99 research outputs found
Environmental regulation and development : a cross-country empirical analysis
No full textThe authors develop comparative indices of environmental policy and performance for 31 countries using a quantified analysis of reports prepared for the United Nations Conference on Environmental and Development. In cross-country regressions, they find a very strong, continuous association between their indicators and national income per capita, particularly when adjusted for purchasing power parity. Their results suggest a characteristic progression in development. Poor agrarian economies focus first on natural resource protection. With increased urbanization and industrialization, countries move from initial regulation of water pollution to air pollution control. The authors highlight the importance of institutional development. Environmental regulation is more advanced in developing countries with relatively secure property rights, effective legal and judicial systems, and efficient public administration.Public Health Promotion,Environmental Economics&Policies,Health Economics&Finance,Agricultural Research,Economic Theory&Research,Environmental Economics&Policies,Health Economics&Finance,Agricultural Research,Economic Theory&Research,Environmental Governance
Does strict employment protection discourage job creation? Evidence from Croatia
No full textEmployment protection legislation in Croatia is among the most strict in Europe. Firing is difficult and costly, and flexible forms of employment are limited. Is this apparent rigidity reflected-as one would expect based on standard economic theory-in low labor market dynamics? Is job creation low and hiring limited? Is the job security of insiders achieved at the cost of outsiders not being able to enter thelabor market? The author attempts to answer these questions by examining job flows. If the employment protection legislation is binding, then job and worker turnover should be low. He shows that this is indeed the case. Hiring is limited and the average job tenure is very long in Croatia. Job destruction is low, however job creation is still lower. The result is accumulation of unemployment, in large part due to new labor market entrants not being able to find a job. The high degree of job protection also seems to strengthen the bargaining position of insiders and results in relatively high wages. So, wages in Croatia are higher than among its competitors, even after adjusting for productivity. These high labor costs are likely to contribute to limited job creation in existing firms, but also are likely to discourage the entry of-and thus job creation in-new firms. The author presents evidence that firm growth has been indeed limited in Croatia, contributing to the low employment level. The author examines other potential causes of high unemployment in Croatia (the unemployment benefit system, labor taxation, the wage structure, and skill and spatial mismatches). He argues that they do not play a substantial part in accounting for poor labor market outcomes in Croatia. The author concludes that the stringent employment protection legislation is the key labor market institution behind low job creation and high unemployment. Based on this he recommends specific measures aimed at liberalizing the labor market to foster job creation and employment.Labor Management and Relations,Labor Policies,Labor Markets,Environmental Economics&Policies,Trade Finance and Investment,Labor Markets,Labor Management and Relations,Labor Standards,Banks&Banking Reform,Environmental Economics&Policies
Voucher privatization with investment funds : an institutional analysis
No full textCommon wisdom among post-socialist reformers has beento use voucher investment funds to provide the corporate governance needed to restructure newly privatized enterprises after mass privatization efforts. The idea has been that mass privatization would spread the ownership too wide and make corporate governance difficult. The author examines the likely institutional behavior of voucher funds and the possible effects of their development on a transition economy. Since most policy advice has been in favor of voucher privatization with investment funds, the author can be seen as playing the devil's advocate, but his argument is institutional, not statistical. Policymaking requires insight and foresight into how institutions will tend to function. He concludes that voucher funds will introduce a bias in the economy away from the real industrial sector toward an ersatz"financial sector"that will have little if any positive financial role but will be well-protected by friendly regulators. One long-term consequence of voucher privatization with investment funds, according to this view, is a de facto"industrial policy"of real sector decapitalization in favor of short-term rent-seeking by fund managers through board sinecures and lucrative side deals with portfolio companies and through financial market manipulation and paper entrepreneurship in the"financial sector."Without strong corporate governance from the funds and without stable ownership of their own, many enterprise managers will exploit the post-socialist version of the"separation of ownership and control"to grab what they can in the form of salaries, bonuses, perquisites, and side deals. The most likely results of the strategy of voucher privatization with investment funds may be a two-sided grab fest by fund managers and enterprise managers -- together with the accompanying drift, stagnation, and decapitalization of the privatized industrial sector.Economic Adjustment and Lending,Payment Systems&Infrastructure,International Terrorism&Counterterrorism,Economic Theory&Research,Banks&Banking Reform,International Terrorism&Counterterrorism,Banks&Banking Reform,Economic Adjustment and Lending,Environmental Economics&Policies,Economic Theory&Research
Addressing the education puzzle : the distribution of education and economic reform
