1,721,019 research outputs found
The Experts, the Virtuous and the Wounded. Who Should Take Part in an «Ideal Conversation»?
No full textElisabetta Lalumera and Sarah Songhorian discuss Philip Kitcher’s Moral Progress. Lalumera focuses on the notion of «ideal conversation» as central to Kitcher’s democratic contractualism, raising concerns about the criteria for inclusion, the role of expertise, and the tension between inclusivity and the requirement for virtuous participants. Songhorian explores the interplay between individual and social dimensions of moral progress, highlighting Kitcher’s rejection of teleological or discovery-based conceptions in favor of a pragmatic, problem-solving approach
Altruismo parrocchiale, punizione antisociale e punizione altruistica: quale contributo possono dare gli studi empirici per la comprensione dell’etica?
Full text linkIn her contribution, Morese takes into account three phenomena that are particularly interesting for understanding how human beings actually behave towards others when their group identities are involved – i.e. parochial altruism, antisocial punishment, and altruistic punishment. The aim of this commentary is to understand if and to what extent the behavioral and fMRI data reported by Morese can also inform our moral normative theories. That is, if they can inform us not only about how human beings actually behave, but also influence our understanding of how they should behave; if they tell us something about the “ought” as well as the “is”
L’etica del potenziamento artificiale
Full text linkThe aim of this paper is to discuss the contemporary possibility of artificially enhancing humans through the lens of ethics. After having introduced human enhancement in general – showing what can be enhance and how it can be done (§1) –, I will focus on the complex distinction between treatment and enhancement (§2) and on the possible problems enhancements can and should face (§3). Focusing on these problems does not imply arguing against the acceptability or desirability of enhancements. I will claim, indeed, that these are crucial issues even advocates of enhancement should deal with.The aim of this paper is to discuss the contemporary possibility of artificially enhancing humans through the lens of ethics. After having introduced human enhancement in general – showing what can be enhance and how it can be done (§1) –, I will focus on the complex distinction between treatment and enhancement (§2) and on the possible problems enhancements can and should face (§3). Focusing on these problems does not imply arguing against the acceptability or desirability of enhancements. I will claim, indeed, that these are crucial issues even advocates of enhancement should deal with
The Methods of Neuroethics: Is the Neuroscience of Ethics Really a New Challenge to Moral Philosophy?
Full text linkWithin the otherwise lively debate on neuroethics, little attention has been devoted to the peculiar methodological issues and challenges it faces. My aim is to track down its methodological specificities. Firstly, I will investigate to which traditional debates neuroethics bears similarity and to what extent it actually represents a novelty in ethical thinking. While the ethics of neuroscience is akin to bioethics, the neuroscience of ethics seems akin to moral psychology. And yet they differ as far as the level of explanation of human moral behavior and reasoning is concerned. Thus, while the neuroscience of ethics and moral psychology share a family resemblance, they cannot be reduced to one another. Secondly, I will explore three different philosophical temperaments towards the role empirical findings can and should have in normative ethics and in metaethics. Prudential reasons would recommend openness to new sources of evidence without risking either reductionism nor neglect
Empathy, Sympathy, and Morality: An Interdisciplinary Approach
No full textEmpathy has been used for at least three purposes in the literature (e.g., Coplan, Goldie 2011):for understanding our acquaintance to works of art, the content of others’ minds, and for its allegedcontribution to moral behavior and moral judgment. I will discuss specifically empathy’scontribution in the understanding of others’ emotional states and in ethics.The aim of this work, thus, is showing that we can understand empathy as a basic mechanism for sharing. It enables us to understand others and facilitates our moral judgment and behavior. This higher ability is made possible by empathy. However, in order to reach it various steps arenecessary. It is not the case that having empathy as a basic mechanism directly leads to this higher ability, nor that the latter is the only way in which human beings can have a moral understanding of the world. I will deal with this topic in Chapters 3, 4, and 5.Before moving to these issues, that constitute the core of my interests, it will be necessary to sketch a theory of emotions and related phenomena. Chapter 1 will focus on the possible objects of sharing by means of a characterization of the phenomena that fall within the affective domain. In Chapter 2, I