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    Explaining Variance in Affect Control Theory: Cultural Consensus, Deflection, and Redefinition

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    Affect Control Theory (ACT) conceives of affective sentiments as sharedmeanings among individuals within a single culture. Recognizing the theory's potentialto explain cultural differences and behavior patterns, many researchers aim to test andapply ACT's insights to within- and across-culture analysis. The growth of the theory'spopularity necessitates a review and exposition of the theory's fundamentalmethodological assumptions and its causal mechanism, deflection. Using data from the2003 Indiana EPA dictionary, I map the distribution of fundamental U.S. sentiments inEPA space, define two new conceptions of deflection, map the universe of eventcurrently measureable deflections, and discuss the ramifications of these findings forpast and future research.I critique ACT's operationalization of "shared meaning" as mean point estimatescalculated from individuals' numeric ratings on semantic differential scales. Pastresearch attributes variation in concept ratings to two sources: unsystematic error in themeasurement tool and imperfect cultural inculcation among respondents. By taking aconcept-focused approach, I show that variation between respondents is structured bythe institutional affiliation of identity concepts and concept labels' word difficulty. Thispattern exists even when controlling for individual-level characteristics, the traditionallyascribed reason for variation in concept ratings.I replicate a well-known ACT study that found support for the dynamic behaviorredefinition hypothesis and did not find support for ACT's redefinition hypothesis. Imake the design more robust and test both the original findings and my claims aboutthe role of institutions in ACT. I find support for the dynamic behavior hypothesis,partial support for the ACT hypothesis, and support for the claim that individualsdepend on institutional information inherent in identity meanings.</p

    Occupational Stratification and the Multidimensional Structure of Symbolic Meaning

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    Subjective cultural meanings were once central to occupational stratification research. However, attempts to operationalize cultural meanings associated with occupations have been widely criticized, leading contemporary stratification scholars to largely abandon subjective measures in favor of objective characteristics. This leaves a gap in our understanding of how inequality is generated and maintained because Weber ([1958]) theorized that status, a form of social symbolic power based on cultural beliefs, represents one of the fundamental bases of inequality. Without an adequate method of operationalizing occupational symbolic meanings, the extent to which cultural beliefs influence stratified life outcomes remains largely unknown.To address this, I used affect control theory, a quantitative general theory ofsocial action, and its measurement model, the semantic differential scale, to examine three issues regarding the relationship between cultural beliefs and stratified outcomes. Symbolic meaning was quantified into EPA ratings that measure three universal, affective dimensions: evaluation (good versus bad), potency (powerful versus weak), and activity (lively versus quiescent). Despite extensive support within structural social psychology, this approach has not been widely used in the field of stratification. In addition to providing a quantitative framework, because symbolic meanings are comprised of multiple dimensions, affect control theory's multidimensional construction allows for novel approaches not possible using unidimensional measures. The three chapters that follow use affect control theory and ratings of occupational meanings from a newly collected dictionary of affective meaning to address the occupational gender wage gap, the effect of occupational status on life chance outcomes, and the development and testing of a new measure of occupational status.</p

    The Duality of Identities and Groups: The Effects of Status Homophily on Social Interactions and Relations

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    Gender and racial stereotypes are a pervasive aspect of social life arising from the consolidation of resources, statuses, and social roles and identities at the population level. They are widely shared group-level associations that influence how we perceive ourselves and others. Understanding how stereotypes influence the impressions we form about others, however, requires understanding how the association between statuses such as gender or race and the other identities we occupy influences impressions. This dissertation examines this process in three studies. In Studies 1 and 2, I model how people react to events using affect control theory’s impression change methodology. I estimate models using event stimuli collected in 1978 and 2010. I find that stereotypically female and male identities have affective profiles that influence how we form impressions. Affect control theory is best able to explain events involving identities that respondents perceived as associated with both genders. Study 3 analyzes perceptions of aggression among adolescents using longitudinal network data. I find (1) that the association between aggression and race grew as Black friend groups grew more homogeneous, (2) that both Black and White students held racialized status meanings, (3) that within-group similarities and between-group differences with respect to perceptions and behaviors grew over time, and (4) that Blacks were more likely to be identified as aggressive after controlling for self-perceptions of aggressiveness, violent behaviors, and peer perceptions of relational and social aggression. Combined, these studies suggest that the association between cultural meanings of goodness, potency, and aggression and statuses such as gender and race are mediated by identities.</p