No full textNo country has achieved sustained economic development without substantially investing in human capital. Previous studies have shown the handsome returns to various forms of basic education, research, training, learning-by-doing, and capacity-building. But education by itself does not guarantee successful development, as history has shown in the former Soviet bloc, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, and the Indian states of Kerala and West Bengal. The question is, when and how does education bring high payoffs? Although theory has suggested a strong causal link between education and growth, the empirical evidence has not been unanimous and conclusive. The authors examine two explanatory factors. First, who gets educated matters a good deal, but the distribution of education is complex and not much has been written about it. They construct an asset allocation model that elucidates the importance of the distribution of education to economic development. Second, how education affects growth is greatly affected by the economic policy environment. Policies determine what people can do with their education. Reform of trade, investment, and labor policies can increase the returns from education. Using panel data from 12 Asian and Latin American countries for 1970-94, they investigate the relationship between education, policy reform, and economic growth. Their empirical results are promising. First, the distribution of education matters. Unequal distribution of education tends to have a negative impact on per capita income in most countries. Moreover, controlling for human capital distribution and the use of appropriate functional form specifications consistent with the asset allocation model makes a difference for the effect of average schooling on per capita income. Controlling for education distribution leads to positive and significant effects of average schooling on per capita income, while failure to do so leads to insignificant, even negative effects, of average education. Second, the policy environment matters a great deal. Our results indicate that economic policies that suppress market forces tend to dramatically reduce the impact of human capital on economic growth. Investment in human capital can have little impact on growth unless people can use education in competitive and open markets. The larger and more competitive these markets are, the greater are the prospects for using education and skills.Curriculum&Instruction,Economic Theory&Research,Decentralization,Public Health Promotion,Health Monitoring&Evaluation,Health Monitoring&Evaluation,Teaching and Learning,Curriculum&Instruction,Economic Theory&Research,Gender and Education
The benefits of growth for Indonesian Workers
No full textIndonesia's adopted development model has proved to be the most successful in alleviating poverty and benefiting workers in developing countries. The government's development efforts focused on agriculture, education, and transport infrastructure. It emphasized providing productive employment opportunities and gradually improving the labor quality through education and training. The wage, employment, and income growth rates were left to market forces. Although the rapid growth of labor-intensive manufacturing has led to more jobs and higher wages benefiting workers, workers employed in these industries have expressed growing dissatisfaction. They complain about problems of child labor, the denial of centrally mandated wages and benefits to workers, poor working conditions, and the abuse of young female workers. The government has tried to improve worker's wages and working conditions by centrally mandating higher labor standards, relying principally on minimum wages. Enforcement has improved and, despite low compliance, minimum wages are beginning to bite. Indonesians are debating whether they need labor intensive industries and whether it is a mistake to base Indonesia's growth on cheap labor. They argue that if labor is more expensive, manufacturers must substitute some capital for labor. However, if labor-intensive industries are rejected, the capacity of the economy to absorb plentiful workers will be reduced. The main alternatives are to push up wages now, or to let wages be determined by market forces and strengthen institutions that could improve working conditions, such as labor unions. The author recommends maintaining flexible labor markets and allowing market forces to set the pace of change, while strengthening labor unions.Environmental Economics&Policies,Public Health Promotion,Labor Policies,Health Monitoring&Evaluation,Work&Working Conditions,Environmental Economics&Policies,Health Monitoring&Evaluation,Banks&Banking Reform,Work&Working Conditions,Municipal Financial Management
Integrated High-Fidelity Planetary Mission Simulators: A Toolkit for Fidelity Evaluation
No full textIntegrated High-Fidelity Planetary Mission Simulators:
A Toolkit for Fidelity Evaluation
Susmita Mohanty
Department of Architecture
Chalmers University of Technology
ABSTRACT
Future missions to deep space or other planets will rely heavily on Planetary Mission Simulators. Simulators will be used to replicate the experience and conditions of such missions as faithfully as possible within terrestrial constraints. Past simulators have largely been partial simulators. They have chosen, perhaps because of complexity, time and cost, to reproduce only a subset of a complete mission. Thus, there exists neither enough literature on high-fidelity integrated full mission simulators nor guidelines and templates on how to set about designing and building one.
The primary goal of this doctoral research is to start filling that void - by proposing a holistic, three-part Fidelity Evaluation Framework: (1) The first is a set of four Checklists spanning key domains of simulator design and operation -- architectural, operational, environmental, and psychological. These Checklists specify various aspects of simulator fidelity for an integrated full mission simulator. Further, for each aspect, the Checklists specify key criteria that need to be met or accounted for. Using these lists, a simulator can be designed, and then evaluated at every stage of development. (2) The second is a Baseline Mission Visualization Tool that helps represent all parts of a reference mission and their interactions using a schematic. Such a schematic lets the simulator team clearly visualize, understand, discuss and track constituent parts of an integrated simulator and their interactions during all phases of simulator design and operations. (3) The third tool facilitates studies of Trade-Offs intrinsic to simulator design and operations, such as between size and weight, and those brought about by resource constraints such as size and duration of project funds.
