1,720,986 research outputs found
A “Modest” Primitivist Theory of Truth: The Ineffability of Truth, Effability of the Correspondence Relation
No full textThe primitivist theory of truth, i.e., the view that truth cannot be analysed in more fundamental terms, has been cleverly revamped by Jamin Asay, who has combined a primitivist approach to the concept of truth with a deflationary approach to the (metaphysical) property of being true. This paper aims to adjust Asay’s primitivist theory to consistently include the primitiveness of the (pre-theoretical) correspondence relation, grasped by our correspondence intuition, alongside the primitiveness of truth. In the process, I apply a thesis by Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson, according to which the correspondence of beliefs to facts (broadly construed) can occur with no commitment to a correspondence theory of truth. Then I argue why Asay’s theory might not be able to account for the primitiveness of the pre-theoretical correspondence relation. Finally, I use a suggestion by André Kukla concerning the possible entailment between an ineffable insight and its effable consequences, to build a revised primitivist theory of truth
Why the 'Spotlight' moves. A Moving Spotlight Theory of Time Based on Emanuele Severino's "La Gloria"
No full textThe aim of this paper is to account for the (metaphorical) movement of the property of being present (or presentness) within the so-called Moving Spotlight Theory (MST). I will be leveraging the key argument by Emanuele Severino’s masterpiece, La Gloria (2001), according to which it is impossible that a (maximal consistent) state of affairs begins to appear and lasts forever in our experience. After a brief overview of the MST’s main tenets (§1.1), I argue that Severino’s ontology might be interpreted as a sort of MST (§1.2), following the hint by Federico Perelda (2017). Thereafter, I briefly recall Severino’s original argument in his own jargon, also proposing English lexical and conceptual translations of the main Italian phrases (§1.3). Then, I propose both a semi-formalization of Severino’s argument (§2.1) and a full formalization by means of temporal logic (§2.2). Finally, I assess all the three versions of the argument, concluding that my formalization might account for the movement of presentness in a non-metaphorical way (§2.3)
Everything for nothing
Full text linkIn this paper I argue that the acceptance of an absolutely unrestricted quantification implies the existence of an absolutely empty possible world. This result could be relevant because David Lewis both admits an absolutely unrestricted quantification (for example in "Parts of classes") and rejects the existence of an absolutely empty possible world (in "On the plurality of worlds"). In order to vindicate my thesis, I propose two strategies. The first is based on the assumption that the phrase 'nothing' cannot be always reduced to a quantifier phrase, as Graham Priest and Alex Oliver with Timothy Smiley have argued. This strategy consists in a paraphrase of the notion of everything that constrains us to admit an empty possible world. The second strategy mainly consists in the use of an “idealistic” principle (say «every determination is negation») and its consequencesIn this paper I argue that the acceptance of an absolutely unrestricted quantification implies the existence of an absolutely empty possible world. This result could be relevant because David Lewis both admits an absolutely unrestricted quantification (for example in Parts of Classes) and rejects the existence of an absolutely empty possible world (in On the Plurality of Worlds). In order to vindicate my thesis, I propose two strategies. The first is based on the assumption that the phrase ‘nothing’ cannot be always reduced to a quantifier phrase, as Graham Priest and Alex Oliver with Timothy Smiley have argued. This strategy consists in a paraphrase of the notion of everything that constrains us to admit an empty possible world. The second strategy mainly consists in the use of an “idealistic” principle (say «every determination is negation») and its consequences
Emanuele Severino e il nichilismo metafisico nella filosofia analitica contemporanea
No full textIn contemporary analytic philosophy metaphysical nihilism is the thesis according to which there could have been nothing, i.e. there is a possible world with no concrete objects in it. This paper compares metaphysical nihilism with the solution to the puzzle of nothing by the Italian philosopher Emanuele Severino.In contemporary analytic philosophy metaphysical nihilism is the thesis according to which there could have been nothing, i.e. there is a possible world with no concrete objects in it. This paper compares metaphysical nihilism with the solution to the puzzle of nothing by the Italian philosopher Emanuele Severino
Is God Creator Out of Nothing and Necessary Being?
