170,747 research outputs found

    The Firing Cost Implications of Alternative Severance Pay Designs

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    Economists have concerns about the firing cost implications of mandated severance plans. Analysis reveals that predicted severance plan consequences depend critically on the precise structure of the plan. Whether governments mandate (i) severance insurance plans or (ii) severance savings plans is important; savings plans have no "firing cost" effects on employer layoff decisions. The firing cost implications of insurance plan are sensitive to the types of job separations that qualify a worker for benefits. Plans that pay benefits across all separations are functionally severance savings plans. The variety of plan types is illustrated using U.S. and international examples.job displacement, worker turnover, severance pay, firing costs

    Severance Payments for Dismissed Employees Severance Payments for Dismissed Employees in Germany

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    This contribution investigates severance payments for dismissed employees in Germany. Particularly, it responds to the following questions: Who receives severance payments? By which characteristics is the level of severance payments determined? Is overcompensation to be considered a relevant issue? Hereby, individual and collective dismissals are distinguished. This is the first study on this issue using individual representative data ­ the German Socio-Economic Panel ­ and multivariate methods. The results indicate that rather women, persons with many years of tenure and working in big firms receive severance payments. There is a huge variance in the size of the payments, which can only partly be explained by tenure, the wage and citizenship. About one quarter of dismissed employees is better off in their following careers independent of having received a severance payment.Severance Payments, Dismissals, Plant closings, Dismissal

    Empirical Analysis of the Severance Pay Non-Performance in Slovenia

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    Combining information from the Firm Survey of Labor Costs with the information about claims filed with the Guarantee Fund by workers whose employers defaulted on their severance pay obligations, the paper analyzes the so-called non-performance problem of severance pay – the fact that coverage, and thus legal entitlement, does not guarantee the actual receipt of the benefit – as experienced in Slovenia in 2000. The findings are threefold: (i) one-third of total obligations incurred by firms failed to be honored and only a small portion of defaulted severance pay claims was reimbursed by the Guarantee Fund; (ii) while both men and women seem to be equally affected, workers older than 40 were disproportionally represented among those whose severance pay claims failed to be honored; and, (iii) among firms that incurred severance pay liabilities, larger and more productive firms were more likely to observe their fiduciary obligations and pay them out. These findings corroborate the weaknesses of severance pay as an income protection program, pointing to the large scale of the non-performance problem and the inequities created by it.severance pay, severance pay non-performance, Guarantee Fund, Slovenia

    Severance Packages

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    Job-to-job turnover provides a way for employers to escape statutory firing costs, as unprofitable workers may willfully quit their job on receiving an outside offer, thus sparing their incumbent employer the firing costs. Furthermore, employers can induce their unprofitable workers to accept outside job offers that they would otherwise reject by offering voluntary severance packages, which are less costly than the full statutory firing cost. We formalize those mechanisms within an extension of the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides (DMP) matching model that allows for employed job search and negotiation over severance packages. We find that, while essentially preserving most standard qualitative predictions of the DMP model without employed job search, our model explains why higher firing costs intensify job-to-job turnover at the expense of transitions out of unemployment. We further find that allowing for on-the-job search markedly changes the quantitative predictions of the DMP model regarding the impact of firing costs on unemployment and employment flows: ignoring on-the-job search leads one to strongly underestimate the negative impact of firing costs on unemployment.firing costs, on-the-job search, mutual consent, minimum wage

    Non-performance of the severance pay program in Slovenia

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    Combining information from the firm survey of labor costs with the information about claims filed with the Guarantee Fund by workers whose employers defaulted on their severance pay obligations, the paper analyzes the so-called non-performance problem of severance pay - the fact that coverage, and thus legal entitlement, does not guarantee the actual receipt of the benefit - as experienced in Slovenia in 2000. The findings are threefold: (i) one-third of total obligations incurred by firms failed to be honored and only a small portion of defaulted severance pay claims was reimbursed by the Guarantee Fund; (ii) while both men and women seem to be equally affected, workers older than 40 were disproportion ally represented among those whose severance pay claims failed to be honored; and (iii) among firms that incurred severance pay liabilities, larger and more productive firms were more likely to observe their fiduciary obligations and pay them out. These findings corroborate the weaknesses of severance pay as an income protection program, pointing to the large scale of the non-performance problem and the inequities created by it.Labor Policies,,Labor Markets,Wages, Compensation&Benefits,Social Protections&Assistance