    Mapping the Social Ecology of Culture: Social Position, Connectedness, and Influence as Predictors of Systematic Variation in Affective Meaning

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    A strong model of culture should capture both the structured and negotiated elements of cultural meaning, allowing for the fluidity of social action and the agency of social actors. Although cultural meanings often reproduce societal structures, supporting stability and consensus, culture is constitutive of and not merely produced by structural arrangements. It is therefore essential to establish clear mechanisms which guide how individuals interpret social events and apply cultural meanings in making sense of the social world. As such, this dissertation focuses on the model of culture forwarded by affect control theory, a sociological theory linking culturally shared meaning with identity, behavior, and emotion in interpersonal interaction (for reviews, see Heise 2007; Robinson and Smith-Lovin 2006). While many theories have attempted to deal with components of the cultural model separately, affect control theory provides a unifying multi-level framework, which rectifies many shortcomings of earlier models by simultaneously accounting for individual cognition and emotion, situational and institutional context, and cultural meaning. The dissertation begins by introducing affect control theory, which considers cultural meanings to be societally bound, based on consensual and widely shared sentiments, and stable over long periods of time. We advocate several refinements to the theory's assumptions about culture, proposing that cultural sentiments are dynamic and structurally contingent, and that mechanisms operating within social networks serve as important sources of meaning consensus and change.The remainder of the dissertation presents empirical evidence in support of our propositions. First, we draw upon primary survey data to show how social position and patterns of social connectedness relate to inculcation into the dominant culture and commonality with the affective meanings of others. Respondents' demographics, social position, social connectedness, network composition, and experiences in close relationships are explored as predictors of inculcation and commonality in meaning. Second, through an experimental study, we explore social influence processes as a mechanism of cultural consensus and change. Analyses examine both conditionally manipulated features of the group structure and respondents' emergent assessments of social influence as predictors of change in task-related attitudes and affective meanings. Our results identify structural sources of normative differentiation and consensus, and introduce social networks methodologies as a means of elaborating affect control theory's explanatory model. More broadly, the findings generated by this project contribute to an ongoing academic discussion on the origins of cultural content, exploring the complex and dynamic relationship between patterns of social interaction and cultural affective meaning. We close by introducing research in progress, which examines predictors of clustering in affective meaning and explores how values, self, and identity condition the effects of social influence on decision-making.</p

    Errors in Judgement: How Status, Values, and Moral Foundations Influence Moral Judgments of Guilt and Punishment

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    This study investigates how actor status, moral foundations theory and Schwartz values influence the moral judgments of guilt and punishment. I argue that to understand individual values consequences for actions, they must be considered within organizational values and larger institutional logics frameworks. Building off Zerubavel’s conception of a three level cognition (Zerubavel 1999), I argue for a tri level conception of values and morality in order to more fully understand how moral judgements work as well as the social context in which they are shaped. Using original research, I offer evidence of three levels of morality. First, I evaluate actor status on judgments of guilt and punishment. I then evaluate individual moral culture using Schwartz Values (Schwartz 2012; Vaisey and Miles 2014). I evaluate the impact of the organization on moral culture measure through the use of status hierarchies (Sauder, Lynn, and Podolny 2012). Finally, I evaluate broader cultural morality using Moral Foundations Theory (Graham et al. 2016; Kesebir and Haidt 2010). Taken together, these three levels of morality present a more ecologically valid understanding of the ways in which moral culture works from the individual, through the meso-social level and to the broader culture. I demonstrate the complex ways in which moral judgments are influenced by universal concerns, organizational influences and individual characteristics. I find that moral foundations theory conceptions of harm does not predict judgments of guilt and punishment but that Schwartz Values do influence these moral judgments. I also find that it is the actor status that most strongly predicts the outcomes of guilt and punishment. The research provides a foundation for future research of how actor status influences moral judgments of guilt and punishment beyond the limited moral community of the current study.</p
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