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    “Come il cane e la pulce”. Elementi di pragmatica del paesaggio

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    This paper suggests that the understanding of the use and the concept of “landscape” can be facilitated by a comparison with Wittgenstein’s language games and that indeed “landscape” functions in a similar way to language games, understood in their intertwinement with forms of life. On this basis, I proceed to outline three fundamental elements of a pragmatist, anti-essentialist conception of landscape and develop two of them schematically. In conclusion, I reflect on some ramifications and possible developments of the proposed perspective

    Aesthetics as philosophy of art, or Hegel’s reconciliation of Kantian dualism

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    Despite the extraordinary influence of Hegel’s aesthetics, the very term “aesthetics” features very seldom in his body of work. Considering both ongoing radical uncertainty as to the status of aesthetics as well as Hegel’s profound and persistent influence on aesthetics, it is worth reflecting on the reasons for, and potential alternatives to, Hegel’s use of the term “aesthetics.” This is the goal of this paper, which combines a reconstruction of Hegel’s variations on the topic with a broader perspective on what they can still teach us today. I begin by discussing Hegel’s presentations of the topic of his lectures on aesthetics (Section II). In Section III, I argue that both Hegel’s ambivalence towards aesthetics and his eventual identification of the latter with a philosophy of art are rooted in his confrontation with Kant’s seminal, yet insufficient, attempt to surmount dualism through his theory of reflective judgment. The attempt to address Kant’s unresolved dualism ultimately leads to the equivalence, both conceptual and terminological, of aesthetics and philosophy of art, and to the autonomy of art as a form of the absolute spirit (Section IV). In the concluding section, I outline the fundamental tensions left open by this equivalence as open challenges in contemporary aesthetics (Section V)

    Jean-François Kervégan. The Actual and the Rational: Hegel and Objective Spirit, translated by Daniela Ginsburg and Martin Shuster. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2018. ISBN: 978-0-2260-2380-9 (hbk). Pp. 384. £41.50/$55.00

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    Recensione del volume: Jean-François Kervégan. The Actual and the Rational: Hegel and Objective Spirit, translated by Daniela Ginsburg and Martin Shuster. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2018

    Reply to Paul Kottman

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    Risposta alla recensione di Paul A. Kottman sul libro "Morte dell’arte, libertà del soggetto: Attualità di Hegel" dell'autore (sul forum "Critique")

    Antisubjectivism and the End of Art: Heidegger on Hegel

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    This paper claims that Heidegger’s confrontation with poetry and with Hegel’s end of art thesis can be read as an attempt to restore the highest function of art by deconstructing the ‘modern’ conception of truth underlying Hegel’s thesis. First, I discuss Heidegger’s interpretation of art following his assessment of the failure of metaphysical language to ‘unconceal’ the truth of Being. Second, I analyse, with specific reference to his interpretation of Hölderlin, what I reckon to be the core thread of Heidegger’s philosophy of art, namely his antisubjectivism. Third, I turn to Hegel’s end of art thesis, showing how for him, as well as for Heidegger, the highest function of art is necessarily connected to antisubjectivism, and hence, under the conditions of modernity, is a thing of the past. Finally, I address Heidegger’s reference to Hegel’s thesis, and claim that, while Hegel fully remains within the horizon of modernity, thus affirming the irreversible pastness of art, Heidegger envisages the possibility of abandoning the fundamental orientation of modernity, and hence of revoking the thesis of the pastness of art

    Spazi kantiani

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    In setting up a philosophical framework to deal with the two inherent risks of human knowledge, dogmatism and scepticism, Kant introduces a systematic, though not always consistent, taxonomy of philosophical spaces in the second paragraph of the Introduction to his Critique of Judgment, entitled On the domain [Gebiet] of philosophy in general. Based on some remarks in Leonardo Amoroso’s paper Kant e il problema di una regola delle regole, this article investigates this taxonomy (sections 1-2), with a specific focus on his notion of “habitat” (Aufenthalt). Habitats are the spaces of empirical contingency, where humans cannot hope to establish necessary and universal laws, but at most a provisional, a posteriori order of familiarity and, as I will highlight, the groundwork for this possibility is an aesthetic one (section 3). In the concluding section 4 I will discuss the paradoxical centrality of the liminal space of the “habitat” and sketchily develop it toward a non-dualistic, Wittgensteinian concept of culture and game

    "Landscape Character Assessment": una proposta pragmatista

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    Nonostante la sua attualità concettuale ed efficacia pratica, una parte della ricerca recente ha espresso una crescente insoddisfazione nei confronti del modello correntemente dominante di carattere del paesaggio e della sua valutazione. Nella prima sezione di questo contributo considereremo gli aspetti principali di questa insoddisfazione, aggruppandoli per comodità in due categorie, teorica e pratica. La sezione successiva offrirà una diagnosi del problema incentrata sull’impiego di una concezione ristretta e astratta dell’esperienza e della sfera estetica o, come dirò più semplicemente, dell’estetico. La terza e ultima sezione, infine, passerà a delineare i contorni di una proposta di miglioramento ispirata al pragmatismo

    The Other Side of Actuality? A Pragmatist Reading of Hegel on Emotions and Being Human

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    According to Hegel’s widely-known and often misinterpreted Doppelsatz, what is rational is actual, and what is actual is rational.1 However we look at the Doppelsatz, it seems to leave aside what we may call “the emotional dimension” of human reality. Indeed, this and other expressions we find in Hegel’s work have led to criticism of his supposedly hyper-rationalist, panlogicist, universalist view of reality. While such criticism has been adequately shown to be superficial and stereotyped, it is also true that much research remains to be done on the emotional dimension of Hegel’s philosophy. My paper contributes to this aim. I will read Hegel in an actualizing perspective and following a pragmatist blueprint. I begin by outlining Hegel’s apparent “double treatment” of the emotional dimension, between appreciation of its role and criticism of its overextension (1). This leads to the discussion of the relationship between the emotional dimension and thinking in Hegel (2), a relationship that can take on different forms, yet is in general to be interpreted in a continuistic sense as the concrete space of human actuality (3). Finally, I substantiate my pragmatist blueprint and the claim of the attractiveness of Hegel’s conception of the emotional dimension through a direct comparison with Dewey’s view of emotions (4)

    Bello

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    Come nel caso di altri termini e concetti del discorso filosofico, anche per quanto riguarda il “bello”, l’arco di tempo che intercorre tra Quattrocento e Settecento vede il concentrarsi e l’intersecarsi di processi di cambiamento profondi, sullo sfondo della permanenza del riferimento a una concezione che attraversa l’intera storia della cultura europea, e non solo

    Premessa [Ragione estetica ed ermeneutica del senso]

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    Premessa al volume "Ragione estetica ed ermeneutica del senso. Studi in memoria di Leonardo Amoroso
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