    Severance Pay and the Shadow of the Law: Evidence for West Germany

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    Due to the complexity of employment protection legislation (EPL) in Germany, there is notable uncertainty about the outcomes of dismissal conflicts. In this study we focus on severance pay and inquire whether its incidence and level varies in a systematic manner with the legal rules as defined by labour as well as tax law. We start with a theoretical model that generates the main observable outcomes of dismissal conflicts as potential equilibrium situations. Using German panel data (GSOEP), we put our theoretical model to an empirical test. Our main result is that the shadow of the law matters. Criteria regarding the validity of dismissals either found in respective legislation or defined by labour courts significantly affect the incidence and magnitude of severance pay. Moreover, restrictive changes in the taxation of severance pay have a negative causal impact on its incidence.Severance pay; Labour law; Taxation; Sample selection; Survey data

    'Take it or Go to Court' - The Impact of Sec. 1a of the German Protection against Dismissal Act on Severance Payments -

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    In 2004, a section was added to the German Protection against Dismissal Act, establishing a new procedure to dismiss an employee, given a predetermined severance payment. Most legal scholars presume the change to be without impact, while a minority of experts claims it to be either beneficial or unfavourable to employees. Our theoretical model suggests that firms will use the new procedure, but that the change in payoffs is indeterminate and, therefore, an empirical issue. Exploiting the fact that collective dismissals are not directly affected by the amendment, difference-in-differences estimates based on panel data for West Germany indicate that the legal change did have a negative effect on severance pay.panel data, Protection against Dismissal Act, severance pay

    MEASURING THE PRIMARY IMPACTS OF SEVERANCE TAXATION: A SPATIAL EQUILIBRIUM APPROACH

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    A spatial equilibrium model is used to quantify the effects of a severance tax on the Pennsylvania coal market. Two regions are identified: the Pennsylvania Market Area and an import/export region. The impacts on prices and quantities of coal supplied and demanded are found to be small. Little of the tax is exported from Pennsylvania, with a high proportion of the tax being passed back to Pennsylvania coal producers. Although the tax revenue exceeds the welfare losses in Pennsylvania, this result is very sensitive to the magnitude of the Pennsylvania own-price demand elasticity.Public Economics,

    Severance Pay and the Shadow of the Law: Evidence for West Germany

    No full text
    Due to the complexity of employment protection legislation (EPL) in Germany, there is notable uncertainty about the outcomes of dismissal conflicts. In this study we focus on severance pay and inquire whether its incidence and level varies in a systematic manner with the legal rules as defined by labour as well as tax law. We start with a theoretical model that generates the main observable outcomes of dismissal conflicts as potential equilibrium situations. Using German panel data (GSOEP), we put our theoretical model to an empirical test. Our main result is that the shadow of the law matters. Criteria regarding the validity of dismissals either found in respective legislation or defined by labour courts significantly affect the incidence and magnitude of severance pay. Moreover, restrictive changes in the taxation of severance pay have a negative causal impact on its incidence.severance pay, labour law, taxation, sample selection, survey data

    Golden Handshakes: Separation Pay for Retired and Dismissed CEOs

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    This paper studies separation payments made when CEOs leave their firms. In a sample of 179 exiting Fortune 500 CEOs, more than half receive severance pay and the mean separation package is worth $5.4 million. The large majority of severance pay is awarded on a discretionary basis by the board of directors and not according to terms of an employment agreement. For the subset of exiting CEOs who are dismissed, separation pay generally conforms to theories related to bonding and damage control. Shareholders react negatively when separation agreements are disclosed, but only in cases of voluntary CEO turnover.CEO turnover; severance pay
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