1,721,068 research outputs found
Agreement through Opposition: Political Ideology and Legislative Constraint in the 'Special Relationships' of the United States
Full text linkSince 1945 the United States (US) has constructed a global web of 'special relationships' with states that share its political values, economic philosophy, or security predicament. Whether we understand these countries as 'clients', 'tributaries', 'friends', 'allies' or 'subordinates', what sets these relationships apart is the remarkably high level of cooperation and the extent to which this has endured over the decades. One question rarely asked, however, is how we can explain variation in the level of cooperation in these relations over time. Each of the 'special relationships' of the US has waxed-and-waned over the years, but the sources of this variation have not been fully uncovered. In this thesis I argue that changes in domestic political variables within each of the allied states are responsible for the varying degrees of cooperation witnessed over time. Utilising the example of Anglo-American relations in the postwar period, supplemented by a large-n statistical study, I demonstrate how a focus on political parties as the optimal actors in studying international cooperation helps us to understand the effects of political ideology and legislative constraint in foreign affairs.</p
Economic openness, power, and conflict
Full text linkEconomic integration between major powers has long been viewed as a force for international stability. The intuitive logic is appealing: states that are trading with and investing in each other stand to lose if that commerce is jeopardized by conflict. Yet there are sound reasons for supposing that such deepening economic integration can also shift the balance of power between major states, by causing follower economies – states that are not among the most developed in the international system – to grow faster than leading economies, and economic size and development are what underpin national material capabilities. Moreover, a rich body of theory and history suggests that such shifts in the balance of power make interstate war more likely. This dissertation argues, therefore, that economic integration can actually be a potent cause of security competition and war. A theoretical framework that unites economic theory on the differential growth impact of trade, financial flows, and technology diffusion with realist arguments on the conflict implications of polarity shifts and dynamic power differentials is constructed. It is then explored using evidence from three key historical cases: the rise of the Dutch Republic during the 1581-1648 period, the relative decline of the United Kingdom and the relative rise of other great powers between 1870 and 1914, and the differential growth rates and corresponding tensions of 1945-89. Certain scope conditions and qualifications notwithstanding, the empirical evidence supports the theoretical framework. As such, the argument that deepening economic integration raises the mutual cost of fighting and thereby makes conflict less likely is not directly refuted, but an important countervailing mechanism is found to be at work. Such a finding has implications for debates over the security implications of economic globalization, the foundations of realist theory, and the causes and potential consequences of the rise of new powers today
Norm contestation in international politics
Full text linkFirst generation norm scholars treat the meaning of a norm as if it was clear-cut and static
in order to show the influence of international law on state behavior. Second generation
norm scholars acknowledge that legal ambiguities and tensions give rise to debates.
However, they tend to end rather than begin with the finding that norm contestation is a
common occurrence in international affairs. This project begins with norm contestation
as a problematic to understand norm development in international relations.
This study develops a theoretical framework on processes and possible outcomes
of norm contestation that can guide empirical research. States can agree or disagree on
both the norm frame (justification) and/or claim (action) when applying international law.
Thus, norm contestation can have four different outcomes: norm clarification (frame and
claim agreement), norm recognition (frame agreement/claim disagreement), norm neglect
(frame disagreement/claim agreement) and norm impasse (frame and claim
disagreement). These alternate endings have different effects on the clarity and strength
of the contested norms, as well as on subsequent debate over them.
This âalternate endingsâ typology structures an empirical analysis using contentanalysis
and elite interviews to compare the duration and effect of contestation over
security norms. I further show that the malleability of norms does not make them
epiphenomenal to power. States pay attention to the legal justifications they provide for
their actions, so that norms both structure debates, and are constructed by them.