A broad-based, empirical approach was used in this research to cast a wide net on all aspects of the design and implementation of simulators. The case study method was the dominant methodology employed in the research. An exhaustive survey of past, present and planned simulators was used to understand the historical simulator landscape. Survey data collected from simonauts of different simulators, fidelity data from simonaut diaries, and data from European Space Agency (ESA) studies was triangulated for the first order Fidelity Evaluation Checklist, which was then refined using insights from Simulation Managers of eight different simulation campaigns. A Baseline Mission Visualization Tool and Trade-Off Studies were proposed based on a design study for an integrated full mission simulator that the author and her colleagues conducted for ESA. Ultimately, the framework itself was validated by applying it to a full mission case study simulator.
The framework developed is a toolkit for simulator system architects, simulation planners, managers, operators and controllers. It is meant not so much to be a definitive work as a useful and practical, application-centric beginning in a hitherto unexplored area. It is expected that users of this framework will further develop and improve upon these ideas based on their observations and experiences.
Language: English. ISBN 978-91-7385-197-8, ISSN 0346-718X, ISSN 1650-6340, 2009:02
Distribution: Chalmers Architecture, SE-42 96, Göteborg, Phone: +46-31-772 100
Water pollution abatement by Chinese industry : cost estimates and policy implications
No full textUsing factory-level data provided by China's National Environmental Protection Agency and the Tianjin Environmental Protection Bureau, the authors of this report estimate the costs of water pollution abatement for Chinese industry. Using their econometric results, they analyze the cost-effectiveness of current pollution control policy in China and make the conclusions that follow. (1) For each pollutant, marginal abatement costs exhibit great differences by sector, scale, and degree of abatement. (2) The benefits of stricter discharge standards should be weighed carefully against the costs. (3) Emissions charges as low as $1 per ton would be sufficient to induce 80 percent abatement of suspended solids, chemical oxygen demand, and biological oxygen demand, respectively. (4) The current regulatory system provides an economic incentive to abate by charging a levy on pollution that exceeds the standard. The results of this analysis suggest, however, that changing to a full emissions charge system would greatly reduce overall abatement costs. The approach the authors recommend for measuring the costs of abatement is to use joint abatement cost functions that relate total costs to treatment volume and the simultaneous effect of reductions in suspended solids, chemical oxygen demand, biological oxygen demand, and other pollutants. Tests of alternative functional forms suggest that a simple (constant elasticity) model fits the data as well as a complex (translog) model does, permitting sophisticated policy experiments with relatively simple calculations.Pollution Management&Control,Environmental Economics&Policies,Water and Industry,Sanitation and Sewerage,Water Conservation,Environmental Economics&Policies,Water and Industry,Pollution Management&Control,TF030632-DANISH CTF - FY05 (DAC PART COUNTRIES GNP PER CAPITA BELOW USD 2,500/AL,Sanitation and Sewerage
How adverse selection affects the health insurance market
No full textAdverse selection can be defined as strategic behavior by the more informed partner in a contract against the interest of the less informed partner(s). In the health insurance field, this manifests itself through healthy people choosing managed care and less healthy people choosing more generous plans. Drawing on theoretical literature on the problem of adverse selection in the health insurance market, the author synthesizes concepts developed piecemeal over more than 20 years, using two examples and revisiting the classical contribution of Rothschild and Stiglitz. He highlights key insights, especially from the literature on"equilibrium refinements"and on the theory of"second best."The government can correct spontaneous market dynamics in the health insurance market by directly subsidizing insurance or through regulation; the two forms of intervention provide different results. Providing partial public insurance, even supplemented by the possibility of opting out, can lead to second-best equilibria. The same result holds as long as the government can subsidize contracts with higher-than-average premium-benefit ratios and can tax contracts with lower-than-average premium-benefit ratios. The author analyzes the following policy options relating to the public provision of insurance: a) Full public insurance. b) Partial public insurance with or without the possibility of acquiring supplementary insurance and with or without the possibility of opting out. In recent plans implemented in Germany and the Netherlands, where competition among several health funds and insurance companies was promoted, a public fund was created to discourage risk screening practices by providing the necessary compensation across riks groups. But only"objective"risk adjusters (such as age, gender, and region) were used to decide which contracts to subsidize. Those criteria alone cannot correct the effects of adverse selection. Regulation can exacerbate the problem of adverse selection and lead to chronic market instability, so certain steps must be taken to prevent risk screening and preserve competition for the market. The author considers the following three policy options for regulating the private insurance market: 1) A standard contract with full coverage. 2) Imposition of a minimum insurance requirement. 3) Imposition of premium rate restrictions.Health Economics&Finance,Environmental Economics&Policies,Insurance&Risk Mitigation,Insurance Law,Financial Intermediation