will show the growth of the debate about empathy and sympathy in the literature by aquantitative analysis of bibliometrics. Then, I will argue against a possible interpretation of empathy as an umbrella concept. Conceptual clarification, thus, will turn out to be necessary. In Chapter 3 I will try to define empathy as a basic mechanism contrasting it with other phenomena that are related to it, but cannot be identified with it. In Chapter 4, I will distinguish empathy from sympathy, interpreting the first as an amoral mechanism, and the latter as a criterion to judge others’ behaviors, direct one’s own, and understand others. This aim will be achieved primarily by an interpretation of Adam Smith’s theory of moral sentiments (Smith 1759).At a first approximation, empathy is what enables us to share others’ emotions and sympathy is a more reflective ability to understand others’ behaviors and affective phenomena, to judge them, andto direct our own behavior. Adopting the sympathetic and impartial spectator’s perspective willconstitute the basis for virtue. I will also understand sadism or Schadenfreude as the opposite ofsympathetic engagement.Chapter 5 will focus on the relation between empathy as a psychological mechanism and sympathy as a moral criterion. The core idea is that empathy can enable the development of a sympathetic concern for others, but the latter constitutes just a possible development of the former. Iwill also sketch the possible relation between descriptive and prescriptive accounts endorsing a nonreductionistversion of naturalism
Sentire e agire. L'etica della simpatia tra sentimentalismo e razionalismo
No full textUno degli scopi centrali di questo lavoro è comprendere adeguatamente il concetto di simpatia per risolvere l’apparente tensione tra descrizione e prescrizione. La simpatia viene definita come uno strumento di condivisione che permette il giudizio e la direzione del comportamento
morale. L’empatia funge da condizione di possibilità della simpatia, ma si colloca su un
piano descrittivo puramente amorale. Distinguere questi due concetti è fondamentale per comprendere se e in che misura sia lecito pensare alla possibilità di un passaggio dalla
descrizione alla normazione. Il processo simpatetico si caratterizza come strumento e metodo
utile a determinare l’agire e fissare le condizioni per un giudizio a posteriori dell’azione, sia propria sia altrui (Smith 1759). Non ne deriva una lista di doveri, ma un criterio per giudicare
e agire moralmente. È mediante tale criterio che si può comprendere il passaggio dalla descrizione di un’abilità “naturale” al comportamento di un soggetto morale
Sentimentalismo etico. Storia e prospettive
No full textIl sentimentalismo morale è quella famiglia di tesi che rintraccia nelle emozioni e nei sentimenti l’elemento decisivo delle azioni e dei giudizi morali. Tradizionalmente concepito in contrapposizione al razionalismo, esso ha visto negli ultimi decenni un rinnovato interesse – motivato anche dal dialogo interdisciplinare con le scienze empiriche. Nonostante questa riscoperta, poco è stato scritto per ricostruirne le radici. Il presente volume intende colmare tale lacuna. Per farlo, da un lato, viene presentata una sistematica seppur sintetica disamina storico-filosofica delle tesi sentimentaliste, presentando e discutendo contributi spesso ignorati e inserendo quelli più noti all’interno del percorso storico-concettuale in cui hanno di fatto avuto origine; dall’altro, vengono discusse le principali tendenze del dibattito contemporaneo neo-sentimentalista in ambito filosofico e psicologico. Comprendere la storia e le prospettive del sentimentalismo è oggi fondamentale per evitare tesi semplicistiche e illuminare come agiamo e giudichiamo moralmente e come dovremmo farlo
Trust, implicit attitudes, and the malleability of group identities
No full textSeveral empirical evidences suggest that our group identity modulates our trusting attitudes, even when groups are created arbitrarily in the lab. Hence, group are malleable entities. While it clearly bears huge risks of malevolent manipulation, this malleability can also be an opportunity: it seems at least theoretically possible to manipulate the sense of belonging – and the automatic trust that follows from it – so as to include people that were previously conceived of as belonging to other groups. I will, thus, investigate two lines of research to be used to show that there are several implicit drives that actually modulate our trusting attitudes. From this, a revision of our ordinary conceptualization of trust seems necessary. Hence, I proposed a two-level characterization of trust that would better serve the purposes of accounting for the data discussed and for the role trust can and should play in ethics
Procedural Moral Progress: Comments on Philip Kitcher’s «Moral Progress»
No full textThe debate on the concept of moral progress has receive renewed attention in the last decade7. Within this debate, Philip Kitcher’s Moral Progress represents an insightful, though provoking, and inspiring contribution
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