on the equilibrium manifold with fixed total resources such that a minimal geodesic joining any two regular equilibria intersects the set of critical equilibria in a finite number of points

    Curvature and uniqueness of equilibrium

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    Let E(r) be the equilibrium manifold associated to a smooth pure exchange economy with fixed total resources r. Balasko (1980) has shown that if the equilibrium price is unique for every economy, then the price is constant, hence the curvature of E(r) is zero. By endowing E(r) with the metric induced from its ambient space, we show that, in the case of two commodities and an arbitrary number of agents, if the curvature of E(r) is zero then there is a unique equilibrium for every economy. Hence the zero curvature condition is sufficient to guarantee the uniqueness of equilibrium

    Minimality and uniqueness of equilibrium

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    In this paper we propose the following conjecture: the equilibrium manifold E(r) is a minimal submanifold if and only if the price is unique for every economy. We show the validity of this conjecture for an arbitrary number of goods and two consumers and for an arbitrary number of consumers and two goods under the assumption that the normal vector field of E(r) is constant outside a compact subset

    Risk aversion and uniqueness of equilibrium in economies with two goods and arbitrary endowments

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    We study the connection between risk aversion, the number of consumers, and the uniqueness of equilibrium. We consider an economy with two goods and I impatience types, where each type has additive separable preferences with HARA Bernoulli utility function, uH(x):=γ1γ(b+aγx)1γu_H(x):=\frac{\gamma}{1-\gamma}(b+\frac{a}{\gamma}x)^{1-\gamma}. We show that if γ(1,II1],theeconomyhasauniqueregularequilibrium.Moreover,themethodsused,includingNewtonssymmetricpolynomialsandDescartesruleofsigns,enableustooffernewsufficientconditionsforuniquenessinaclosedformexpressionthathighlighttheroleplayedbyendowments,patience,andspecificHARAparameters.Finally,wederivenewnecessaryandsufficientconditionsthatensureuniquenessfortheparticularcaseofCRRABernoulliutilityfunctionswith\gamma\in (1,\frac{I}{I-1}], the economy has a unique regular equilibrium. Moreover, the methods used, including Newton’s symmetric polynomials and Descartes’ rule of signs, enable us to offer new sufficient conditions for uniqueness in a closed-form expression that highlight the role played by endowments, patience, and specific HARA parameters. Finally, we derive new necessary and sufficient conditions that ensure uniqueness for the particular case of CRRA Bernoulli utility functions with \gamma=3$
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