States act strategically when interpreting norms, but social dynamics intervene in
the process, and influence the outcome: the kind of legal framing and legitimation strategy
that a state or a third party to which norm interpretation was delegated to engages in
matters. Next to this justificatory discourse, the reactions of in- and out-group members
to norm interpretations decide over their sustainability.</p
The evolution of global fisheries governance, 1960-2010
Full text linkFisheries straddling or migrating between international maritime boundaries represent a typical case of the tragedy of the commons. Over two dozen Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMOs) have been created to manage these fisheries, which means it also represents a typical case of 'regime complexity' or 'governance architecture'. These literatures recognise that such institutions do not operate independently and therefore institutional functions such as attracting participants, practising their regulatory role, and performing their mandate should be understood as interdependent. This thesis proposes that we study such institutions together with actors and architectures of relations between and among them, which together I term 'governance complexes', by means of a relational approach. This relational approach combines relational theory, which posits the operation of endogenous relational mechanisms alongside exogenous explanations such as institutional design, with network methods that enable structural insights and robust inference that takes into account these interdependencies. The dissertation comprises two main parts that describe and explain the global fisheries governance complex, respectively. The first describes how the governance complex's three main components, states, RFMOs, and states participation in these RFMOs, have evolved. A topological typology utilising key network concepts is proposed and employed to show that the global fisheries governance complex is not fragmenting but becoming more overlapped and nested. The second part explains how this governance complex has evolved in terms of (1) participation, (2) practice, and (3) performance. First, it finds that while states find institutional design features such as an RFMO’s internal organisation attractive, relational mechanisms such as popularity and closure also provide important heuristics for participatory decisions in complex settings. Second, it finds that high levels of organisation also enables higher regulatory activity, but so do relational mechanisms such as coercion or imitation. Third, it proposes the concept of net effectiveness to gauge an institution’s "take-home" performance once its position in the broader governance complex has been taken into account. The result is not only an explanation of the evolution of global fisheries governance but also a developmental step towards an institutional relationalist theory of governance complexes
The strategic logic of international agreement design
Full text linkConventional wisdom suggests that weak international actors should avoid concluding ambiguous agreements with much stronger partners because this increases their vulnerability to subsequent exploitation. Why then do we observe so many instances of just such agreements signed under conditions of extreme power asymmetry? I answer this question by emphasising an underappreciated factor shaping the agreement design strategies of actors: Power trajectory. Focusing on international trade, I develop a three-part framework which demonstrates first, that powerful but rising states gain from securing narrow agreements because as the scope of these agreements is broadened, they are provided with more opportunities to use their growing power to secure increasingly favourable deals. Conversely, powerful but declining states are incentivised to conclude broad agreements as a way to lock-in an advantage that will decline over time.
Second, I demonstrate that because of the particular vulnerabilities faced by weak states as a result of these narrow agreements, strong but rising powers are often required to make up-front concessions in order to secure their preferred contract and overcome the fears of their weaker counterparts. Third, I show that powerful but rising states can reap the benefits of subsequent rounds of bargaining because the initial agreement has induced the weaker party to make transaction specific investments which serve to drastically reduce its exit options.
In developing this framework, I make three contributions; first, from a theoretical standpoint I specify more precisely the conditions under which powerful states choose to tie their hands and so qualify both the liberal claim that powerful states must always do so, and the realist suggestion that they strive to maintain freedom of action. Second, I make an empirical contribution by placing the trade policies of four major economic powers in detailed comparative perspective. Finally, I make a substantive contribution by demonstrating yet another mechanism by which the strong secure their preferences at the expense of the weak in international affairs.</p
Great power politics in multipolar systems
Full text linkMy dissertation develops Georealism, a theory to explain how great powers behave in international relations. The dissertation has two main goals. One is that it aims to create a uniform theory of international relations, particularly balancing, bandwagoning, alliances, and war. The other is that it intends to explain the behaviour of individual great powers in detail, rather than just systemic outcomes. The basic premise of Georealism is that states face a threat both from their neighbours and from potential hegemons. In four chapters, I explore the implications of this insight on great power behaviour. First, I explain why continental states choose balancing or bandwagoning when faced with a potential hegemon. Second, I look at how offshore states behave towards the continental states to maximize their security. Third, I create a theory of the alliance choices of great power. Last, I explain which great powers go to war with each other and when. All the theoretical implications are well supported by quantitative and qualitative tests taken from various cases of European great power politics from 1683 to 1913. Georealism can indeed predict the behaviour and motivations of individual states with great accuracy on a variety of topics.</p
