127 research outputs found
Replication Data for: "Capturing Correctly: A Reanalysis of the Indirect Capture-Recapture Methods in the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission"
No full textThese are the files relates to the paper entitled "Capturing Correctly: A Reanalysis of the Indirect Capture-Recapture Methods in the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission
Replication Data for: A Truth Commission did not tell the truth: a rejoinder to Manrique-Vallier and Ball
No full textThis data and programs replicate the tables in the aforementioned paper
Replication Data for: A Truth Commission did not tell the truth: a rejoinder to Manrique-Vallier and Ball
No full textThis data and programs replicate the tables in the aforementioned paper
Replication Data for: "Capturing Correctly: A Reanalysis of the Indirect Capture-Recapture Methods in the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission"
No full textThese are the files relates to the paper entitled "Capturing Correctly: A Reanalysis of the Indirect Capture-Recapture Methods in the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission
Employment and Deadweight Loss Effects of Observed Non-Wage Labor Costs
No full textTo assess the employment effects of labor costs it is crucial to have reliable estimates of the labor cost elasticity of labor demand. Using a matched firm-worker dataset, we estimate a long run unconditional labor demand function, exploiting information on workers to correct for endogeneity in the determination of wages. We evaluate the employment and deadweight loss effects of observed employers' contributions imposed by labor laws (health insurance, training, and taxes) as well as of observed workers' deductions (social security, and income tax). We find that non-wage labor costs reduce employment by 17% for white-collars and by 53% for blue-collars, with associated deadweight losses of 10% and 35% of total contributions, respectively. Since most firms undercomply with mandated employers' and workers contributions, we find that full compliance would imply employment losses of 4% for white-collars and 12% for blue-collars, with respective associated deadweight losses of 2% and 6%.Employment, Deadweight Loss, Job Creation, Labor Costs, Labor Law
Occupational Selection in Multilingual Labor Markets
No full textIn multilingual labor markets agents with high proficiency in more than one language may be selected into occupations that require high levels of skill in communicating with customers or writing reports in more than one language. In this paper we measure this effect in Catalonia, where two languages, Catalan and Spanish, coexist. Using census data for 1991 and 1996, and controlling for endogeneity of Catalan knowledge, we find that proficiency in speaking, reading and writing Catalan reinforces selection into communication intensive jobs/positions such as entrepreneurial, trade, and service activities; white-collar occupations; and permanent employment. Interestingly, the effect of language on occupational selection is stronger for women than for men.occupational selection, language, labor markets
A Structural Analysis of Crime and Economic Incentives of Youth
No full text85 pg.In this thesis, a dynamic model is estimated to analyze the effect of economic incentives on crime involvement and recidivism of young people. The model assumes that the utility of individuals depends on their earnings from legal work and illegal activities. Every period, young agents face an expected wage. They may get extra income from criminal activities but lose some when punishment occurs. There are two types of punishment: arrest and incarceration. Criminals have to pay a fine if arrested but need to serve sentences from months to years with no earnings if incarcerated. The model is estimated through the SMM using data from the NLSY97, a nationally representative survey of 8984 individuals with employment records, criminal information, illegal income, and detailed arrest and sentence records, as well as other socio-demographic information. Although there are many other factors contribution to youth crime, this study shows that economic incentives explain well the behavior of individuals. Since the negative impact of punishment increases as the wage level goes up, people with lower wage levels from the legitimate labor market are more likely to commit a crime. People without criminal records have the highest persistent wage rate, while the wages of ex-offenders highly depends on the wage shock, which is explained by a large wage gap before and after jail. In general, people have lower propensity to commit a crime if their expected income from illegal activities is low. However, compared with ex-offenders, people without any record are more likely to commit a crime as their expected illegal income increases. If the expected illegal income becomes high enough, they will always commit a crime. Since the probability of being punished is higher to ex-offenders once they recidivate, they are less likely to be involved in criminal activities if the expected wage is over a certain level. The ability of the model to incorporate the wide variety of sentence terms and types of punishment allows me to evaluate the effect of different policies on the crime participation and recidivism of youth. An increase in the probability of incarceration, an increase in the probability of long sentences or a decrease in the probability of being released can decrease the overall crime involvement but increases the jail population. An increase in the probability arrest, such as increase in the police force, may decrease the crime involvement of people without criminal records but increases the overall crime involvement, which is due to a highly increase in the crime participation and population of people with arrest or jail records. An increase in the fine rate slightly decreases the overall crime involvement and the population with criminal records.Advisor(s): Rendon, Silvio . Committee Member(s): Ben?Átez-Silva, Hugo ; Montgomery, Mark R.Mocan, Naci.Stony Brook University Libraries. SBU Graduate School in Department of Economics. Charles Taber (Dean of Graduate School)
Does Wealth Explain Black-White Differences in Early Employment Careers?
No full textIn this paper I inquire about the effects initial wealth has on black-white differences in early employment careers. I set up a dynamic model in which individuals simultaneously search for a job and accumulate wealth, and fit it to data from the National Longitudinal Survey (1979-cohort). The estimates show that borrowing constraints are tight for both race groups. Regime changes reveal that differences in initial wealth account almost fully for the racial gap in wealth and wages at the beginning of employment careers, but their effect tapers off and completely dissapears several years after graduation. In contrast, differences in the labor market environment and in preferences are shown to account fully for both racial gaps, in wealth and in wages, persisting several years after High School graduation.Job search, wealth, racial differences, borrowing constraints, consumption, unemployment, estimation of dynamic structural models
Employment and deadweight loss effects of observed non-wage labor costs
No full textTo assess the employment effects of labor costs it is crucial to have reliable estimates of the labor cost elasticity of labor demand. Using a matched firm-worker dataset, we estimate a long run unconditional labor demand function, exploiting information on workers to correct for endogeneity in the determination of wages. We evaluate the employment and deadweight loss effects of observed employers’ contributions imposed by labor laws (health insurance, training, and taxes) as well as of observed workers’ deductions (social security and income tax). We find that non-wage labor costs reduce employment by 17% for whitecollars and by 53% for blue-collars, with associated deadweight losses of 10% and 35% of total contributions, respectively. Since most firms undercomply with mandated employers’ and workers contributions, we find that full compliance would imply employment losses of 4% for white-collars and 12% for blue-collars, with respective associated deadweight losses of 2% and 6%.
Occupational Selection in Multilingual Labor Markets: The Case of Catalonia
No full textIn multilingual labor markets agents with high proficiency in more than one language may be selected into occupations that require high levels of skill in communicating with customers or writing reports in more than one language. In this paper we measure this effect in Catalonia, where two languages, Catalan and Spanish, coexist. Using census data for 1991 and 1996, and controlling for endogeneity of Catalan knowledge, we find that proficiency in speaking, reading, and writing Catalan reinforces selection into being employed, being an entrepreneur, and into white-collar occupations and communication-intensive jobs. In particular, being able to read and speak Catalan increases the probability of selection into white collar occupations by betwen 9 and 14 percentage points, while writing Catalan increases by 6 to 13 percentage points the probability of engaging in services, and government and educational activities.Language, Occupational Selection, Industry, Immigration, Skill Premium.
- …