Small and medium-size enterprises in economic development : possiblities for research and policy
No full textThe World Bank's most important long-term advantage in promoting development, says the author, may lie in opportunities to address related obstacles simultaneously. It could mount concurrent efforts to address the problems of small and medium-size enterprises in a particular sector, region, or economy, for example. It could address the conditions of founding new firms, providing finance or technical assistance, developing mutual support institutions, resolving disputes, and perhaps reducing counterproductive government interventions. Were the Bank to follow such a coordinated approach, programs could be designed to generate data to illuminate the impacts and interactions of various elements of policy. These data could be exploited, then, in research designs, or even the design of management information systems, shaped by program evaluation. The author proposes four general issues for research (plus a series of topics for each issue). (1) Can Bank initiatives involving small and medium-size enterprises in developing countries facilitate the entry of these enterprises into similar learning relationships with other firms - foreign firms, larger firms in their own countries, or each other? (2) The economic significance of high"turbulence"(entry and exit rates) in small-firm populations is poorly understood. The fact of high turbulence is well-documented in industrial countries; it is not for developing countries, but available data suggest a broadly similar pattern. Are high failure rates for small businesses symptomatic of an important shortcoming in the system of economic organization itself? Or should the unit of analysis be the enterprise, the entrepreneur, or the entrepreneur's family? (3) Is the apparent trend favoring a larger economic role for smaller production units autonomous rather than induced by other changes? Does it depend on general operating factors such as the declining costs of communication and computation? (4) The rate of learning by a small firm may depend on the nature of its transacting partner. Certain multinational enterprises make good teachers, for example, but certain local labor markets or markets for consumer goods and services may not be well-positioned for relevant learning. They may learn well how to adjust to local circumstances but not to the international diffusion of technology and ways of organizing (the main source of hope for developing countries). Perhaps Bank policy should be more concerned with transaction patterns.General Technology,Environmental Economics&Policies,Decentralization,ICT Policy and Strategies,Small and Medium Size Enterprises,Environmental Economics&Policies,General Technology,Small and Medium Size Enterprises,ICT Policy and Strategies,Small Scale Enterprise
Hungary's bankruptcy experience, 1992-93
No full textHungary adopted a tough new bankruptcy law in late 1991 that took effect on January 1, 1992. It required managers of firms with arrears over 90 days to any creditor to file for either reorganization or liquidation within eight days (the so-called"automatic trigger") and provided a rather sympathetic framework in which to do so. The result: since January 1992, more than 25,000 cases have been filed - far beyond lawmakers'expectations. Both positive and negative views about the law have been expressed, but details about how the process has actually worked have been scarce. The authors help fill this information gap by providing detailed data on a randomly selected stratified sample of actual cases filed in 1992-93, supplemented by information gained through interviews with judges, liquidations, and firms involved in bankruptcy. Their conclusions are as follows. First, the bankruptcy process appears to have had some degree of economic logic in 1992 and 1993. Better firms were more likely to enter and emerge"successfully"from reorganization, while worse firms were more likely either to fail in reorganization or to file directly for liquidation. Second, judicial reorganization need not be slow and costly. The first wave of reorganizations was handled surprisingly quickly, especially considering the sheer number of cases, the novelty of the process, and the shortage of trained judges. This quickness was possible largely because of the decentralized design of the process. Once the court approved a case, the court had little role. (Amendments added in 1993 may have made the process more bureaucratic and expensive). Third, in this sample, major delays occurred not in reorganization but in liquidation. Creditors will do almost anything to avoid filing for liquidation, and once firms enter liquidation they are still likely to be kept alive indefinitely. In the end, this lack of a viable creditor-led"exit"and debt collection mechanism harms firms by increasing the cost and reducing the flow of credit. Fourth, although the bankruptcy process displays some degree of economic logic, one should not assume that it operates as a similar law would in a market economy. In particular, a likely source of private gain in Hungary appears to be asset or other value diversion (or"value-stripping) before bankruptcy. Fifth, the main need is to strengthen the incentives of creditors to monitor the process closely and to improve their ability to do so.Banks&Banking Reform,International Terrorism&Counterterrorism,Strategic Debt Management,Small Scale Enterprise,Small and Medium Size Enterprises,Banks&Banking Reform,Strategic Debt Management,Legal Products,International Terrorism&Counterterrorism,Economic Theory&Research
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