Participation and cooperation in global climate governance
Full text linkInternational climate politics have seemed stalled throughout much of the past three decades. At least until the 2015 Paris Agreement on Climate Change, states largely failed to adopt new substantive treaties through the United Nations-led climate governance process. However, at the same time and largely unnoticed, states created a vast array of over 60 additional institutions to manage climate change. These new institutions address neglected topics, articulate alternative principles, and convene different sets of actors than the UN-led process. I ask why states have created these outside institutions, why states join these institutions, and how participation in these institutions relates to states’ cooperative behavior. I argue that the UN-led climate process is an inefficient response to climate change that leaves states dissatisfied and searching for other institutional options. However, this dissatisfaction arises from two opposing sources. First, states may be dissatisfied with the slow pace of cooperative progress. These states join new climate institutions that focus on capacity building and supporting ambitious cooperation. By contrast, a second set of states are dissatisfied with the spectre of costly mitigation obligations in a new climate treaty. These states join new climate institutions that focus on negotiations and act to undermine effective cooperation. As a result, dissatisfied states join climate institutions for opposing reasons, and crucially they join different kinds of institutions. I use a statistical measurement model to recover states’ preferences in international climate politics from their memberships in climate institutions. In statistical tests, I then show two important facts. First, state participation in climate institutions is linked to their dissatisfaction. Second, patterns of participation are associated with the ambition of countries’ greenhouse gas mitigation targets in the Paris Agreement. These findings help illuminate debates about how states use dense institutional environments, why states join institutions, and the depth of cooperation
Who will govern artificial intelligence? Learning from the history of strategic politics in emerging technologies
Full text linkArtificial intelligence (AI) is a strategic general purpose technology (GPT) with the potential to deliver vast economic value and substantially affect national security. The central claim motivating this work is that the development of a strategic GPT follows a distinct pattern of politics. By modelling this pattern, we can make predictions about how the politics of AI will unfold.
The proposed model follows a life cycle of a strategic GPT. It focuses on three actors â the state, firms, and researchers. Each actor is defined by their goals, resources and constraints. The model analyses the relationships between these actors â specifically, the synergies and conflicts that emerge between them as their goals, resources, and constraints interact.
Case studies of strategic GPTs developed in the U.S. â specifically aerospace technology, biotechnology, and cryptography â show that the model captures much of history accurately. When applied to AI, the model also does well to capture political dynamics to date and motivates predictions about how we could expect the politics of AI to unfold. For example, I predict that AI firms will be increasingly constrained by the legislative environment, and more pressured to serve national defense and security interests. Some will be caught in the cross-hairs of public critique and researcher push back; some, however, will willingly sell AI technologies to the state with little friction. Further, I predict that the political influence of researchers will shrink, going against what some may view as a rise in researcher influence given recent events of employee backlash in AI firms. In turn, the inclination and capacity for the state to exert control over AIâs development and proliferation will likely grow, exercised via tools such as export controls.
Artificial intelligence is going to matter greatly, and indeed, already does. It matters, then, that we understand the politics that surrounds it, and that we ultimately lay the groundwork for the governance of a technology that is poised to be transformative. </p
Information, access, and conflict: transnational interest groups and the politics of global tax governance
No full textWhat accounts for variation in technical demand for business supplied information in tax policy processes at the OECD? This study explores the relationship between politicised international corporate tax policy processes and the participation of transnationally active corporate taxpayer interest groups. Existing ‘transnationalist’ tax IPE literature has largely neglected the role of transnationally active taxpayer groups and often deploys explanations centred on logics of ideas and socialisation to explain the nature of transnational tax policymaking (businesses – firms and their advocacy groups). In focusing exclusively on expert networks, much of this literature neglects the role of political interests in the transnational tax policymaking space. This dissertation therefore explicitly focuses on the under-researched study of transnational taxpayer interests by using an approach centred on interest group politics in the international tax policymaking process. The study focuses on why and when interest group input is demanded by policymakers in the OECD (delegates and technocrats), and what the role of intergovernmental conflict in the collective political principal plays in shaping OECD policymaker demand for taxpayer stakeholder participation in transnational tax policymaking. Bringing in insights from the lobbying literature on resource-exchange dynamics, this study evaluates how increasingly tough cooperation problems between countries, ultimately shape technocratic ‘demand’ for informational input from business. Th study explores the varying demand for transnational taxpayer stakeholder input in the OECD's recent work on corporate taxation (2012-2021) in three distinct eras that map onto underlying conflicts of interest with the collective political principal: (I) Transparency (II) Digital Taxation (III) Global Minimum Taxation. The study uses a qualitative methodological approach drawing on interviews and extensive document analysis
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