No full textIn this paper I propose an argument for showing that prima facie God cannot be creator out of absolute nothing (nihil absolutum), if He is a necessary being. Then I offer a strategy for making these attributes of God compatible. By means of this strategy, I argue that a possible worlds-approach can give a good account for what I call ‘theologies of nothingness’, i.e. those theologies that – broadly speaking – identify God with nothingness.In this paper I propose an argument to show that prima facie God cannot be creator out of absolute nothing (nihil absolutum), if He is a necessary being. Then I offer a strategy for making these attributes of God compatible. By means of this strategy, I argue that a possible worlds-approach can give a good account for what I call ‘theologies of nothingness’, i.e. those theologies that – broadly speaking – identify God with nothingness
La frattura originaria -aporie del tutto e impossibilità logica della differenza a partire da Parmenide
No full textStarting from the Parmenidean fundamental ontological relation between being and nothingness, the paper shows that difference among entities would imply several contradictions, even if we adopted Plato's solution as it appears in the dialogue "Sophist".Starting from the Parmenidean fundamental ontological relation between being and nothingness, the paper shows that difference among entities would imply several contradictions, even if we adopted Plato's solution as it appears in the dialogue "Sophist"
Nulla e negazione - l'aporia del nulla dopo Emanuele Severino
Full text linkFin dalle origini la filosofia occidentale ha cercato di liberare il pensiero dall'enorme scandalo rappresentato dal nulla assoluto, proibendo persino di nominarlo (Parmenide), oppure volgendo lo sguardo da un altra parte (ad esempio Platone e Heidegger, verso la differenza rispettivamente ontica e ontologica), o mostrandone la auto-negazione (Severino). Questo libro propone un modo nuovo di avvicinarsi al "non-essere" e alla sua aporia: un modo che, invece di eliminarlo dal pensiero, afferma la libertà del nulla da ogni forma di negazione. Si tratta, certo, di raddoppiare lo scandalo, tanto da mettere in questione anche il linguaggio stesso, dove già solo la parola nulla si costituisce "via negationis (nec-ulla)". Ma il presente saggio indica un ripensamento radicale del legame tra il nulla e la negazione proprio per tentare di risolvere l'aporia, articolandola attraverso una struttura diversa da quella tradizionale, sebbene la forma dell'argomentazione resti fondata sulla logica della non contraddizioneFin dalle origini la filosofia occidentale ha cercato di liberare il pensiero dall'enorme scandalo rappresentato dal nulla assoluto, proibendo persino di nominarlo (Parmenide), oppure volgendo lo sguardo da un altra parte (ad esempio Platone e Heidegger, verso la differenza rispettivamente ontica e ontologica), o mostrandone la auto-negazione (Severino). Questo libro propone un modo nuovo di avvicinarsi al "non-essere" e alla sua aporia: un modo che, invece di eliminarlo dal pensiero, afferma la libertà del nulla da ogni forma di negazione. Si tratta, certo, di raddoppiare lo scandalo, tanto da mettere in questione anche il linguaggio stesso, dove già solo la parola nulla si costituisce "via negationis (nec-ulla)". Ma il presente saggio indica un ripensamento radicale del legame tra il nulla e la negazione proprio per tentare di risolvere l'aporia, articolandola attraverso una struttura diversa da quella tradizionale, sebbene la forma dell'argomentazione resti fondata sulla logica della non contraddizione
Osservazioni sul cap. IV de "La struttura originaria"
No full textConsiderazioni critiche sulla soluzione di Emanuele Severino all'aporia del null
How to Defend the Law of Non-Contradiction without Incurring the Dialetheist’s Charge of (Viciously) Begging the Question
Full text linkAccording to some critics, Aristotle’s elenctic defence (elenchos, elenchus) of the Law of Non-Contradiction (Metaphysics IV) would be ineffective because it viciously begs the question. After briefly recalling the elenctic refutation of the denier of the Law of Non-Contradiction, I will first focus on Filippo Costantini’s objection to the elenchus, which, in turn, is based on the dialetheic account of negation developed by Graham Priest. Then, I will argue that there is at least one reading of the elenchus that might not be viciously question-begging. In doing so, I will leverage, reinterpret and adjust the distinction between two senses of epistemic dependence, offered by Noah Lemos and originally based on some thoughts about George Edward Moore’s ‘proof of an external world.’ The key point of my counter-objection to recover the elenchus is to use the distinction between a necessary-condition relation between propositions (p only if q) and a grounding relation between facts (the fact that an epistemic agent S believes that p is grounded in the fact that S believes that q), where p and q are the content of S’s beliefs
Buddhismo e senso comune. Filosofia della meditazione
Full text linkIn che cosa crede chi pratica la meditazione buddhista? Dare una risposta univoca e coerente è assai difficile; il Buddhismo infatti si concretizza in una molteplicità di scuole e dottrine caratterizzate da complesse logiche e metafisiche. Ci sono tuttavia delle indicazioni minimali che fungono da denominator comune per chi si accosta alla meditazione. Esse riguardano soprattutto l’assenza di punti di vista determinati, l’esperienza del tempo e la relazione di dipendenza reciproca di ogni cosa con ogni altra. Utilizzando gli strumenti della filosofia analitica, questo libro propone una interpretazione dei princìpi basilari che guidano la meditazione buddhista, facendo leva sulle potenzialità del senso comune, inteso non semplicemente come l’opinione generica della maggioranza – troppo spesso già infarcita di presupposti metafisici discutibili - bensì come insieme di credenze che tutti noi possediamo, ma di cui non sempre siamo consapevoli
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